


THE BALANCE SHEET
OF SOVIETISM

BORIS L. BRASOL



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
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**THE BALANCE SHEET
OF SOVIETISM**

THE BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIETISM

By

BORIS L. BRASOL

*Author of "Socialism Vs. Civilization," "The
World at the Crossroads," "Critical Essays," etc.*

Lasciate ogni speranza . . .
DANTE. *Inferno.*

Awake! Arise! Or be forever fallen.
MILTON. *Paradise Lost.*



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FOREWORD

THE tragic fate of Russia has attracted the attention of civilized mankind. Much has been said and written about the amazing degradation of the political, social and economic life of a country which hitherto was justly considered the biggest reservoir of wealth and economic potentiality. In our day the fact can scarcely be denied that Russia's present suffering was caused by and is the direct result of the incompetent and sinister Communist practice wrought upon her people by a small but unscrupulous and closely organized group of professional agitators or incurable theoreticians belonging to the Marxian school.

Idle are the attempts to explain the systematic destruction of Russian economics by the much debated Allied "blockade," or the drought and other meteorological fluctuations, no matter how unfavorable such may have been. At present the most stubborn Socialist adherents are somewhat ashamed to attribute all the blame for the prevailing conditions in Russia to the events and circumstances which have had but an insignificant and rather remote bearing upon the destinies of her people.

During a period of five years the Bolsheviki have been given the chance to work out a practical program for putting their theories into effect. Nor was there lack of effort on their

part to "*Use the weapons of hell to attain the Communist paradise.*" Hell they have attained, while paradise is still to be found in the column of articles lost.

In the case of Russia, the world is witnessing the most complete failure of a governmental system that has ever been recorded in history. Every department of present Russian life distinctly proves the hopelessness of further attempts to erect a stable economic edifice upon the sandy foundations of Marxian principles. On the plains of Russia, Socialism has suffered a defeat so conclusive as to make its recovery impossible. The Soviet leaders themselves have been compelled to admit their failure. Their battle-cry of 1917: "*Proletarians of all countries unite to smash Capitalism,*" has been converted into a new motto: "*Capitalists of all countries unite to save Communism.*"

Having received but little encouragement from international labor, the Red rulers of Russia are now seeking the support of International Finance. Those "who got slapped" by the Russian workers and peasants, have suddenly turned their attention to the pocket-book of the Western Banker. For it is not impossible that short-sighted greed may induce the wealth-owning classes to disastrous endeavors to consolidate the waning power of Communism in Russia. The Genoa and Hague Conferences were early manifestations of this new

policy which may be put in operation on a colossal scale.

But whatever course the dealings with the Soviets may assume, it is apparent that the first stage of the Socialist experiment in Russia has been completed and a new phase is rapidly evolving. With International Finance playing an important part in the future development of Russia, the whole trend of events must necessarily become the joint function of two factors, Communism and Capitalism, seeking to make concessions to each other. Socialists are hoping that these mutual reverences will result in converting Capitalism into mild Communism, while capitalists expect Communism to assume the form of mild Capitalism. In all probability both groups will fail in their expectations as, from a strictly scientific viewpoint, Capitalism and Socialism are phenomena mutually excluding each other.

However, this volume is not intended to deal with the problematic future. Its object is merely confined to an analysis of the actual "achievements" of Communism, in the light of economic and social policies enforced by the Bolsheviki during the whole period of their amazing misrule. In this sense the volume as it stands is nothing but *the balance sheet of Communism*, and it is no fault of ours that the account presents a vivid picture of *fraudulent bankruptcy*.

**THE BALANCE SHEET
OF SOVIETISM**

The Balance Sheet of Sovietism

CHAPTER I

THE SOVIET MACHINE

WHAT is Soviet Russia?*

The average person having but a vague conception of social and political conditions abroad, may give a somewhat evasive answer, stating that Soviet Russia is a part of the territory of the former Russian Empire, throughout which chaos reigns, and where nothing but instability is stable.

To a certain degree such a definition would be accurate for it cannot be denied that the November revolution of 1917 did turn things upside down in Russia. The moment the Bolsheviks placed themselves in the saddle of governmental power, they began issuing numerous decrees and regulations, the chief purpose of which was to tear history out of Russia's heart,

* The word "Soviet" is derived from the Russian, meaning *Council*. In the modern sense it is used to describe a form of revolutionary organization and is more specifically applied to the organization of the Communist Governments which were set up in different countries during the years following the World War. The specific meaning attached to the word "Soviet" dates its origin back to 1905, the time of the first outbreak of the revolutionary movement in Russia, when the extremist leaders in Petrograd and other Russian cities induced the industrial workers and employees to elect their representatives to the Central Council or Soviet, an institution which was designed to control the revolutionary movement.

causing the ruin of a social and political order which had stood solid for many centuries in the past. There was a real epidemic of "abolitions" of every kind. Everything that went to make up Russian statesmanship, history, economics, and national spirit, was overnight denounced, eliminated, abolished, torn into pieces, or otherwise destroyed, for the sake of erecting "a new social order" along the lines of Karl Marx's doctrine.

The feverish haste with which the historical foundations of Russian culture were annihilated by the Reds was bound to result in confusion and general chaos. The vast majority of the people were utterly stupefied at this work of colossal destruction, ostensibly undertaken in their name, on their behalf, and of their own volition. So great was the consternation among the peaceful population that at first nobody seemed to have the courage to protest against the unparalleled violation of the sovereign rights of an independent nation, perpetrated by a clique of irresponsible internationalists and political lunatics.

It was not until the early part of 1918 that the people began to revolt against the tyranny suddenly forced upon them.

Still it would be a mistake to infer that the Communist misrule during that period was solely confined to destruction, because the very system of terror and oppression, used as a

weapon against the nation, necessitated the immediate establishment of an elaborate administrative apparatus bearing all the typical marks of bureaucratic management. On the other hand, the Communist regime, being a Socialist undertaking, adopted as its first measure the seizure of other people's property, declaring production and distribution the business of the State. Therefore, it became the business of the State to build up a machinery adapted to control all economic functions. This, in turn, required something in the nature of a constitution, or some kind of fundamental laws, proscribing technical methods and means for governing a country with over 100,000,000 inhabitants, and with an area almost four times as large as the United States.

The Socialist adherents who stood behind the Communist revolution in Russia were naturally faithful disciples of Karl Marx. It was their great ambition to follow Marx's political alphabet as closely as possible. No wonder, therefore, that the fundamental aims of the so-called Soviet constitution fully coincide with those outlined by Marx over seventy years ago. His first concern was to *destroy* the "bourgeois society" founded on the principles of private property. As a means thereto, he advocated the "*forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions,*" the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, and "the expropriation of the ex-

propriators." He also strongly emphasized that a Communist revolution would necessarily entail a merciless war against the wealth-owning classes. On this subject Marx, indeed, used plain language when he concluded his Communist Manifesto with the daring threat: "*Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution.*" To make the Communist program more appealing to the masses of the people, Marx sweetened the social panacea thus prescribed with the promise that:

"In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

Quite in accordance with these cardinal principles, the immediate purposes for establishing the "Russian Republic of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" were thus defined by Lenin and his associates:

"The abolition of the exploitation of men by men, the entire abolition of the division of the people into classes, the suppression of exploiters, the establishment of a Socialist society, and the victory of Socialists in all lands, * * * *"

This statement is embodied in the "*Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People*" which forms part of the Soviet constitution.

In order to draw a comprehensive picture of the present conditions in Russia, giving a precise answer to the question, "What is Soviet Russia?", it is essential to analyze the laws and regulations which form the basis of the Soviet system. In this connection it must be remembered that the "fundamental law" of the Soviet Republic consists of a series of separate statutes or administrative acts which were either first adopted or merely confirmed by the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918. The Soviet "constitution" in this shape contains five parts, divided into seventeen chapters, and subdivided into ninety paragraphs. Summarizing its distorted features, it may be noted that only two specific objects are set forth for the Communists to achieve: First, the *organization of a Socialist society in Russia*; and, second, a *Socialist victory in all lands*.

While the first aim is confined to Russia proper, the second applies to the world at large, involving all other countries in a revolutionary upheaval, thereby enacting a world drama, the prologue of which was staged on Russian soil. This proves that the Soviet régime is not merely a local matter restricted to Russian domains. On the contrary, the Soviet "constitution" itself contains a specific provision entitling the present rulers of Russia to intermeddle with political affairs all over the world,

fostering revolutionary mischief and conducting systematic propaganda undermining legally constituted governments, in lieu of which they are pledged to introduce a standardized social order as decreed by Marx.

Having thus defined their general aims, the Soviets further sought to devise a practical plan enabling them to proceed with the actual realization of their schemes. In this respect too the fundamental laws of the Soviet Republic differentiate between two lines of measures, one of which is calculated to effect the desired social change in Russia, while the other is intended to win foreign countries over to the Socialist program.

These two categories of measures are here analyzed separately.

LOCAL MEASURES

The sweeping character of the Socialist *coup d'etat* in Russia is best illustrated by a mere reference to such paragraphs of the Soviet "constitution" as were designed to bring about a radical change in her social structure. On the other hand, the fact that the Communist leaders in their task were blindly following Karl Marx is clearly demonstrated by a comparison of the Soviet provisions with the revolutionary program outlined by Marx in his Communist Manifesto.

"DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE LABORING AND EXPLOITED PEOPLE."

THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO OF KARL MARX. Pages 41-42.*

"Clause 3:

"(a) For the purpose of attaining the socialization of land, all private property in land is abolished, and the entire land is declared to be national property and is to be apportioned among agriculturists without any compensation to the former owners, in the measure of each one's ability to till it."

"(b) All forests treasures of the earth, and waters of general public utility, all equipment whether animate or inanimate, model farms and agricultural enterprises, are declared to be national property."

"(c) As a first step toward complete transfer of ownership to the Soviet Republic of all factories, mills, mines, railways, and other means of production and transportation, the Soviet law for the control by workmen and the establishment of the Supreme Soviet of

"Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes."

"Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State."

"Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State."

* * * *

* Charles H. Kerr & Company, Chicago.

National Economy is hereby confirmed, so as to insure the power of the workers over the exploiters.

“(e) The transfer of all banks to the ownership of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, as one of the conditions of the liberation of the toiling masses from the yoke of capital, is confirmed.”

“(f) Universal obligation to work is introduced for the purpose of eliminating the parasitic strata of society and organizing the economic life of the country.”

“Centralization of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.”

“Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.”

In other words, the Marxian program is reflected as in a mirror, in the Soviet “constitution,” with the distinction that while Marx is brief and explicit in his statements, the modern Communists resort to demagogic eloquence. There is only one idea in the Soviet Declaration that has not been directly borrowed from Marx, that is the provision to build up a Socialist army, simultaneously disarming the wealth-owning classes. The provision thereto reads verbatim:

“For the purpose of securing the working class in the possession of complete power, and in order

to eliminate all possibility of restoring the power of the exploiters, it is decreed that all workers be armed and that a Socialist Red Army be organized and the propertied class disarmed."

These measures logically lead up to the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship which is specifically described in paragraph 9 of the "constitution":

"The fundamental problem of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic involves, in view of the present transition period, *the establishment of a dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful all-Russian Soviet authority*, for the purpose of abolishing the exploitation of men by men and of introducing Socialism, in which there will be neither a division into classes nor a state of autocracy."

This stipulation leaves no doubt as to the character of Bolshevik rule. It proclaims a principle which is entirely alien to the conception of modern democracy, namely, a deliberate attempt to institute class rule, the rule of a single proletarian class over the rest of the population. Liberals and Soviet sympathizers in this country and elsewhere have devoted special efforts to prove that the Soviet régime in its actual workings hardly differs from the basic methods of democratic government. Mr. Morris Hillquit has gone so far as to assert that:

"In all kindness to our comrades in Russia,

* * * they do not have a dictatorship of the proletariat. *The Soviet Government is neither a dictatorship nor a rule of the proletariat. That does not make it any less dear to us.*"

On this point, however, Mr. Hillquit differs with "Comrade" Lenin, who, to the great disappointment of his parlor Bolshevist friends abroad, explicitly states:

*"When at war we use military methods. We don't promise any liberty nor any democracy."**

In the light of paragraph 9 of the Declaration, and Lenin's own assertion, it is apparent how hopeless are the endeavors to present the Soviet rule in the form of a "real democracy," with a slight admixture of mild Socialism and a pinkish shade of modern radicalism. The truth must be clearly understood: The Bolsheviks did set up in Russia a class dictatorship—rather a class tyranny. It is all the more cruel as the total number of industrial workers in Russia did not exceed, even in pre-war times, 5,000,000, or less than 31½ per cent. of the total population. Moreover, if it is conceivable for an enlightened minority to rule over a majority of highly ignorant people, it is quite insane to entrust the reins of governmental power to a small group of inefficient and illiterate manual

* Compare Lenin's address at the Third Congress of the Communist Internationale, as quoted in No. 18 of the "Communist Internationale," p. 4504. Moscow, October, 1921. Translated from the Russian.

workers, giving them unrestricted authority to use and abuse the entire political and economic apparatus.

This, however, is precisely what happened in Russia. For the American mind, and for those who have been brought up in sympathy with the republican ideal, the term "*Soviet Republic*" is obviously misleading, for the kind of régime that was established in Russia in consequence of the Communist revolution has nothing in common with modern conceptions of the republican form of government. The historical tendency of constitutional practice evolved a condition which made it possible for the majority of the people to participate either directly or indirectly in the administration of State affairs. The Soviet "constitution," on the contrary, deliberately prevents vast multitudes of the Russian population from taking any part in political life. For instance, on the strength of Clause 65 of the Bolshevist fundamental law, the following social groups enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for:

- (a) Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an increase in profits.
- (b) Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, receipts from property, etc.
- (c) Private merchants, trade and commercial brokers.
- (d) Monks and clergy of all denominations.

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- (e) Employees and agents of the former police, as well as members of the former reigning dynasty.
- (f) Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship.
- (g) Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their rights of citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses, for the period fixed by the sentence."

Even a superficial analysis of this clause proves that millions of Russian peasants employing hired labor, besides great numbers of those involved in commercial intercourse, must be forced out of political activities of any kind. The class tyranny established in Russia is further emphasized in the provision of the Soviet "constitution" declaring:

" * * * During the progress of the decisive battle between the proletariat and its exploiters, the exploiters shall not hold a position in any branch of the Soviet Government. The power must belong entirely to the toiling masses and to their plenipotentiary representatives—the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies." (Clause 7.)

On the other hand, the same policy is followed in Clause 14 which pertains to the principle of the freedom of the press. We quote it verbatim:

"For the purpose of securing freedom of ex-

pression to the *toiling masses*, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic abolishes all dependence of the press upon capital, and turns over to the *working people and the poorest peasantry* all technical and material means for the publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books, etc., and guarantees their free circulation throughout the country."

This also applies to the right to hold meetings and form organizations, societies and various associations. In every instance these rights are granted "to the working class and poorest peasantry" only. Even regarding education, about which boudoir Bolsheviks have babbled so much, the Soviet "constitution" conclusively proves that the acquirement of knowledge is considered the exclusive privilege of the proletariat, while all other classes are left to grope in darkness. The text of Clause 17 reads:

"For the purpose of guaranteeing to the *workers* real access to knowledge, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic sets itself the task of furnishing full and general free education to the *workers and the poorest peasantry.*"

What the Bolsheviks actually meant by the term "full and general free education," is explained in a resolution adopted by the Eighth Convention of the Russian Communist Labor Party. This document is of great interest, especially in America where Soviet sympathizers

systematically allude to the so-called "educational achievements" of the Soviet régime. It is, therefore, proper to quote it at length. Referring to the methods to be used for the education of the poorest peasantry, the resolution contains the following:

"For the purpose of educational activities in the villages the following elements must co-operate:

1. Communistic propaganda;
2. General education;
3. Agricultural education.

"Political propaganda in the villages must be carried on among the literate peasants as well as among the illiterate.

"The propaganda among the literate must consist first of all in the distribution of popular literature and newspapers of a *communistic character, specially prepared for this purpose*. Such literature must be sold at very low prices in schools, reading huts and in all Soviet stores. * * * The courses for children, and especially those for adults—the academic as well as the special (agricultural for instance), must include: (1) popular history of culture from a *scientific socialistic* point of view and with a specially prepared part devoted to Russian history and to the history of the Great Russian Revolution; (2) the interpretation of the Soviet constitution. For both of these courses proper text-books are to be prepared immediately.

"*The teachers are obliged to look upon themselves as upon agents not only of a general but also of a communistic education.*

“In this respect they must be subjected to the control of their immediate heads, as well as the local party organizations. Moving picture houses, theatres, concerts, exhibitions, etc., inasmuch as they will reach the villages (and all effort is to be exerted for this purpose), must be utilized for communistic propaganda directly, i.e., through the upkeep of these and also by way of combining these with lectures and meetings.”

Analogous principles are recommended for *general education*, the Bolsheviki taking particular care to have it serve the purpose of spreading Communistic ideas among the unenlightened masses of the Russian people.

“General education”—thus further runs the text of the resolution—“within school and outside of school including artistic education: theatres, concerts, motion pictures, exhibitions, etc., endeavoring not only to shed the light of a varied knowledge on the dark villages, *but primarily to aid in the creation of self-consciousness and of a clear conception of things, must be closely connected with the communistic propaganda.*”*

Adding to this, the provision of the Bolshevik constitution, stipulating that all workers be armed and the wealth-owning classes disarmed, we have in brief an accurate picture of the internal policies adopted by the Soviets to force upon the Russian people an unparal-

* This resolution was first published in the official Bolshevik “*Northern Commune*,” in its issue of April 6, 1919, and republished in *Soviet Russia* of New York on July 12, 1919, pp. 13 and 14.

leled tyranny. The result is that an insignificant minority is ruling over the overwhelming majority of the population. The Soviet decrees and regulations, having been applied to every-day life, produced in Russia a reign of terror, a proletarian dictatorship in its precise sense, with hopeless demagogues and worshippers of Marx experimenting on a great nation and making constructive progress absolutely impossible.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Bolshevist constitution contains a number of provisions directly bearing upon the Soviet foreign policy. Contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, almost barring America from participating in international affairs, the Communist rulers have laid particular stress upon the necessity for Russia to interfere with matters having no relation whatsoever to her internal situation as such.

Faithful to the principles of Karl Marx, who, in his "*Communist Manifesto*," urged the Socialists to "Everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the social and political order of things," the Bolsheviki explicitly stated, making it one of the cardinal points of their program, that they aim at "The victory of Socialists in all lands." Accordingly, they have a special chapter in the "Declaration of

Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People" entirely dealing with the methods for fostering revolutionary activities abroad. Using bombastic language, they declare:

"Expressing its fixed resolve to liberate mankind from the grip of capital and imperialism, which flooded the earth with blood in its present most criminal of all wars, the Third Congress of Soviets fully agrees with the Soviet Government in its policy of abrogating secret treaties, of organizing on a wide scale the fraternization of the workers and peasants of the belligerent armies, and of making all efforts to conclude a general democratic peace without annexations or indemnities, upon the basis of the free determination of peoples."

The determination to liberate mankind is of course very laudable. But is mankind prepared, or has it manifested a desire to be liberated by or rather to fall under the yoke of the Soviets? Each nation cherishes its own ideals and methods of government, and in no way is it bound to accept—at least without vigorous resistance—the principles of the Marxian theory, or any other theory, that might be forced upon it from the outside. The Soviets, however, have proclaimed it their task not only to liberate mankind, which falls within the range of political lyrics, but also to pursue the specific policy of sowing discord among the so-called oppressed peoples. Clause 5 of the

“constitution” is the nucleus of a disastrous undertaking known as “The Scheme of the Red East,” which will be treated in another chapter. It reads:

“It is also to this end that the Third Congress of Soviets insists upon putting an end to the barbarous policy of the bourgeois civilization which enables the exploiters of a few chosen nations to enslave hundreds of millions of the working population of Asia, of the colonies, and of small countries generally.”

Now, it may be true that Belgian rule in the Congo, or the British régime in India, or the United States policy in Haiti, do not conform with the sublime standards of statesmanship; but the question is why these and similar digressions from the ideal should be a matter of concern for the Bolsheviki in Russia? No self-respecting State can nor will tolerate interference with its internal policies by an outside power. As a general rule, such interference constitutes a *casus belli* and is liable to cause grave international disturbances. This, however, is the very thing that the Soviets are trying to bring about in order to accelerate the process of world revolution, which they hope will culminate in a Socialist victory throughout all lands. In this sense the Bolshevik foreign policy is a shrewdly preconceived plot against civilization at large.

As to the Bolshevik policy for the dismemberment of the Russian Empire, it had its inception in the Soviet constitution itself. Clause 6 proclaims "the full independence of Finland," which had been a Russian province ever since 1809. The same article declares the principle of "self-determination" for Armenia. It is a matter of historical record that the Soviets recognized the "independence" of "Ukrainia" which for centuries had been an organic part of Russia, its capital, Kiev, being justly called "The Mother of Russian cities." In further adherence to this policy, the Bolsheviks engineered the disintegration of the Caucasus, setting up mushroom republics, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Their program of self-disintegration was extended as far East as the Transbaikal region, where they established the so-called "Far Eastern Republic," thus splitting up the basic Russian territory into numerous insignificant state communities, deprived of independent economic resources and without any historical foundation.

After the inevitable collapse of the Soviet régime, decades, if not centuries, will be required to bring together these dissected territories and once more restore the unity of the Russian Nation.

Quite in line with the avowed precepts of Bolshevik foreign policy is also the demand expressed by the Fifth All-Russian Congress

of Soviets that "The annulment of loans made by the Government of the Czar, by landowners and the bourgeoisie" be firmly upheld, giving new impetus to the "Final victory of the international workers' revolt against the oppression of capital."

The repudiation of Russia's foreign debt was and still remains one of the main obstacles to the recognition of the Soviet régime by western powers. It is true that this obstacle was cleverly used by the Soviet leaders in their historical controversy with western Europe at the time of the deliberations at Genoa. England and France set forth the motto: "*We will recognize you if you will recognize Russia's foreign debt*"; the Soviet answer to this being, "*We will recognize Russia's foreign debt if you will recognize us.*" In a way, this controversy is quite groundless for no matter whether the Bolsheviki will or will not agree to pay, the whole bargain has but a theoretical significance. Funds are not available in Russia to meet foreign obligations. Moreover, Tchicherin, the Soviet spokesman at the Genoa Conference, implied that the recognition of her international obligations is conditioned upon obtaining a huge gold loan from those very countries to which she is now indebted. And then such a loan would mean a new asset for world revolutionary propaganda. At this place we merely touch upon this question, but in one of the sub-

sequent chapters the Soviet foreign policy will be analyzed at greater length.

Such in substance are the principles of the Soviet "constitution" in its two phases, dealing both with the internal conditions wrought upon Russia by the Communist régime, and its attitude toward international affairs.

SOVIET ORGANIZATION

It now becomes important to give a brief sketch of the organization of Soviet institutions, since much of the present plight in Russia is directly due to the incompetent manner in which the Bolsheviki sought to solve administration problems. So far as political generalities were concerned, the Soviet leaders could borrow their knowledge from Karl Marx, and this they have done to the utmost. But when it came to actually building up an apparatus adapted to govern a country, not only regulating its political activities but also supervising the whole gamut of economic functions, the Communists most emphatically revealed their inefficiency.

According to the Soviet "constitution," the supreme power in Bolshevist Russia is vested in "The All-Russian Congress of Soviets" (Clause 25). This institution is composed of representatives of urban Soviets, one representing 25,000 voters, and of provincial delegates

who are elected to the All-Russian Congress by Provincial Soviet Congresses (one delegate for every 125,000 inhabitants).

The All-Russian Congress is convoked by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee at least twice a year. (Clause 26.) The All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, composed of not more than 200 members. Clause 29 provides that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "is entirely responsible to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets," but the subsequent clause establishes the rule that "In the periods between the convocation of the Congresses, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the supreme power of the Republic." There is further an obvious contradiction between Clause 24, vesting the supreme power of the State in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and Clause 31 reading:

"The All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the supreme legislative, executive, and controlling organ of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic."

The analysis of the subsequent article, describing the authority of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, shows that as a matter of fact the actual governmental power is entrusted to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and *not* to the All-Russian Con-

gress of Soviets. Among other rights belonging to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, this body has the right to appoint the so-called "Council of People's Commissars for the purpose of general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic." (Clause 35.)* The Central Executive Committee also forms departments (People's Commissariats) for the purpose of conducting various governmental branches.

To make the confusion complete, the Soviet "constitution" embodies two articles which we also quote verbatim:

"Clause 37. The Council of People's Commissars is entrusted with the general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

"Clause 38. For the accomplishment of this task the Council of People's Commissars issues decrees, resolutions, orders, and, in general, takes all steps necessary for the proper and rapid conduct of governmental affairs."

Thus, the poor Soviet citizen is at once confronted with three supreme governmental powers:

- (a) The All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
- (b) The All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
- (c) The Council of People's Commissars.

* The Council of People's Commissars is an institution similar to the Cabinet or Council of Ministers.

Each one of these institutions issues decrees and resolutions; each one of them is entitled to direct "in a general way" the affairs of the Soviet Utopia; and each one of them is dependent upon the other two. Although the All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, nevertheless it is the All-Russian Central Executive Committee that convokes into session the All-Russian Congress, each body acting simultaneously as the chief executive and the chief legislative organ of the State. On the other hand, while the central Executive Committee is ostensibly responsible to the All-Russian Congress, there is no way of determining to which of the several All-Russian Congresses the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is responsible, for there is no logical sequence in the personnel of the All-Russian Congresses. Furthermore, because the term of service of the Central Executive Committee is not specifically defined in the constitution, there might arise a condition which would make the Central Executive Committee responsible to four or five successive All-Russian Congresses. This would mean that the Central Executive Committee is practically responsible to none of them.

But the legal muddle does not end here. Both the All-Russian Congress and the Central Executive Committee, besides exercising executive and legislative rights, are also given author-

ity to act as the supreme judicial organs of the State. These two bodies combine in a most peculiar manner the three functions of government: Legislative, executive and judicial. Such an organization of the Central apparatus inevitably results in a hopeless confusion of all governmental affairs and in the complete immunity of governmental officials.

Next comes the inter-relation between the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

The Council of People's Commissars is responsible both to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. All orders "of great political significance" are referred for consideration and final approval to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. However, measures requiring immediate action may be decreed directly by the Council of People's Commissars. In point of fact, matters requiring immediate action are usually those bearing "great political significance." Thus one provision practically nullifies the other, making it impossible to ascertain where the authority of the Council ends and that of the Central Executive Committee begins.

Still further conflict is caused by the provision requiring that every People's Commissar be assisted by a Committee of which he is president, while its members are appointed by the

Council of People's Commissars. The rôle of these "assisting" Committees is rather an amusing one, as the People's Commissar "Has the individual right to decide on all questions under the jurisdiction of his Commissariat," his only duty being to report his decision to the members of the Committee. If any of them happen to disagree with the Commissar, they may "without stopping the execution of the decision, complain of it to the executive members of the Council of People's Commissars or to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee."

The desperately bureaucratic character of the Soviet Central machinery is also demonstrated by the fact that there are as many as seventeen different People's Commissars and People's Commissariats, each one of them having its special Commissariat "Collegium." The following are the departments enumerated in the Soviet constitution: (Clause 43.)

- "(a) Foreign Affairs.
- (b) Army.
- (c) Navy.
- (d) Interior.
- (e) Justice.
- (f) Labor.
- (g) Social Welfare.
- (h) Education.
- (i) Post and Telegraph.
- (j) National Affairs.
- (k) Finances.

- (l) Ways of Communication.
- (m) Agriculture.
- (n) Commerce and Industry.
- (o) National Supplies.
- (p) State Control.
- (q) Supreme Soviet of National Economy.
- (r) Public Health."

In addition, there is the "All-Russian Extraordinary Committee for Combatting Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Sabotage," commonly known as the "Cheka," which actually rules over the All-Russian Congresses, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the People's Commissars and Commissariats, and which controls the principal domain of Soviet activity—*terror*.

On the question of jurisdiction of the All-Russian Congress and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Communists became so befuddled that they practically gave up the attempt to draw a line of demarcation between the respective authority of the two institutions. They merely go on enumerating, under one clause, the different matters with which these two organs are entitled to deal:

"The All-Russian Congress *and* the All-Russian Central Executive Committee deal with questions of State, such as:

- (a) Ratification and amendment of the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

- (b) General direction of the entire interior and foreign policy of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (c) Establishing and changing boundaries, also ceding territory belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (d) Establishing boundaries for regional Soviet unions belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, also settling disputes among them.
- * * * * *
- (h) Foreign relations, declaration of war, and the *ratification of peace treaties*.
- (i) Making loans, signing commercial treaties and financial agreements.
- * * * * *
- (k) Approval of the budget of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic." (Clause 49.)

And so on.

However, modifying the above stipulations, Section 51 draws a distinction between the jurisdiction of the All-Russian Congress and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, giving the former exclusive right to amend the fundamental principles of the Soviet constitution and also to ratify peace treaties.

The Bolshevik leaders did not confine themselves to a description of the Central Soviet apparatus. They devoted three chapters to the organization of local Soviets. Without going into its details, it must be noted that the Local Soviet power is roughly divided into two branches, one administered by the *Congresses*

of the Local Soviets and the other acting under the authority of the *Local Soviets of Deputies*.

There are four categories of Congresses of Local Soviets:

- (a) *Regional*—formed of representatives of the urban and county Soviets. (One representative for 25,000 inhabitants of the county and one representative for 5,000 voters in the cities.) These Soviets must not exceed 500 members.
- (b) *Provincial*—composed of representatives of urban and rural Soviets. (One representative for 10,000 inhabitants from the rural districts and one representative for 2,000 voters in the cities.) The number of members of this category must not exceed 300.
- (c) *County*—these Congresses are composed of representatives of rural Soviets, one delegate for each 1,000 inhabitants but not more than 300 delegates for the entire county.
- (d) *Rural*—composed of representatives of all village Soviets belonging to one *volost*.*

Every Congress of Soviets (Regional, Provincial, County and Rural) elects its own Executive Committee, varying in number from 10 to 25. The structure and authority of the Local Executive Committees are similiar to those of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Aside from these bodies, there are the so-

* Smallest Russian administrative division.

called *Soviets of Deputies*, both in the cities and other settlements (towns, villages, hamlets, etc.). The number of deputies in such Soviets varies from three to fifty for each settlement. The term of service of the deputies is three months. Therefore, in practice Soviet citizens are continuously kept busy electing deputies to Soviets of different denominations. This electoral epidemic is assuredly not contributing to the stability and efficiency of the Soviet system at large.

The very spirit of the Bolshevik constitution relating to organization of the Central and Local Soviet authority is liable to encourage the almost endless multiplication of Soviet institutions which, in turn, gives birth to an almost unlimited number of Soviet bureaucrats. This fact is admitted even by the Soviet leaders themselves. To give only one instance of the prevailing condition we cite No. 282 of the official Bolshevik organ, the *Petrograd Pravda* for 1920. Therein reference is made to a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, bearing the official title, "*Regulations for the Stabilization and Improvement of the Peasants' Household.*" For the purpose of putting it into effect, the Council of People's Commissars decided to establish the following Soviets:

1. In every province and county a "*Sowing Soviet*" is composed of not more than five members whose duty it is to supervise the

- sowing in the respective provinces and counties.
2. For discussing the measures proposed by the Sowing Soviets, special "*Agricultural Soviets*" are instituted, comprising members of the Sowing Soviets, Regional Soviets, Peasants' Committees, etc.
 3. In order further to expedite the agricultural work, special *Rural Soviets* are formed.
 4. Finally, general supervision of the activities of the three above-named categories of Soviets is vested in the *Provincial Soviet* which has authority to issue its own special decrees, cancelling those set forth by other Sowing Soviet organizations.

This is a typical illustration of the amazing inefficiency of the Communist liberators of mankind. No wonder that the Bolsheviki themselves are quite alarmed at the bureaucratic marasmus penetrating the whole Soviet system. So, in the Bolshevik *Pravda* (No. 105, 1919) the following confession is made:

"World history has never known an example of such endless dawdling, combined with such an enormous number of employees, as we have it in our Soviet institutions."

The governmental routine in Soviet Russia is quite irritating. To obtain any kind of information, or to have anything done through Soviet officials, one has to visit dozens of different departments, chanceries, and offices, sometimes located in different parts of the city, without

even a remote chance of ultimately obtaining the information needed. In Moscow alone, out of the total population not exceeding 900,000, there are 400,000 Soviet employees. One and the same paper, before being issued by this or that Soviet, must have the signatures of scores of Soviet parasites, every one of whom revises the decision of the preceding signer. Foreigners who have been admitted to Soviet Russia have presented long accounts of fabulous disorder reigning in Communist chanceries. An Italian writer, Magrini, once had the misfortune to buy a couple of photographs relating to revolutionary events from one of the Soviet photograph institutions. This is what happened:

“In order to pay 1200 rubles, this being the price of the photographs, I was compelled to waste two hours visiting *three* Auditing Departments, which issued *six* receipts. Three of these receipts were retained by me, while I was instructed to present two copies to different Accounting Departments; and, finally, the last copy was turned over by me to the cashier.”*

Because the Soviet constitution fails to properly define the jurisdiction of the various departments within the Central apparatus, none of the Soviet bureaucrats seems to know pre-

* Compare F. A. Shcherbina: “*Laws of Evolution and Bolshevism*,” Belgrade, Ed. 1921. Translated from the Russian.

cisely what their rights and duties are. The situation is all the more trying as the inter-relation between the Central Government and Local Soviet organs remains quite obscure. The Soviet constitution contains no provisions whatsoever which would serve as a criterion for a comprehensive answer as to where the authority of the local institutions ceases and the jurisdiction of the Central Government begins. The result is that chaos and astounding disorganization are the rule throughout the Soviet offices and in all governmental affairs.

Truly, Lenin and Bronstein, Apfelbaum and Finkelstein are cunning babblers. Their eloquence at times is most convincing. They talk their audiences almost to death. But efficient work and practical achievement, elementary knowledge and similar bourgeois "inventions" are not within their realm. They seek to capture the imagination of the people by revolutionary phraseology and cascades of demagogic rhetoric. They hypnotize. They mislead. They deride. They poison minds with vain promises and political illusions. They undermine the very foundations of common sense, morality and faith. They talk and talk, achieving nothing but destruction. To use Hegel's expression, they practice the most cruel policy: "*From nothing, through nothing, to nothing,*" and it is not surprising that such tactics have brought Russia to misery and ruin.

CHAPTER II

THE LAND PROBLEM IN RUSSIA

THE land problem in Russia is the keynote to the whole Russian situation. This is explained by the fact that Russia is a typical agricultural country.

Even in good old prosperous times, that is, prior to the revolution, Russia's industrial level was rather low, while not less than 80% of the entire population was engaged in agricultural pursuit. The Russian agricultural output was enormous, reaching, in 1910, a total of \$4,100,000,000; this in spite of the comparatively backward technique of land-tilling processes. Not only was Russia a self-supporting country, from the point of view of her food supply, but heavy agricultural export formed the basis of her prosperous trade balance with foreign countries.

Astounding miscomprehension has been displayed by many foreign authors who undertook to render judgment on the real land conditions in Imperial Russia. The general conception of such critics was largely based upon hearsay accounts of the "terrible oppression" endured by Russian peasants, of the alleged despotic attitude of the former land nobility toward the small farmers, and similar stories. Some Socialist writers went so far as to assert that the

Russian peasants had never been landowners and never could own the land, as the entire agricultural area was owned either by the nobility or by the State. Statements of this kind have been systematically disseminated from decade to decade, with the result that public opinion in western countries, and more particularly in America, accepted this as a true picture of the land situation.

In point of fact, the whole problem was grossly misrepresented. Yet a clear understanding of Russian agrarian relationship is so important that a few statistical data bearing upon the question will not be out of place.

On February 19, 1861—that is to say, two years before the abolition of slavery in the United States—over 20,000,000 Russian peasants were liberated from bondage by Emperor Alexander II. The manifesto liberating the peasants was accompanied by an act granting to them 111,628,506 dessiatines,* or 318,257,527 acres of land suitable for tilling. This land was made the property of the peasants. Every one of the 8,450,782 peasant farms contained an average of 13 dessiatines, or 37.18 acres. According to official statistics of 1878, the whole acreage of arable land in European Russia was 377,020,161 dessiatines, which were distributed in the following way:

* A Russian *dessiatine* is equal to 2.86 acres.

	DESSIATINES
State, Church and Municipal Institutions	166,317,099
Peasants	121,726,820
Nobility	73,163,744
Other Castes	15,812,498

Now it becomes important to demonstrate the gradual increase in peasant land ownership:

1861	111,628,506	Dessiattines
1878	121,726,820	“
1905	167,760,289	“
1917 (January 1)....	188,000,000	“

In other words, *prior to the revolution*, the peasants in European Russia owned, on the basis of private property, almost 50 per cent. of the entire available acreage.

Such are the main facts regarding the distribution of lands in Russia. Thus the historical tendency of agrarian relationship assumed the following features:

- (a) The gradual transference of the agricultural acreage to the peasants and small farmers.
- (b) The diminishing of lands owned by the nobility.
- (c) The gradual but systematic increase in the small farms and a corresponding decrease in the acreage of large estates.

This complex process obviously stood in contradiction to the Marxian theory, which affirms that the small farmers are apt to be "swallowed" by the wealthy land owners, forcing the former into the ranks of agrarian proletarians. However, in spite of the fallacy of this assertion, Socialists of all denominations have conducted violent propaganda, urging the peasants to revolt against "the greedy land owner," and to grab his lands, thus escaping the "miserable lot of sinking to the depths of pauperism." Year by year, beginning with the 70's, vicious propaganda of this nature has been on foot. Innumerable Socialist leaflets have been circulated among the Russian peasants, and finally the revolutionists have succeeded in imbuing the minds of the farmers with the deeply rooted belief that the land should belong only to those who till it, and consequently that it was the right of the peasants to take away, by force if necessary, all lands belonging either to the State or the nobility. Instances were frequent when revolutionary agitators, being aware of the unshaken loyalty of the peasants to the Imperial Régime, would approach them with forged manifestos announcing that, although the Czar is willing to cede all the land to the "poor people," he is prevented from so doing by the "tricky nobility."

The results of this propaganda first became apparent in 1905, when the long-expected agra-

rian revolt broke out. At that time the Russian Army was engaged in a difficult struggle against Japan. The attention of the Government was centered on Far Eastern affairs, and the snake of revolutionary intrigue gradually wormed its way to the masses of the people, inciting them to start a rebellion against their "oppressors." The peasants began to destroy large estates, setting fire to the noblemen's country houses, killing the cattle, wrecking agricultural machinery, and murdering the proprietors themselves. Revolutionary outbreaks in different cities accompanied the outrages in rural districts, and this considerably hampered the task of the Government in restoring order. The situation remained grave until the end of 1906. However, with the termination of the Japanese War, Stolypin having become Premier, the revolutionary movement was promptly suppressed. To the great disappointment of all Marxian sympathizers, Stolypin suddenly came out with his brilliant project for an all-embracing agrarian reform, the chief aim of which was to accelerate the process of the peaceful accumulation of land in the peasants' hands. The State was given the right to compel the land owners to sell their estates to the Government, which, in turn, resold the lands thus purchased to the peasants, at prices which were from 50 per cent. to 60 per cent. lower than those prevailing on the market. Stolypin was the soul

and brains of the reform. A man of iron will and boundless devotion to his country, he knew that this measure, if put into practice and made completely effective, would deprive the Socialists of their last weapon of agitation and in this way save Russia from the horrors of "the great and bloodless revolution." Stolypin's reform was a constructive blow to the revolutionary underground and this could not be forgiven by those who were engaged in undermining the greatness of the Russian Empire. The first attempt to murder Stolypin failed. But a few months later he was treacherously assassinated by an alien revolutionist in the city of Kiev. With the death of Stolypin, the great work of agrarian reconstruction lost its impetus. Then came the World War, with all its sufferings and the mechanical displacement of human multitudes. The balance of governmental power was lost, and Russia collapsed under the combined pressure of the German General Staff, International Socialism and International Finance.

The beginning of the agricultural disaster dates back to the Socialist régime of Kerensky. 1917 was a repetition of 1905, only on a larger scale. It was an epoch of wholesale destruction, of baseless hopes placed in the "constructive genius of the liberated people"; it was the honeymoon of the revolution, when political and social mischief of every description was

encouraged by the Provisional Government itself. Private estates were subjected to the most flagrant looting. "*Grab the land!*" became the resounding battle-cry of trouble-makers from all parts of the world, who hastened to invade Russia. Land owners were driven off their estates, their property seized, their families insulted, their art collections destroyed, their houses burned down. The first result of this rapacious policy was an astonishing decrease in the agricultural output in 1917 as compared with preceding years. Instead of 4,627,000,000 poods of grain, yielded in 1916, the total for 1917 fell to 3,866,000,000 poods, showing a decline of 771,000,000 poods. Naturally, this immediately affected the whole scale of food prices. By June, 1918, the average market price of rye flour was 650 to 800 rubles per pood, as compared with the normal price of four to five rubles.

Thus it was during the régime of the Provisional Government that private lands were actually seized by the peasants. By the time Lenin and Trotzky had intervened, the whole agrarian problem was practically "settled." The Bolshevik policy relating thereto was but a continuation of the insane tactics resorted to by the "mild Socialists" of the Kerensky creed. The Soviets made a further endeavor to encourage the complete abolition of private land ownership, substituting for it different kinds of

“collective homesteads in agriculture.” To this end they passed a series of bills and land decrees, all of which were ultimately summarized in one legislative act known as the “Fundamental Law of the Socialization of Land.” It went into effect in September, 1918. Inasmuch as this law is the basis of the whole Soviet policy toward the land problem, it is essential to analyze it at some length.

It must be borne in mind that in spite of repeated announcements in the press about the alleged revision of Soviet tactics, the Communist attitude as regards the agrarian solution has scarcely undergone perceptible changes.

Confirming earlier provisions of the land decree of November 7, 1917, the “Fundamental Law” in Article I proclaims:

“All property rights in the land, treasures of the earth, waters, forests, and fundamental natural resources within the boundaries of the Russian Federated Soviet Republic are abolished.”

Article II further provides:

“The land passes over to the use of the entire laboring population without any compensation, open or secret, to the former owners.”

It is difficult to determine what “entire laboring population” means; but other provisions of the Land Law indicate that the term embraces

“those who till the land by their own labor.”
At least Article XIII specifically states that:

“Personal labor is the general and fundamental source of the right to use the land for agricultural purposes.”

Naturally, the employment of hired labor in agricultural pursuit is prohibited by the law. It is only in exceptional cases that such form of employment is permitted, provided wages are paid by the State and labor is subject to the general rules of the Workmen's Control.

The general tendency of the Land Law is to repress private initiative, depriving those engaged in agriculture of every personal incentive to work and increase the productivity of their efforts. In this connection Article XXI is indicative of the whole Communist psychology. It reads:

“Land is given to those who wish to work it themselves for the benefit of the community and *not for personal advantage.*”

Disregarding the basic laws of social science, which demonstrate the fact that economic progress is largely founded upon the motive of personal gain, the Communists have set forth a principle designed to outwit nature herself. Contrary to reason and deeply rooted human instincts, they believe that an economic system

can be devised in accordance with bureaucratic regulations, eliminating the personal element from the whole range of human relationship. In order to force this abstract theory upon the people, the Land Law further provides that:

“Surplus profits, obtained on account of the natural fertility of the land, or on account of its location near markets, are to be turned over for the benefit of social needs to the organs of the Soviet power.” (Article XVII.)

In addition, the trade in agricultural machinery and in grain, both internal and foreign, is proclaimed the monopoly of the Communist State (Articles XVIII and XIX). This, of course, takes away the last stimulus for thrift and efforts to increase the productivity of labor. It is precisely this provision that led the peasants to widespread opposition to the Soviet régime. The farmers flatly refuse to grow more wheat than actually needed for their personal use.

Owing to the chaotic condition of Soviet statistics, it is impossible to give the exact figures of the decrease in the acreage under cultivation. But it can be asserted that the situation during the whole period of Communist management, in this respect, has been growing from bad to worse. The lands seized from private land owners by the peasants have remained untilled. Aside from that, a vast area

of the peasants' own lands have been abandoned, resulting in a systematic and alarming decline in crops.

As far back as in 1918, in a pamphlet entitled "Struggle Against Hunger," Trotzky frankly admitted the fact that Russia was starving. He cited many wire dispatches received by the Soviet Government, from different parts of the country, in which the food conditions in rural districts were described in the darkest terms. Trotzky, however, did not have the courage to explain the real reason for this condition. He sought to shift the responsibility therefore upon the well-to-do peasants, who, he declared, were the "chief enemies" of the laboring masses. It has always been the policy of the Soviets, while admitting Russia's economic degradation, to attribute the blame to anyone but themselves. The "Allied Blockade," the "greedy foreign capitalists," the "Czarist agents," the "village sharks and innkeepers"—everything was used in the way of argument to justify the horrible plight of the Russian people under the Soviet régime.

What actually happened was that the Soviets found themselves at war with the entire rural population. Communist leaders have often referred to the so-called "selfishness" of the peasants, accusing them of concealing from the State their surplus products. It is true that in many districts the farmers would rather destroy

their crops than surrender them to the Socialist Commissars. The cities controlled by the Bolsheviks declared war against the villages. The villages, in turn, adopted a policy of passive resistance to the Soviet demands. The whole situation became so acute that extraordinary measures were needed to pump the grain out of the farmers. The notorious "food crusades" were offered as a solution of the intolerable food crisis in the cities. These crusades were undertaken both by the Central and Local Soviet authorities, assisted by Red Army detachments. Very often regular battles would take place between the food crusaders and the farmers, followed by wholesale executions of the "defeated counter-revolutionists." Sometimes, in addition, punitive expeditions were dispatched by the Commissars in order to overcome the peasants' opposition. Entire villages were burned down, being destroyed by artillery fire. Fertile regions were devastated by the Red Army, and yet up to the present the Soviets have failed to "conquer" rural Russia.

The Bolshevik press contains but few accounts of the methods which were and still are being used by the Communists in their struggle against the Russian peasants. So, in No. 450 of the "*Izvestia*" of the Central Executive Committee for 1918 we read:

"In Okhansk the punitive detachments are mercilessly punishing the criminals and have exe-

cutted thirty peasants who participated in the counter-revolutionary outbreak."

In issue No. 25 of the same organ for the year 1919, there is this statement:

"The Velij district was in the grasp of a peasants' White Guardist rebellion. The revolt was energetically quelled."

An article in No. 27 of the "*Izvestia*" of the Central Executive Committee for 1918, written by a Communist, Kerjentzev, describes a revolutionary outbreak among the peasants in the Kostroma district. The author briefly remarks:

"The data referring to the peasants' revolt presents a dreadful picture as regards the methods of suppressing it."

But then the Kostroma methods do not differ in the least from those used in other provincial districts.

In No. 71 of the "*Northern Commune*" for 1918 we find:

"Military food detachments invaded the provincial districts with banners displaying the motto:

"*'We will not let the workmen starve from hunger. Merciless war against those who conceal the grain.'*"

According to the same paper, during the first three months of 1919, in one provincial district alone, 255 food crusades were instituted by the Soviets. During the first year of Soviet rule 77,000,000 rubles were levied as fines upon the peasants in consequence of their opposition to the Communist Land Law.

Some of the Bolshevist officials themselves finally became convinced that armed oppression alone is incapable of winning the peasants over to the Communist régime. For instance, the official "*Economicheskaya Jisn*," commenting on a decision adopted by the Congress of Trade Unions, held at Moscow in March, 1919, points out:

"Experience has proven that it is not wise to dispatch armed requisitionary detachments to the rural districts for the results are harmful. The peasants must be approached, not with rifles, but with argument and persuasion. Food detachments alone will not help. The policy must undergo a radical change. Owing to the present policy in regions where the population hitherto never knew what hunger was, now we witness the disappearance of food supplies."

Lenin, who, by his American admirers, is considered the great prophet of the revolution, addressing on March 23, 1919, the Communist Congress at Moscow, emphatically declared:

"It is necessary to win the confidence of the peasants. Up to the present we have been the

pupils of the peasants and not their teachers. There can be nothing more silly than the very idea of violence in the realm of economic relations pertaining to the medium homestead. Here the problem does not consist in the expropriation of the middle-peasantry, but in the necessity of taking into account the peculiar conditions of their life, in the necessity to learn from the peasants the methods of gradually achieving a better order of things and not in 'bossing' them. In this respect, comrades, indeed we have sinned quite a good deal.' ("Izvestia" of the Central Executive Committee, No. 69, 1919.)

Still the conciliatory tone of Lenin's admission in reality meant nothing. It must be remembered that when Lenin speaks, he usually bears western countries in mind. His declamations are calculated to create a favorable impression upon loose-minded liberals on both sides of the water. When, amidst his floods of words, a drop of reason is suddenly discovered, radicals *urbi et orbi* begin to cheer his wisdom, commenting on every dot and comma, and twisting his formulas in ten thousand different ways. A great difference there is, however, between words and deeds. The actual situation in the villages and rural districts in general is vividly described in the "Izvestia" of May 1, 1919. The author of the article, a peasant himself, sends out an S. O. S. in the vain hope that his voice will be heard in the wilderness of the Communist State:

“Help! We are perishing!”—thus reads the article—“At the time when we are starving, do you know what is going on in the villages? Take, for instance, our village, Olkhi. Speculation is rife there, especially with salt, which sells at 40 rubles a pound. What does the militia do? What do the Soviets do? When it is reported to them, they wave their hands and say, ‘This is a normal phenomenon.’ Not only this, but the militiamen, beginning with the chief and including some Communists, are all engaged in brewing their own alcohol, which sells for 70 rubles a bottle. Nobody who is in close touch with the militia is afraid to engage in this work. Hunger is ahead of us, but neither the citizens nor the ‘authorities’ recognize it. The people’s judge also drinks, and if one wishes to win a case one only needs to treat him to a drink. We live in terrible filth. There is no soap. People and horses all suffer from skin diseases. Epidemics are inevitable in the summer. If Moscow will pay no attention to us, then we shall perish.”*

In spite of the complete fiasco of Soviet tactics to bring about, if not peace, then at least a truce, with the Russian peasantry, in spite of Lenin’s admissions and Trotzky’s confessions, the agrarian policy of the Bolsheviki was pursued with remarkable stubbornness. It culminated in the notorious decree of January 27, 1921, which is the prime cause of the appalling famine which Russia is living through

* Quoted from “Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia.” Washington Government Printing Office, 1919, p. 14.

to-day. The main features of this decree can be summed up as follows:

- (a) Sowing the fields is declared everybody's duty to the State. The various Soviet institutions are given the authority to devise plans for the sowing campaigns. They also decide which particular area must be cultivated and what kind of grain must be sown. Individual farmers must comply with this program as a matter of duty to the State.
- (b) The technical methods of tilling the land are also regulated by the Soviets, these regulations being compulsory. Mechanical processes are to be applied to the tilling of land and to sowing the fields.
- (c) The entire crop becomes the property of the State, while the farmer gets only such quantities of grain as are rationed to him by the respective Soviet organs.

It is doubtful if a law more inefficient than this, and less adapted to the realities of life, could be found in the history of legislation.

On its surface it shows marks of hopeless bureaucratic obstinacy and failure to grasp the substance of economic relations. No special mental acumen is required to realize that no government on earth has been or will be powerful enough to regulate the economic activities of every individual citizen, teaching him how best to direct his creative energies, and how to apply his technical ability in solving diverse economic tasks. Even should we, for the sake of argu-

ment, admit that there can be a government strong enough to control the countless individual efforts which go to make up the economic life of a nation, nevertheless, bureaucratic management of this kind would be bound to result in failure because of the inequality of individual faculties. John cannot be made to work equally well, equally efficiently and equally fast as Henry. Besides John and Henry are laboring in different surroundings and under unequal difficulties. Therefore, the *standardization* of their work cannot be achieved no matter how efficient a government is, or how despotic it chooses to be.

Almost immediately after the issuance of the decree of January 27, 1921, Soviet officials began to elaborate their system of compulsory agriculture. On February 8, 1921, mobilization was ordered of all specialists in agriculture, including the former owners of the estates, their superintendents, and persons who had received special training in agricultural colleges. Simultaneously, further recommendations were made for abandoning individual forms of land ownership, and inducing the peasants to adopt *Communal* or *Socialistic* methods of tilling the land. The proposed system provided for the participation of entire peasants' Communes in plowing the soil, while the crops were to be stored in Communal granaries. Besides these stipulations, the decree regulates the method of

distribution of grain among the population. All these combined measures resulted in a further decrease of the area under cultivation, thus preparing the ground for the frightful famine of 1922.

The land policy of the Bolsheviki is probably the greatest blunder in the long series of blunders committed by them since the time they rose to power. Even from this brief sketch of Soviet measures pertaining to rural Russia, it can be seen that the keynote to Communist legislation is the *socialization of land*. This cardinal principal was adopted by the Soviets in full conformity with the theories of Karl Marx. Guided by the avowed intention of working out a model Marxian State, the Bolsheviki made an attempt to force upon 100,000,000 Russian peasants an economic system entirely alien to their psychology and to the whole history of Russian agrarian relations. It was easy in times past to move the peasants to loot and grab the estates belonging to the nobility. Appeals to greed and base instincts usually find prompt response when made to the disorderly and illiterate mob. Nor was it difficult to convince the peasants that if they should seize other peoples' lands, they would increase their own land holdings, thereby getting something for nothing. But when it came to enforce the program of socialization, which necessarily meant the abrogation of all individual titles to

the land, the peasants emphatically declined to give up any of their own holdings, denying the authority of the Communist State to extend its control over the free use of their lands, a right which they had enjoyed in the past.

Despite the numerous Bolshevik decrees "nationalizing" the land "*for the benefit of the entire laboring population,*" the peasants, as a matter of fact, have never given up their property rights in the land, responding to Soviet legislation by a series of revolts against the Communist Commissars. In vain were the attempts to suppress by "direct action" the counter-revolutionary movement spreading all over the rural districts. Those among the Bolsheviks who were familiar with the psychology of the people, understood that it was impossible to carry on a successful warfare against multitudes of rebellious peasants. Of course, Apfelbaum (Zinoviev), the Red dictator of Petrograd, did threaten to murder a large portion of the population of Russia for the sake of putting into effect the Marxian program. It was he who, in 1918, made this infamous statement:

"To overcome our enemies we must have our own Socialist militarism. We must win over to our side 90,000,000 out of 100,000,000 of the population of Russia under the Soviets. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them; they must be annihilated."*

* Speech made by Apfelbaum, reported in the "*Northern Commune,*" September 19, 1918, No. 109.

The more intelligent Bolsheviki, however, insisted upon less brutal and more subtle measures to be employed in the Soviet campaign against the Russian peasants. They accepted the Machiavellian principle: "*Divide et impera*"; in other words, a method of sowing artificial dissension among the peasants themselves. The Soviets have tried to incite the poorer farmers against the well-to-do peasants. For this purpose, they formed, in rural districts, so-called "Beggars Committees," which were designed to become the nuclei of Communist organizations throughout the agricultural regions. These Committees were put in charge of the distribution of food supplies among the rural population, and they were also given authority to supervise the collection of "surplus" food in the villages. This measure, indeed, did help to foster civil strife, causing further confusion among the farmers; but it failed to win the support of the peasantry as a whole to the Soviet régime, as neither the poorer nor the wealthier peasants were persuaded to surrender their lands to the Communist State.

The present situation with regard to the land problem may be summed up as follows:

Nominally, all the land has been nationalized. In reality, however, the peasants persistently cling to their property rights and their legal titles. On the other hand, notwithstanding official encouragement through legislation of Com-

munal or Socialistic methods of cultivation, the land is being tilled according to old customs of individual enterprise. The decree giving the Soviets authority to confiscate the "surplus crops" resulted in an amazing degradation of agriculture as such. It can be asserted that in 1921 the total area under cultivation in European and Asiatic Russia, including "Ukrainia" and Turkestan, did not exceed 25,000,000 dessiatines,* while in Russia proper the gradual reduction of crop areas roughly assumed the following proportions:

1917.....	222,300,000	Acres
1918.....	182,780,000	"
1919.....	140,790,000	"
1920.....	93,860,000	"
1921.....	41,990,000	"†

In famine-stricken regions the area actually sown in 1921 was only 9,789,897 acres as compared with 13,267,270 acres in 1920.‡

* Compare these data with exhaustive statistical research of Professor Pestrjetzky in his monography on the present land conditions in Russia, entitled, "*Around the Land*," pp. 55 to 65, Berlin, 1922, Published in Russian.

† According to Soviet statistics, the total area under cultivation in 1920 was 25 per cent. less than in 1916. This may be true if the whole territory embracing the former Russian Empire is taken into consideration. However, confining the analysis to Russia proper, excluding the Little Russian Governments, or the so-called Ukrainia, we notice a much greater reduction, which is confirmed by data furnished by the Central Soviet Statistical Board, showing the total output in cereals for 1921 amounted to only 32,200,000 tons, which is less than 50 per cent. of the average output for 1910-1914. Compare these data with pamphlet, entitled "*How Bolshevism Wrecked Russia*," a reprint from the "*Morning Post*," London, 1922.

‡ See "*Soviet Russia*," No. 1, January, 1922, p. 7. Published in New York City.

Simultaneously, the food ration throughout the villages decreased in an alarming degree. In the Government of Tula, which is considered a model district from the point of view of yielding tax returns, according to Soviet statistics, in November, 1920, 91 per cent. of the population was living on food substitutes, consisting mainly of wood saw-filings and husks mixed with potatoes. The daily ration in that district in November, 1920, was equal to 2,300 calories; while in February, 1921, it was only 1,502 calories. In the Government of Samara, which in former times was one of the wealthiest agricultural regions, the daily ration in calories for November, 1920, was 2,540, while in February, 1921, it had fallen to 1,700 calories. It will be noted that the normal ration for persons engaged in manual labor is approximately 6,000 calories per day.

Further light is thrown upon the extent of agricultural disintegration by figures showing the extermination of horses in Soviet Russia:

1918.....	24,000,000 Horses
1919.....	9,500,000 “
1920.....	Figures not available
1921.....	3,300,000 Horses

In 1922 the situation became so critical that in many rural districts plows were drawn by the peasants themselves as all horses had been

killed and their flesh used for food. The outlook for 1923 is hopeless.

The same picture is true about cattle. Sheep-breeding, which was so extensive in Imperial Russia, has almost ceased under Communist rule, while the number of pigs in 1920 was 80 per cent. less than in 1914.

Between 1900 and 1913 the gross output of agricultural products in Russia increased 33 per cent. The agrarian revolution left Russia almost without agricultural implements, and in 1920 the peasants obtained a number of plows seven times less than in 1913. The number of harrows acquired by them for the same period was ten times less. In 1921 and 1922 the output of agricultural machinery in Soviet Russia was almost nil. Therefore, in 1923 it will be practically impossible to till the land even should grain in sufficient quantities be obtainable. While the exact figures regarding the output of agricultural machinery for 1921 and 1922 are lacking, the comparative table on page 60 may give a general idea of the staggering depreciation in the manufacture of such machinery.

The number of agricultural machines imported from abroad in 1920 was insignificant and the total was below 16,000 machines of every kind.

60 THE BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIETISM

	1913	1914	1920
	Imported from Abroad	Manufactured in Russia	Manufactured in Russia
Plows	200,000	550,000	500
Harrowes	36,000	80,000	862
Reaping machines	100,000	38,000	167
Fanning Machines	15,000	38,000	167
Planting machines	10,000	70,000	1,068
Threshing ma- chines operated by horses.....	13,000	27,000	558*

In this connection the official Bolshevist "*Economicheskaya Jisn*" (No. 92, April 27, 1922) furnishes important data. An article published in this issue, entitled "The Restoration of the Manufacture of Agricultural Machinery," reads in part as follows:

"The convention dealing with the problem of the manufacture of agricultural machinery which adjourned a few days ago, disclosed the hopeless condition of that branch of industry. Figures made public during the convention by the Department of Agricultural Machinery demonstrate that in the early part of 1922 the number of workers engaged in this industry was only 26 per cent. of the pre-war number. The output

* The above figures were taken from the following sources:

"*Agriculture*," issues Nos. 1 and 2, September and October, 1921. Monthly magazine issued in Prague, published in Russian.

A. Rakétov: "*Synopsis of the Economic and Financial Situation in Present Russia According to Official Data*," Reval, 1921. Published in Russian.

Professor A. Terne: "*In the Realm of Lenin*." Published in Russian, Berlin, 1922.

varies from 0.1 per cent. to 3 per cent. (planting machines, harrows, threshing machines, fanning machines) to 13.3 per cent. (plows) of the pre-war production. These figures signify a catastrophe in the manufacturing of Russian agricultural machinery and in their supply to the population. This is particularly true if we take into consideration that in pre-war times Russia manufactured not more than 50 per cent. of her entire need in these implements."

Such in brief is the deplorable result of Bolshevik management in the field of agricultural relationship.

It is only natural that the peasants as a class were thrown into opposition to the Socialist régime. The wily promises made by Lenin to the farmers will certainly fail to catch them in the Communist trap. Russian peasants are no fools. They remember well Lenin's speech delivered to the Tenth Communist Congress, when he said, "The interests of the workers and the peasants differ. Only an agreement with the peasants can save the Socialist revolution in Russia until the time when a proletarian revolution will take place in every country." But the farmers also remember that it was upon Lenin's own motion that the same Congress adopted a new form of taxation, establishing a *tax in kind*, the so-called "Prodnalog," a tax levied in the form of taking from the farmer his agricultural products and turning them over to the State. Although Lenin boasted

that this measure would tend to conciliate the peasants to the Soviets, in reality, however, it drove another wedge between rural and urban Russia. That is the reason why the peasants regard the Communists as a class of privileged parasites, and their urban strongholds as an arena for insane social experiments.

Nor is the latest Bolshevik agrarian invention going to solve the land problem. On May 12, 1922—so it was reported in the general press—the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets proposed a plan providing life tenure for the peasants engaged in agricultural pursuit. On the other hand, however, the principle of State ownership of all land was reiterated and no further changes were suggested.

In this way the “new” land policy is but another version of old principles. This plan as well as the “Fundamental Decree of the Soviet Government,” dated May 22, 1922, which purports to grant limited concessions to property rights, were obviously designed to please Mr. Hughes and thus to drag the United States into a shameful deal with the Soviets. One of the Communist Commissars by the name of Kursky, commenting on the latter decree, was very frank in stating that:

“Soviet officials * * * considered this decree largely meets the condition of Secretary of State Hughes for American trade in Russia.”

Nothing can be expected from such "surrenders" to capitalism. The thing which the peasants want is to *own* their land, to keep it on the basis of private property, including the right of selling, mortgaging it, and leaving it to their families. In other words, so long as private property in land is not restored in full, the present land chaos will prevail and minor changes and modifications of the "Fundamental law of socialization of the land" will bring no relief whatsoever to the famine-stricken population, and will prove unable to relieve the general condition of economic despair ruling throughout Red Russia.

CHAPTER III

THE RUIN OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRIES

MARXIAN principles of socialization applied to Russia have ruined her agricultural system and proved equally disastrous to her industries.

Marx labored long and hard to show that the suffering of the working class is the direct consequence of social conditions which enable the capitalist to monopolize all means of production and distribution, leaving to the toilers the sad fate of selling in the open market their only possession, that is, their labor. According to his theory, the labor problem cannot be solved without a radical change in the entire structure of modern society, as the result of which all industrial and financial assets would fall under the control and become the property of the working class. Marx anticipated that such a social transformation must necessarily be achieved by force, inevitably upsetting the whole mechanism of economic relationship.

The Bolsheviki, having learned by heart the Marxian A-B-C, saw no other means of solving the industrial problem than that decreed by their stepfather.

As far as Russia was concerned, the nationalization of her industries could not be justified

even from the point of view of the Socialistic theory itself. Generally speaking, Capitalism in the western sense of the term was non-existent there. It was only during the last twenty years that modern industrial methods gradually began to be applied to Russian soil. In that country industry was a weakling, nourished by the State. A high custom-wall was erected which gave the manufacturers sufficient time to get upon their own feet. The protective policies of the Imperial Government, it is true, proved quite beneficial. The four years preceding the World War marked a decisive advance in Russia's industrial prosperity. Thus, during the period between 1910 and 1913, the number of new industrial and commercial corporations, and their paid-up capital, increased in the following proportion.

YEAR	NUMBER OF NEW CORPORATIONS	PAID UP CAPITAL IN MILLIONS OF RUBLES
1910	104	119.3
1911	166	185.3
1912	202	233.5
1913	240	403.1*

Owing also to the tireless efforts of the Government, during the ten years preceding the war, railroad lines and transportation facilities in general were materially enlarged. This, in

*See *Russia—Her Economic Past and Future*, by Dr. Joseph M. Goldstein, New York, 1919, p. 80.

turn, had a stimulating influence upon the tempo of economic development as a whole. With all that, the industrial technique continued to be backward, especially if compared with such countries as the United States, England and Germany. Under these conditions, it was idle to speak of the "concentration" of capital, of "industrial magnates" controlling Russian production, of the "monopoly of capital," and similar attributes of capitalistic progress. In Marx's own opinion, however, these phenomena must precede the social decomposition of modern civilization, ultimately substituting for it a Socialistic order. Moreover, orthodox Socialists, including Marx himself, have always contended that a "successful" social revolution can be accomplished by no other class than the industrial proletariat. In this connection Marx stated as follows:

"Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class *always increasing in numbers*, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor

at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.”*

It was also Marx who asserted that:

“Of all classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie to-day, the proletariat alone is a revolutionary class.”

When Lenin and Trotsky started to advocate a social revolution in Russia, there was no proletarian class in the Marxian sense. Russia was and still remains a country of small farmers, tenaciously clinging to their property rights, their farms and their individual households. Out of the pre-war population of the Russian Empire—that is to say out of 160,000,000—there were less than 5,000,000 industrial workers. But out of this number hundreds of thousands still kept farms which were cultivated by their relatives. On the other hand, many workers were employed in industrial concerns only part of the year, while pursuing their habitual agricultural occupation during the other part. Therefore, even from the orthodox Marxian point of view, there was no social group or class in Russia capable of undertaking and bringing to a “successful”

* *Capital* by Karl Marx, Vol. I., pp. 836 and 837. Charles H. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1919.

end the destruction of the capitalistic system, erecting on its ruins a model Communist State.

Disregarding these fundamental facts, the Bolsheviki, as far back as April, 1917, suddenly broke loose with violent agitation among the workers of Petrograd and Moscow, urging them to join their ranks and promising to put them in immediate control of all factories, plants, mills, railroads and other industrial assets. The Marxian formula: "*All wealth is produced by labor. To labor all wealth is due,*" was over night accepted by the toiling masses who were unable to grasp its real meaning. Nor is it strange that the "Workers' Control" should have appealed to the proletariat, especially at an epoch when the whole country was being kept in a state of constant unrest, and when the minds of the people were put out of balance by the trend of revolutionary events. It was all the easier to enforce the nationalization program as hundreds of factories were actually deserted by their owners who fled before the terror instigated by the rebellious workers. In point of fact, already under Kerensky's régime, wages extorted by the laborers grew to be so excessive that the operation of the factories became next to impossible.

The Soviet constitution does not devise an exhaustive system for the nationalization of industry as is the case with the socialization of land. The general stipulation therefor is con-

tained in Item (c) of Clause 3 of the "*Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People.*" It reads verbatim:

"As a first step toward complete transfer of ownership to the Soviet Republic of all factories, mills, mines, railways, and other means of production and transportation, the Soviet law for the control by workmen and the establishment of the Supreme Soviet of National Economy is hereby confirmed, so as to insure the power of the workers over the exploiters."

In this Section two distinctly different principles are set forth: *first*, nationalization from the point of view of State ownership; and, *second*, nationalization in the sense of workers' management of industrial concerns.

The seizure of industrial plants by the Soviets primarily assumed a casual character. The earlier decrees nationalizing such concerns were issued in consequence of the opposition manifested by their owners and managers to the Soviet order of December 8, 1917, introducing the "Workers' Control" over production.

The first industrial corporation nationalized by the Soviets was the Simsky Mining Company.

The decree thereto of December 12, 1917, reads:

"In view of the refusal of the Simsky Mining Company to submit to the decree of the Council of

People's Commissars, relating to the Workers' Control the Soviet of People's Commissars hereby resolves to confiscate the entire property of the Simsky Mining Company, of whatever it may consist, declaring it the property of the Russian Republic."

The same motive is given in the Soviet decree of December 19, 1917, for nationalizing the well-known Bogoslovsky Mining Company. It was not until February 1918 that the program began to be carried out systematically. In the beginning the tendency was to nationalize key industries, especially the entire metallurgical, textile and mining output. The earliest attempt to take over the famous Donetz coal region was made on December 28, 1917, when a regulation was adopted ordering that all mines located in this district be placed under Soviet control, and their output monopolized by the State.

On the 22nd of April, 1918, an important measure was introduced by the Soviets nationalizing foreign trade in all its ramifications. According to this decree, commercial transactions with foreign countries were made the exclusive prerogative of persons duly authorized by the Bolsheviki. With the exception of special agents, nobody had the right to carry on trade relations with foreign countries, either in the way of export or import. Gradually, all economic functions, including production, trade

and distribution, came under Soviet management. Finally, in December 1920, industrial concerns employing only five workers were declared the property of the State.

Among the more drastic phases of the socialization fever was the decree of December 14, 1917. This is the edict on the seizure of private banks which were monopolized by the State. The preamble to this legislative act expresses that the nationalization of banks is ordered

“In the interest of the regular organization of the national economy, of the thorough eradication of bank speculation, and the complete emancipation of the workmen, peasants, and the whole laboring population from the exploitation of banking capital, and with a view to the establishment of a single national bank of the Russian Republic which shall serve the real interests of the people and the poorer classes, * * *.”

All assets and liabilities of banking institutions, in this way, were taken over by the Soviets, while all existing private joint-stock banks were merged in the State Bank.

Indeed it was a simple matter, by one stroke of the pen, to abolish—on paper at least—the whole Russian banking system; but, with private banks blown up in the air, the Soviets proved thoroughly incapable of solving the vital problem of credit. The barbarous manner in which the Communist rulers grabbed all

financial assets is quite typical of their "governmental" methods. In modern economics, banking is an organic part of the productive system, its prime social function being the financing of industrial and commercial enterprises, which constitute the backbone of national existence.

Prior to the revolution, Russia's industries were largely dependent upon banking capital, which provided the necessary means for the development of productive resources. The more efforts were made in the field of industrial research, the more it became obvious that extensive banking and accessible credit were absolutely indispensable to economic progress. Accordingly, during the ten years preceding the World War, thousands of corporations of "mutual credit" were established throughout Russia, rendering prompt and efficient assistance to the creative efforts of the people. Petty trade, which had a far-reaching significance in national economics, was actively supported by these institutions.

The nationalization of banks did not entail the abolition of money as a mode of exchange. Money continues to exist in the Communist State. Therefore, all industrial concerns, although nationalized, have to have money for the purchase of raw materials, to pay wages, and to carry on their business in general. Leaving aside for the present the question of

the deflation of the Russian ruble, it is necessary to point out the peculiar condition which was the outgrowth of the nationalization of banks. All monies and collateral in the possession of banking corporations, having been declared the property of the State, it became the business of the State to finance all such industrial and commercial concerns as heretofore had been supported by private banking capital. In other words, its nationalization threw upon the State a tremendous burden which in previous days was divided between thousands of credit institutions and the State itself. The effect was most harmful.

In the current Soviet press there are countless complaints about the inefficiency of the Communist State Bank, its failure to give financial support to nationalized enterprises, and the irritating routine required to obtain credits for industrial purposes.

The Communists took over almost 100 per cent. of Russia's industries but they did not create a financial organization adequate to cope with the daily needs of production. In consequence, hundreds of plants and mills remain idle without a remote possibility of resuming operations. Even those factories which are considered by the Soviets as "shock factories"—that is to say, the operation of which is of paramount importance for the very existence of the Communist State—have often complained

about the thorough neglect manifested by the "Gosbank" (State Bank) in relation to their financial requirements.

Lenin and other Soviet leaders repeatedly insisted upon the utmost importance for the Communist State, in the first place, to organize and efficiently exploit the huge industrial enterprises, uniting them in productive agencies similar to American trusts. Voluminous literature was produced on this subject, and yet the practical endeavors of the Soviets to establish such trusts have resulted in a complete fiasco, not only in the sense of technical management, but also from a financial point of view.

One instance described in the Soviet newspapers, referring to the central organization of Russian textile industries, may give a general idea of the prevailing situation. A Soviet official who was ordered to inspect the business of this "Centro-Textile" made the following report with regard to its financial transactions:

"The Financial Department of the Centro-Textile received up to February 1, 1919, the sum of 3,400,000,000 rubles. No control was established with regard to the apportionment of this fund. The money has been given away to the factories at their request, and this was made in the form of advance payments against bills of lading. Due to this, instances were frequent where monies were paid to non-existent factories. From January 1st up to December 1, 1918, the Central Textile made such advance payments against com-

modities for the amount of 1,348,619,000 rubles. At the same time, by January 1, 1919, commodities which would serve as collateral for such advance payments were amounting only to 143,716,000 rubles, that is eight times less than money paid out in advance. Moreover, the fact of the general inefficiency of the Central Textile must be noted, especially in connection with the purchase of wool. Thus, by January (1919) only 129,808 poods were purchased, whereas the annual requirement of wool is calculated at the amount of 3,500,000 poods.”*

Similar is the condition in practically every line of industry and commerce. The official Soviet organ *Economicheskaya Jisn*, in its issue of the 26th of April, 1922, reported that the Petrograd hemp trust, formed in January of that year, was unable to start operations owing to the lack of funds which were to have been supplied by the Gosbank. Information of the same nature is given regarding the Forest and Textile Trusts, and the coal mines in the Donetz Basin.

There is a Russian proverb: “With seven nurses the child is blind.” This can be applied to State ownership and Soviet Administration of key industries and their “shock plants.” Numerous Soviet institutions and Communist appointees are supervising, managing, controlling and auditing their operations. Every Com-

* See Prof. Shcherbina, *Op. Cit.*, p. 100. Translated from the Russian.

missar feels it his right and duty to interfere with their work. The consequence is that these basic branches of production have been ruined, possibly even to a greater degree than the auxiliary agencies which are less annoyed and comparatively more free to pursue their own policies.

An equally harmful effect upon industrial development was caused by the Soviet invention known as the "Workers' Control." The first decree thereto was issued on December 8, 1917. The object of this measure was to eliminate individual management, but primarily the management of those who owned the factories, putting production under the control of the industrial proletariat. The Bolsheviki were firmly convinced that, after all, this was an easy task to perform, because they maintained that manual work alone is the creative force of wealth. They failed to grasp the economic truth that natural resources which furnish the material substance for all mechanical processes, and the brain work of experts organizing industries are just as much the component parts of production as manual labor itself.

The destructive phase of the Worker's Control, namely, the elimination of the legitimate owners, was not difficult to achieve. Most brutal methods were used to compel them to surrender their factories to the Worker's Shop Committees. The technical personnel was subjected to

both psychological and physical terror. "*Down with the bourgeois bloodsuckers!*", for a time, was the real order of the day. Thousands of persons who formerly supervised the mills and plants were either incarcerated or murdered in cold blood, while the rest were forced to seek refuge abroad. According to a statement made in 1919 at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers and Red Armies Deputies, by Mr. Nevsky, former Commissar of the Department of Railways and Communications, "*No less than 25 per cent. of the trained engineers employed in the management of railways since the revolution were murdered,*" while about 50 per cent. of the pre-revolutionary engineering staff had fled "to escape murder." Hence, only 25 per cent. of the entire number of technically skilled railroad employees nominally remained in the ranks of the former personnel. But with regard to these Nevsky explained:

"I pass my life in hunting them out of prison because no proper management can go on without skilled laborers."*

This condition by no means was confined to transport alone. It existed and still prevails in all branches of industry, commerce and State banking.

* Mr. Nevsky's report quoted in the *London Morning Post*, May 1, 1919, in an article entitled, "Bolshevist Transport Muddle."

Such was the primitive manner by which the first taming of the "exploiters" was accomplished by the Soviets. The second, or constructive, problem relating to the workers' management was something the Bolsheviki were unable to overcome. They started out on the premise that all the delicate functions of production could be properly organized and controlled by the workers themselves, no matter how little technical experience they may have had.

The decree on the Workers' Control is certainly one of the most startling exhibits of the "constructive achievements" of Communism. The merits of this legislative act can be best appreciated by examining its more fundamental provisions:

- "1. In the interests of a well-planned regulation of the national economy in all industrial, commercial, banking, agricultural, transporting, co-operative, and productive associations and other enterprises engaging hired workers or distributing work outside, Workers' Control shall be introduced over production, purchase, sale of products and raw materials, their storage, as well as over the financial part of the enterprise."
- "2. The Workers' Control is carried out by all the workers of a given enterprise through their elective organizations such as: factory committees, aldermen's boards, etc. These organizations shall include representatives of the employees and the technical personnel."

- “3. In every large town, province, or industrial region, a local Soviet of Workers’ Control shall be formed, which, being an organ of the Soviet of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants Deputies, shall be composed of representatives of trade unions, shop and other labor committees, and co-operative societies.”

According to the subsequent sections, the organs of the Workers’ Control are given the right to supervise production, fixing a minimum ratio of output, and enabling them to take all necessary measures for determining the cost of production. (Paragraph 6). These organs are also allowed access to all files of the industrial enterprises. Their decisions are mandatory on the owners of the enterprises and may be revoked solely by a resolution of the higher organs of the Workers’ Control. (Paragraph 8). The only exemption in favor of the owners is contained in Paragraph 9, reading:

“The owner or the administration of the enterprise shall, within the course of three days, have the right to file a protest before the higher organs of the Workers’ Control against any resolution passed by the lower organs of the same Control.”

An analysis of this decree discloses two leading features of labor management as adopted by the Soviets:

First: the so-called *collegiate system* of management as distinguished from and opposed to

individual management of the owner; second, the outspoken domination of manual labor over technical experts.

The former principle is but a natural feature of Communism. Socialism has never favored the creative force of individual effort. On the contrary, it has always sustained the policy of "mass action." Whenever it comes to actually doing something requiring brains, Marxian followers recommend a parliament with scores of delegates proficient in talking abilities. Any minor measure pertaining for instance to the purchase of spare parts for a drilling lathe, or selecting the nearest warehouse, is vigorously debated by committees and sub-committees before being put into effect. On the other hand, the most complicated industrial policies have to be brought before and decided upon by large bodies of manual workers who have not the slightest idea as to what management means or how it should be conducted.

Besides, the decree establishes an extremely intricate procedure for carrying out the Workers' Control through four different groups of Soviets:

- (a) The Factory Soviet,
- (b) The City Soviet,
- (c) The Regional Soviet, and finally,
- (d) The All-Russian Soviet of Workers' Control.

The clumsy make-up of the Central Soviet is

described in Paragraph 4 which provides that this body shall be composed of representatives of the following institutions:

1. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets—5 members.
2. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Peasants' Delegates—5 members.
3. The All-Russian Soviet of Trade Unions—5 members.
4. The All-Russian Center of Co-Operative Societies—2 members.
5. The All-Russian Bureau of Factory Committees—5 members.
6. The All-Russian Union of Engineers and Technicians—5 members.
7. The All-Russian Union of Agronomists—2 members.
8. From each All-Russian Labor Union with at least 100,000 members—1 member.
9. From each Trade Union whose number of members exceeds 100,000—2 members.
10. The Petrograd Soviet of Trade Unions—2 members.

Now, all these various Soviets, mutually subordinate to each other, from stage to stage, are compelled to refer their decisions and regulations to higher organs of Workers' Control, until they ultimately reach the central body,—moving slowly along like a caterpillar tank. It is only here, on the top of the bureaucratic pyramid, that all momentous problems of national production are finally decided upon.

Had a decree of this kind been inaugurated by the Imperial government, or any of the would-be bourgeois governments, Socialists from the four corners of the earth would have burst into an uproar, accusing the wealth-owning classes of every possible administrative vice. But, because the decree bore the stamp of Lenin, liberals and radicals all over the world have devoted much "study" and "careful research" to the relative merits of this "great" Bolshevist discovery. Obviously it is impossible to supervise the whole range of industrial functions with a bureaucratic outfit so heavy and so inefficient. Nevertheless, Socialist sponsors in this country and elsewhere prayingly whispered, "*Oh, give them a chance! Give them only a chance!*" And the chance has been given to the Bolsheviki. They have been allowed to carry out their program to the fullest extent.

Not even a year had passed before Soviet leaders themselves found out that industry was being rapidly brought to a state of complete decay. Much to their surprise, they noticed that the Workers' Control in reality meant wholesale graft, willful neglect, and the highest degree of incompetency. The simplest questions of management were hopelessly befuddled. Urgent problems of organization were dragged along through numerous Soviet chanceries until finally they lost their mo-

mentous significance. Furthermore, the different organs of Workers' Control came in conflict with the Supreme Board of National Economy, the task of which is to elaborate general standards for the economic life of the country, serving as a medium between the work of the central and local branches of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' Control. Finally, the different Soviet agencies, such as the Fuel Board, the Metal Board, the Transport Board, the Central Supplies Committee, etc., acting upon their own authority, interfered all the time with the orders of both the Supreme Board of National Economy and the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' Control, causing extreme confusion in every line of Russian industry.

In the factories all discipline was abandoned. The I. W. W. slogan, "*Strike on the job!*" became the ruling condition of the work in nationalized concerns. The eight-hour day which was decreed at the very outset of the Bolshevik advent to power proved nothing but a myth. The men worked as long as they chose to stay in the factories, while the whole course of industrial labor was converted into an endless meeting at which Communist ideas were propagated and the workers incited to take revenge upon the "blood-thirsty capitalists." But these were no longer in existence.

Regulations recommended by Workers' Shop

Committees were deliberately violated by the workers themselves, and the foremen of olden times were held under suspicion and openly accused of being "bourgeois sympathizers." Under these circumstances, naturally, the entire industrial mechanism went to pieces, and the proletarian State promptly landed outside the broken trough.

The scale of economic disorganization will be understood by a mere comparison of the output of different supplies for 1913 or 1914 with that of 1920.

After two years of Soviet management, every branch of industry presented practically the same picture of degradation. For instance, the textile mills, in 1914, were equipped with 7,285,000 spindles, working on full time, while in 1920 there were only 385,000 spindles working on part time. In 1920 only 125,000 workers were employed by textile manufacturers, which is 75 per cent. less than during normal times.

In 1913 Russia had 37 cement plants working at full speed. In 1920 there was only one cement plant, working on part time.

In 1913 there were 140 blast furnaces as compared with 12 in 1920.

In 1914 there were 275 glass plants and 20 china manufacturing plants, with a total of 93,000 workers. In 1920 only 67 glass plants and 11 china manufacturing establishments were in operation, employing a total of 32,000 workers.

TOTAL OUTPUT*

	1913		1920	
Ores of different kinds	581,000,000	poods	8,000,000	poods
Copper ore	69,000,000	"	219,000	"
Manganese ore	17,377,000	"	216,000	"
Chromide ore	1,500,000	"	105,982	"
			(9 months)	
Salt, Perm region..	26,000,000	"	2,000,000	"
Salt, Baskunchak region	41,000,000	"	1,200,000	"
Salt, Donetz Basin.	39,000,000	"	7,500,000	"
	1914			
Smelted cast iron ..	257,000,000	"	6,000,000	"
	1913			
Oils (vegetable) approximately ..	25,000,000	"	500,000	"
Paper	24,000,000	"	2,000,000	"
	1914			
Matches (in thousands of boxes)...	3,808	"	632	"

With regard to precious metals, the figures are as follows:

	1914		1920	
Gold, Ural region	103	poods	22	poods
" West'n Siberia	97	"	1	"
" East'n Siberia	1,679	"	92	"
	Total 1,881		106	
Platinum	298	"	20.5	" †

* See *Pravda*, November 14, 1920, and *Economicheskaya Jisn*, January 1, 1921.

† Compare with data furnished by *Economicheskaya Jisn*, January 29, 1921.

In view of this condition, the number of workers engaged in all branches of industry had been reduced. The *Economicheskaya Jisn* (No. 242, October 20, 1920), analyzing this phase of the economic situation, produced the following figures relating to the Moscow industrial section, which formerly was considered the Russian Manchester:

NUMBER OF WORKERS

Region	September 1, 1918	June 1, 1920	Per Cent. of Decrease
Ivanovo-Voznesensk ..	146,300	30,600	79
Vladimir	103,100	21,200	80
Kostroma	17,600	8,100	57
Moscow	368,100	216,400	41

In Petrograd and Moscow the number of manual laborers has decreased as follows:

Petrograd, 1917.....	365,777
1918.....	144,530
1920.....	102,000
Moscow, August 1, 1918.....	147,424
June 1, 1919.....	105,210
June 1, 1920.....	*87,363

The British Labor Delegation and the German Socialist Commission which visited Soviet Russia in 1920 have made an exhaustive survey of the industrial conditions in that country. Both of these delegations devoted much

* See *The Russian Economist*, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 585, April, 1921. These tables were taken from the official *Economicheskaya Jisn*, issues of October 1, 1920, and October 20, 1920.

attention to the startling decline in the productivity of labor. Mr. Dittmann, who was at the head of the German Commission, referring to the Kolomna machine plant, stated:

“The Russian employees were partly men who had been drafted by force from villages; others were volunteers whose motive was to get the special food ration given to factory workers. Not one of them showed the slightest interest in his work; quite on the contrary, there was universal disposition to sabotage, which extended even to some of the higher employees.”*

In January, 1919, the Soviet authorities undertook an investigation regarding the number of hours worked by the employees in railroad repair shops. The following was found:

Every one of the workmen worked during January

Year	Hours	Per Cent.
1916	254	100.
1917	235	92.5
1918	159	60.0
1919	170	66.9†

Owing to the Workers' Control, the Mitishchi machine plant near Moscow, in pre-war times one of the model industrial concerns, became utterly crippled. By 1919 the productivity of that plant showed a decrease of 60 per

* See Mr. Dittmann's report published in the Berlin *Freiheit*, issues of August 31st and September 1st, 1920.

† See Sobolev's, *The Present Economic Situation in Soviet Russia*, p. 20. Kharbin, 1921.

cent. as compared with 1916, although the working-day had remained the same, namely, eight hours.

The *Economicheskaya Jisn*, describing the deplorable situation in the textile industry, remarked that, on the average, the decline in the productivity of work in textile mills amounted to 35 per cent., while in some of the nationalized enterprises it fell below 75 per cent., as compared with the pre-revolutionary period.

The Bolshevik newspaper *Trud*, in its issue of April 28, 1919, frankly admitted:

“Our misfortune consists in that we do not know how to use such means as are in our possession, namely, labor. The productivity of labor in the textile industry experienced an amazing decrease. There is no discipline. Due to carelessness and neglect, the machines are in a state of decay and they are incapable of yielding the former amount of efficiency.”

An interesting account of the manner in which Soviet factories were and still are operated is found in the Moscow *Pravda* (January 6, 1921). This paper refers specifically to a mill called “Mars” which is engaged in manufacturing military uniforms:

“In the factory Mars, two thousand workmen are engaged. Theft has assumed extraordinary proportions. Those identified as thieves are punished and compelled to perform filthy work for a period of one or two weeks. Those upon whom

this punishment is inflicted immediately begin to steal again. There is no discipline whatsoever in the factory. Workmen are continuously striking on the job. The quality of the work performed is extremely poor and 70 per cent. of the goods so manufactured are rejected by the inspectors."

For the present, these data may be sufficient as they do give a general idea of the extent of industrial disintegration at the close of the initial stage of Soviet misrule.

When, after two years' experimentation along the lines of collegiate management, the Soviet leaders became thoroughly convinced that there was nothing to be hoped from the Workers' Control, they began to ring the alarm bells. Lenin and the other Commissars were forced to admit the disheartening results of their industrial policies; but in their usual hypocritical manner, they sought to excuse their failure by ascribing it to reasons beyond their control, and more particularly to general conditions which turned out to be rather unfavorable for the Soviets.

Speaking before the Communist Party in March, 1921, Lenin tried to justify the economic methods of the Bolsheviki by setting forth the following argument:

"Our system was dictated to us by military considerations and necessities and not by the needs of the national economy. There was no other outcome in the conditions of unparalleled

confusion in which we found ourselves, when, after the Great War, we had to endure a series of civil wars. Of course, in the methods of application of our policy, we made a great number of mistakes and exaggerations. As a matter of principle, however, this policy was right in the conditions of war which were wrought upon us."

Another Communist, by the name Varga, analyzing the proposed "changes" in the economic policies of the Soviets, remarked:

"Urgent needs of war, the resistance and the sabotage of the bourgeoisie, compelled the Soviet authorities, *contrary to the will of the Communists* (?), to resort to nationalization, adopting the well-known system of military communism. The bureaucratic mechanism, once set in motion in a given direction, often digressed from the aims which were originally devised. This system, the social foundation of which was the military union of the urban workers and the poorest strata of peasantry, was liable to cease the moment the war terminated."*

Again we encounter the "sabotage of the bourgeoisie," the "wicked Kolchak," the "inhuman blockade," and the whole battery of accessories used in the Communist phraseology. But whatever excuses were offered by the Bolsheviks, the fact remains undeniable that the Workers' Control, as a concise policy of in-

* See No. 18 of the *Communist Internationale*, Moscow-Petrograd, issue of October 8, 1921, Varga's Article "The Turning Point in the Economic Policy of Soviet Russia."

dustrial management, does correctly interpret the idea of proletarian dictatorship, giving soap-box leaders of manual labor the upper hand in the economic life of the State.

Militant proletarian dictatorship led to the complete elimination of the expert from the fields of industry. Thus the historical struggle between muscles and brains ended in a victory for the former. This, however, was a Pyrrhic victory, for conclusive proof was given that economic progress cannot be achieved without the aid of human intelligence and technical skill.

When, finally, the Bolsheviki had discovered this truism, they began to frame "new" economic policies. There was really nothing else to do since, as far back as January, 1920, the situation was described by Rykoff, former President of the Supreme Board of National Economy, as "*catastrophic*."

Here are some of the measures which were proposed for the solution of the industrial crisis:

First: The Abolition of the collegiate system of management.

Second: Employment of experts in all branches of industry.

Third: Improvement in transportation.

Fourth: Compulsory labor.

Fifth: Militarization of labor.

Sixth: A resolute campaign against labor desertion.

This program did not spring into existence fully armed, like Minerva from the head of Jove. On the contrary, it had been evolved after protracted and weary word-duels between the two main factions of Soviet "ideology." One was the militant group of Apfelbaum and Trotzky, advocating bombastic policies and dreaming of world-power conquered by fire and sword; the other was Lenin's party which sought to attain the same aims, using, however, more "diplomatic" methods. The first group refused to argue with anything but an iron fist. Lenin, while believing in the iron fist, preferred to use it in a silk glove. Therein lay the difference. Friction between the two wings of Communism at one time grew so acute that rumors were current that either Trotsky had conceived a plan to depose Lenin, or that Lenin had made up his mind to get rid of Trotsky. Bolshevik press agencies of course always denied such rumors, trying to convey the impression that between the two Soviet autocrats there existed a friendship as touching as between Castor and Pollux. As a matter of fact, dissension was there.

At this point a brief characterization of these two Communist ringleaders is perhaps not out of place.

Both Lenin and Trotzky are avowed disciples of Marx. They both have received their revolutionary training in the backyard of Euro-

pean politics. Both have had their own grudges against civilized society, and consequently it is not surprising that they should possess embittered mentality. In the depths of the social underground, Lenin and Trotzky learned the whole gamut of unscrupulous methods for fostering political mischief. Russia to them meant nothing. They looked upon that country as an arena where, owing to the darkness of its populace, silly theories and ideas could be more easily propagated than in other European States. Both are too rebellious to be free. They are obsessed with the mania of grandeur. It is their ambition to eventually become Field Marshals of world revolution. But while Lenin, in the past, devoted much time to the study of economic sciences, Trotzky's mental luggage is as light as down. He knows nothing outside of the Marxian primer, but this he knows by heart. Due, probably to his Semitic origin, Trotzky has a speculative, practical mind, while Lenin is more inclined to theoretical argumentation and dialectics. He likes to be called the "Hamlet of World Revolution." At times, Lenin is disposed to political meditation, while Trotzky adores parading, and the whole ritual of Communist ceremonies. He obviously poses as a Napoleon when he spends his leisure hours reviewing mercenary troops on the plaza before the Moscow Kremlin. Vengeance upon the "bourgeois society" is the

dominant motive in Trotzky's psychology. He, therefore, has become the apologist for Red Terror and the tortures of the Cheka. Lenin, on the other hand, is the great master of propaganda: he believes more in the gradual undermining of the foundations of civilization than in high explosive methods. In the Soviet outfit, Lenin is doing the thinking part, while Trotzky represents the dynamic element. For Lenin, destruction is what he describes as the "necessary stage" for attaining the Communist millennium. For Trotzky, destruction is an aim in itself, a leading principle, a basic policy. Trotzky envies Lenin and seeks to overshadow his prestige among the Communist devotees both within and outside of Russia. Trotzky is avaricious and "thrifty," which has enabled him to "save" some 80,000,000 Imperial rubles in gold. These are being kept safe—beyond the reach of his Bolshevist brethren—in one of the South American banks. In this sense Lenin has a "broader character." He wantonly dissipates Russian State funds without giving much thought to the final outcome of the Soviet *Dance Macabre*. Meanwhile, however, he does enjoy his comfortable little home in the Imperial Palace at Moscow, with a number of sentimental women giving a touch of artistic *charm* to the unparalleled horrors of Bolshevism.

Amidst the industrial chaos wrought upon Russia, the two heralds of Communism had

to come to an understanding because the continued disintegration of Russian economics inevitably would become, as it actually has become, a grave menace to the existence of Soviet rule itself.

ABOLITION OF THE COLLEGIATE SYSTEM AND THE BOURGEOIS EXPERTS

In the controversy over the collegiate and individual management, Lenin took the view that the reconstruction of industry can be successfully carried out only by the abolition of the Workers' Control and the restoration of the individualistic principle. At the Third All-Russian Congress of Transport Workers, he made it clear that he was in favor of reversing the whole Soviet policy in this respect. He said:

“Was it possible in the former times for anyone who considered himself a defender of the bourgeoisie to say that there should not be any individual authority in the administration of the State? If such a fool should have been found among the bourgeoisie, the other members of his class should have laughed at him. They would have said to him: ‘What has the question of individual or collegiate management to do with the questions of class?’ ”*

After some hesitation, Trotzky acceded to this viewpoint.

* Quoted from Leo Pasvolsky's book *The Economics of Communism*, p. 234, New York, 1921.

Opposing this opinion, a large group of Communists continued to defend with obstinacy the principle of collegiate management, arguing that the restoration of individual control would inevitably bring the bourgeois expert back to the footlights of economic life. This, they maintained, would, in turn, infringe upon the sovereign rights of the victorious proletariat, placing it in a rôle subordinate to the industrial managers. Tomsky, President of the Executive Committee of the Trade Unions, was the spokesman for the latter group. After protracted deliberations, the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in April, 1920, passed a resolution settling the controversy by adopting a sort of middle course. The idea of collegiate management was upheld, but the reservation was made that individual management should be favored in the executive field. It was, therefore, recommended that in the higher stages of industrial mechanism, collegiate forms of management be preserved, with the understanding, however, that the membership of the managing committees would be reduced.

Yet on the crucial point regarding the participation of experts in organizing industries, the Communists are still groping in darkness, and no uniform policy has been adopted so far. Instances are known where the Bolsheviki have tried to secure the services of bourgeois experts. In this connection Russian engineers, at pres-

ent residing abroad, have been approached by Soviet agents with a view of inducing them to accept responsible positions in the Communist State. These approaches rarely led to the desired results as the Russians are fully aware that it is impossible to work efficiently under the Soviet régime. Such experts as did accept Bolshevik offers found themselves in a very trying position. Theoretically they were given a free hand in the management of several industrial concerns. Fat salaries were paid to them and they were placed in the first category as far as food rations are concerned. But despite these privileges, a Soviet spy is always watching them and reporting their activities to the Cheka. In this way the managers' decisions are actually governed and over-ruled by highly ignorant Communists and by the All-Russian machine of oppression. So far the new tactics advocated by Lenin have had but little effect upon the general industrial status, mainly because the policy of terror was chiefly directed against the educated classes. The result was that a majority of technically skilled engineers and scientists were either murdered or otherwise incapacitated. The truth is that Russian experts are practically unavailable.

The latest information from Soviet Russia seems to indicate that the Workers' Control is being rapidly replaced by individual management. If Communist statistics are to be

taken for granted, already by January, 1921, only 17.3 per cent. of all industrial concerns in the Petrograd district had continued to remain under the control of Workers' Boards, while over 86 per cent. had been restored to individual management.*

But in this respect the Bolsheviki have gone from one extreme to another. Wherever they have come back to individual methods of management, a policy of bureaucratic centralization has developed and factories are left to the mercy of illiterate Soviet appointees acting as officials of the Socialistic State. Superintendents of this kind certainly are incapable of reinstating industrial work on a business footing. Accordingly, the results of centralized management are no better than those obtained under the Workers' Control.

The following extract from an article published in the Soviet press may serve to corroborate this assertion:

“On November 4th, 1920, at a meeting of the ‘Special Transport Committee’ presided over by Comrade Trotsky, and on November 5th in the Council of Labor and Defence, a report was made by an expedition of the Special Transport Committee, which investigated the conditions of the ‘Shock Group’ of works in the South. The expedition points to the existence of bureaucratic centralization, which entirely paralyzes the sup-

* See *Economicheskaya Jissn*, December 22, 1920.

ply of the works and of the railway workshops; the absence of competent boards of management at the works, resulting in a fall of discipline, an increase in the loss of working days, which, for instance, at the Makeeff works has reached for certain workshops as much as 60 per cent.; the abnormal position with the supply of food-stuffs and clothing to the workmen of certain concerns; the failure to adapt the productive capacity of the workshops to the program, put forward in the order No. 1043.’’*

It is evident that the Communists are tossing about from one experiment to another without being able to find their way out of the economic labyrinth. As a last resort, they are now seeking to improve the situation by means of placing Russian factories in the hands of foreign experts.

Recently the Soviets started negotiations with German industrial firms, giving them unlimited power to organize the work of reconstruction. So, in May 1922, a German syndicate signed an agreement with the Bolsheviki for rebuilding the Kronstadt docks. It is also reported that a German banking group has undertaken to build up a commercial steamship line between Petrograd and Hamburg. In addition, Polish manufacturers, through Mr. Aschkinazi, the representative of Poland in

* *Economicheskaya Jisn*, 256, Nov. 1920. Published in *The Russian Economist*, Journal of the Russian Economic Association in London, Vol. I., No. 3, April, 1921, p. 599.

the League of Nations, presented a memorandum urging the League to approve a scheme which practically means a technical invasion of Russia. The plan, if adopted, will enable Polish experts to organize and supervise various branches of Russian industry for the commercial benefit of Poland.

These and similar schemes, however, are nothing but palliatives which are quite inadequate to solve the Russian industrial crisis in its all-embracing scope.

RAILROAD TRANSPORT

The present aspect of Russia's economic life is all the more deplorable as transportation has been paralyzed by incompetent Soviet management.

The railroad problem has a particular significance in Russia because of her enormous area. The grain region is located 1,000 miles from Petrograd. The Caucasian oil fields are over 2000 miles away from Moscow. The principal Black Sea ports, as well as Archangel in the North, are thousands of miles removed from both Petrograd and Moscow, while the richest mining district, the Ural Mountains, is located on the border of Asia, and in former times it took three and one-half days to reach Cheliabinsk in an express train. Therefore, Russian economics must largely rely upon a highly developed railroad net, which can be

compared with blood-carrying veins, nourishing the heart of the organism.

It is difficult to portray authentically the present industrial prostration of Russia without touching upon the question of transportation.

The total length of railroad lines throughout the Empire in 1916 was approximately 78,000 versts.* The Versailles Treaty took Poland, Finland and other border regions away from Russia which reduced the mileage of her railroads to some 55,000 versts.

In 1914 there were 20,057 locomotives. In the beginning of 1920 their nominal number in Soviet Russia was 18,612. Out of these, however, 10,560 were classed as disabled and only 7,610 were considered in running order. In 1921 the disabled locomotives constituted 59 per cent. of their total number as compared with 16 per cent. in 1914. Besides, in February 1921, the number of engines idle owing to fuel shortage was over 1000. According to Soviet statistics, the number of locomotives by April 1, 1922, was 19,048; but 12,746 were out of commission and 364 were scheduled for repair, which means that the per cent. of disabled locomotives increased to 68, or 11 per cent. since the beginning of 1921.† The output of new locomotives shows the following:

* One verst equals approximately three-quarters of a mile.

† See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 92, April, 1922.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Output</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Output</i>
1914	816	1917	396
1915	903	1918	191
1916	599	1919	85 *

Addressing the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets in April, 1920, Trotzky stated:

“We do not produce any new locomotives. The real enemy which we have to face is hunger, misery, darkness and general disintegration. In 1916 there were 16,886 locomotives in working order. In 1918 we had 4,679; in 1919 only 2,411.”

Early in 1920 Rykoff, speaking before the Congress of Trade Unions delegates, made this outspoken statement:

“Before the war the percentage of disabled locomotives * * * even in most difficult times, did not surpass 15 per cent. To-day the percentage is 59.9. In consequence, out of every 100 locomotives in Soviet Russia, there are 60 which are out of service and only 40 of which are in working order. The repair of the disabled locomotives diminishes with extraordinary rapidity. Before the war 8 per cent. were repaired every month. After the October revolution of 1917 this percentage was reduced sometimes to 1 per cent.; at present we have been able to raise this figure but only to 2 per cent. *Under the present condition of railroads, the work of repairing cannot keep pace with the destruction of locomotives,*

* Quoted from *Narodnoje Khoziaistvo*, semi-monthly organ of the Supreme Soviet of National Economy, Nos. 5-6, 1920, p. 5, Moscow.

*and each month we register a decrease in the number of locomotives at our disposal as compared with the preceding month. This decrease amounts monthly to 200 locomotives.”**

Professor Lomonosoff, one of the Soviet Commissars in charge of the Transportation Department, estimated the minimum number of locomotives urgently needed in Russia at 5000. This is probably a correct calculation. But it must not be overlooked that the maximum annual output of all Russian locomotive plants does not exceed 500, and it would, therefore, require at least ten years to build the lacking number of engines.

The repair of locomotives also shows a backward tendency: only 467 engines were repaired in January, 1922, as compared with 660 in December 1921, and 701 in January 1921.†

The same desperate condition is observed with regard to railroad cars. In 1917 their number was 574,486. By 1921 it was reduced to 454,985, out of which only 350,000 were in working order. On April 1, 1922, out of a total of 392,000 freight cars, 173,000 or 44 per cent were out of commission.‡

* See pamphlet *Economic Russia in 1920* by Gregor Alexinsky, published by the Foreign Affairs News Service, May, 1920, New York City.

† See *Wirtschaftspolitische Aufbau-Korrespondenz*, May 5, 1922, No. 18, published in Munich, Germany. Information quoted therein is based upon data furnished by the *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 84, 1922.

‡ Compare *Commerce Reports*, published by the U. S. Department of Commerce, issue of June 5, 1922, p. 644.

The state of the railroad track itself is also undergoing rapid decay. It is estimated that in order to maintain the railroad tracks in serviceable condition, it is necessary every year to replace the rails on a mileage of 3,500 versts. In 1920, however, only 240 versts of new rails were laid. In addition, there was a shortage of some 18,000,000 railroad ties which made the rebuilding of the tracks practically impossible.

Out of 38,000 railroad telephone apparatus, 32,500 need fundamental repair. Russian railroads are equipped with 10,000 telephones, but 8,000 or 80 per cent., are out of commission. Finally, in order to restore the railroad telegraph system to pre-war efficiency, 10,000,000 new poles are required.

The financial side of railroad operation under the Soviets is just as bad as its technical status. The deficit of Russian railways for the first two months in 1922 amounted to 14,100,000,000 paper rubles (approximately 94,000,000 gold rubles). Added to the arrears in wages and supplies not paid for, the deficit reached the stupendous mark of 15,300,000,000,000 Soviet rubles.*

In brief, such is the deplorable condition of railroad transport under Soviet management.

The Communist authorities have delivered countless speeches on the question of disintegration of the railroad traffic. At every Com-

* Compare with data in *Commerce Reports*, June 5, 1922, p. 644.

munist Convention, at every gathering of trade unions and other labor organizations, the situation is rehashed again and again. Lenin and Rykoff are submitting elaborate reports on the subject, inventing new reasons for the present collapse of the railroads. Trotzky many times has shaken his fist in anger at the imaginary enemy hampering the work of Soviet reconstruction. Volumes have been written on this problem, and yet not only has the transportation system failed to improve in the least, but from month to month Soviet statisticians record an ever-growing number of losses in the rolling stock and a further disorganization in the railroad service. In the light of these facts, the Commissars themselves admit that unless a radical change and rapid improvement in transport are effected, the fate of the Socialistic State is doomed.

COMPULSORY LABOR AND MILITARIZATION OF LABOR

The universal obligation to work is one of the cardinal principles proclaimed by the Soviet State. From the point of view of the Marxian theory, a Socialistic enterprise is a single economic unit within the limits of the State, having a standard plan of production and distribution guaranteed by universal labor service. Such an organization presupposes an obligatory distribution of human labor through-

out the different branches of national economics, as agriculture, industry and transportation. But human beings—at least in civilized countries—have become accustomed to look upon their right to freely dispose of their working energy as the most sacred guarantee of liberty and progress. In view of this, for a Socialistic State, it becomes necessary to introduce compulsory labor by a series of legislative acts, the enforcement of which must be supported by measures of a compulsory character, or in the last analysis, by military force of the proletarian State. Such is the theory of Socialism.

In practice, the Commissars have literally applied these abstract premises to every-day intercourse in Russian life.

In the "*Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People*" the principle of compulsory labor has been proclaimed but in a general way. However, on account of the aggravation of the industrial crisis, and because of the obdurate resistance of the citizens to compulsory regulations prescribing the methods and amount of work to be yielded, the Bolsheviks began to be restive over their ability to put the Marxian theory into effect. Owing to this experience, by the year 1919 they saw fit to elaborate a number of regulations on compulsory labor, enacting them in the "*Code of Labor Laws of the Russian Socialist Federal*

Soviet Republic.” The opening paragraph is, really the keynote to the entire document. It reads:

“All citizens of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, with the exceptions stated in Section 2 and 3, shall be subject to compulsory labor.”

Persons exempted from this general rule are those under sixteen and over fifty years of age, as well as those who have become incapacitated by injury or illness. Even students in colleges, according to Paragraph 4, are subject to compulsory labor.

The enforcement of this law is secured through the Division of Labor Distribution, Trade Unions, and all institutions of the Soviet Republic. The assignment of workers to particular jobs is made through the Division of Labor Distribution, or the so-called “Komtrud.” (Paragraphs 15 and 16.) Although the Soviet Labor Code declares, as a general principle, that employment must be based upon vocation or natural inclination to a particular kind of work, nevertheless, according to Section 29, an “unemployed person who is offered work outside his vocation shall be obliged to accept it,” at least as a temporary occupation. Acceptance of workers for permanent employment is preceded by a period of probation of not more than six days. According to the

showings of the test, the men are either given a permanent position or rejected with payment for the trial period. In the event of their rejection, the Labor Code establishes an onerous procedure for applicants desiring to file appeals. These must be filed with the respective trade unions.

Paragraph 27:

“If the trade union deems the appeal justified, it shall enter into negotiations with the establishment or person who has rejected the worker, with the request that the complainant be accepted.”

Paragraph 28:

“In case of failure of the negotiations the matter shall be submitted to the local Department of Labor whose decision shall be final and subject to no further appeal.”

Anyone familiar with the bureaucratic routine prevailing in Soviet Russia will readily understand what these provisions actually mean. In practice, instances are frequent where a person assigned by the Komtrud to a certain work is thereupon rejected by one employer after another so that the “productive efforts” of such an applicant are restricted to filing appeals with and lobbying in different Trade Unions, Soviets and Labor Boards.

Among the more odious features of the Labor Law is the right of the State to trans-

fer the worker not only to another enterprise situated in the same locality, but even to have him sent to other labor districts which may be far removed from the place of his original employment.

Human labor is considered the property of the State and human beings are shipped like so many cattle from one part of Russia to another without the slightest regard for their personal comfort and habitual occupations.

The Soviet Labor Code is being used as a means of oppression against the unfortunate bourgeoisie, while the privileged Communist class is either exempt from compulsory labor, or else assigned to easy jobs. During the unceasing epidemics ravaging the country, the bourgeoisie, on the strength of the regulations of the Labor Code, are being forced to dig graves and bury the dead. During guerrilla periods, under the pretext of the same rules, the bourgeoisie are being compelled to dig trenches for the Red Army. When the Communists suddenly decide to establish some kind of a new "front," for instance when they wish to clean up their filthy cities, again it is the bourgeoisie who has to perform the job. It is a cruel and relentless mockery. Eminent physicians and jurists, skilled engineers and scientists, refined women and ladies of society are forced to work as grave-diggers and street-sweepers.

Of course, these drafted workers are "striking on their jobs" and sabotaging the Communist State.

Compulsory labor, as an avowed policy in Russian economics, was introduced not only in conformity with the Marxian stipulations, but also as a measure to increase productivity. Soviet decrees recommending methods for securing labor efficiency were thoroughly ignored both by the workers and the Communist superintendents themselves. The reason therefor is to be found not so much in the opposition of the masses of the people to the Bolsheviki, as in the fact that their legislation has always refused to deal with actual conditions and social realities. The Communist lawmakers try to squeeze life into the Procrustean bed of abstract theories and dead formulas. Take this rule:

*"Every worker must, during a normal working day and under normal conditions, perform the standard amount of work fixed for the category and group in which he is enrolled."**

What does "the standard amount of work" mean? What significance have the "Valuation Commissions" established to determine the standard output for workers in each trade? They are merely defunct bureaucratic bodies sapping the Soviet treasury. Any consid-

* Paragraph 114 of the Soviet Labor Code.

eration for fixing the standard output must be based upon "normal working conditions," that is, satisfactory conditions of machinery and accessories, timely delivery of materials and tools, a good quality of materials, and similar factors bearing the greatest importance upon the tempo of industrial production. But what is normalcy as applied to Soviet Russia? Every department of life is upset; every industrial agency is broken, and the whole technique of production is brought to a standstill. What then is "the standard output"? And what is the object in putting up this smoke screen of theoretical dissertations on the methods for increasing labor productivity when factories have nothing to keep them running, no raw materials, no fuel, no lubricants, and no food to feed the workers?

Much hope has been placed by the Communists in their Labor Code. It was expected that as soon as these cruel regulations were put into effect, the creative faculty of the people would be restored and the citizens of the Socialist State would quickly resume their peaceful labors. But, alas! from the point of view of industrial returns, the year 1919 proved even more disappointing than the preceding years. The immediate effect of the reinstatement of slavery was that workers by the thousands began to desert the factories, fleeing to rural districts. Even the "shock plants" in

which food rations were somewhat better than in ordinary enterprises, began to experience an acute shortage of workmen. Labor desertion assumed colossal proportions, especially in the northern and central industrial districts. The pressure brought by the Central Soviet upon the Trade Unions in order to arrest further reduction in the number of industrial workers failed to bring about the desired effect. Futile were also the efforts to increase production by lengthening the labor-day and staging the ridiculous "Communist Sabbaths."* The notorious "eight-hour day" was given up. A Soviet radio dating back to February, 1920, stated:

"The toiling masses must understand that it is necessary to abandon the idea of an eight-hour day in this time of disorganization and hard work. *They must work ten and twelve hours a day and realize that they are working for a brighter future.*"

But babbling about "a brighter future" did not help. No one in Russia places any credence in Communist promises.

It was then that Trotzky came out with his nefarious project for the "Red Labor Army." In short, it called for a census of the popula-

* In order to increase production, Trotzky began to advocate the institution of the so-called "Communist Sabbaths," which means that the members of the Communist Party were urged to voluntarily work on Saturdays and holidays. Much boasting has been on foot about the wonderful spirit which the Communist partisans manifested toward the needs of the "Workers' and Peasants' State," but the actual results of the "Communist Sabbaths" are negligible.

tion fitted for work and coincided with military conscription. The local Commissars of the War Department were instructed to act as agents for labor mobilization.

At the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of National Economy, Lenin, on this point, quite in accord with Trotzky's bestial psychology, tried to justify slavery by stating:

"I should like only to point out that during the transition period from civil warfare to new problems, we should throw everything on the front of labor, and concentrate here all forces for a maximum effort, with a merciless determination. Just now we shall not permit any evasion. Throwing out this slogan, we shall justify that we must to the utmost bend all the vital forces of workmen and peasants to this task and demand that they give us all their help. And that, by creating a labor army, by straining all the forces of workmen and peasants, we shall be carrying out our basic task. We shall be able to collect hundreds of millions of poods of grain. We have them. But incredible, *diabolical* efforts are required."

In further elucidation of this program, the Moscow authorities on March 11, 1920, sent out the following radio:

"The utilization of military units for labor has both a practical (economic and social) and educational significance. The conditions under which the utilization of labor on a large scale

* See *Izvestia*, issue of January 29, 1920. Translated from the Russian.

would be commendable are as follows: Work of a simple nature which can be performed by any Red Army soldier, adoption of a system of stating a clearly defined task, *which when not accomplished leads to the reduction of the food ration*, adoption of the premium system, the employment of a great number of Communists in the same working district so that they may set Red Army units a good example (?). The employment of large military units unavoidably leads to a great percentage of Red Army soldiers unemployed directly in productive labor. For this reason the utilization of all labor armies, retaining the army system and organization, may only be justified from the point of view of keeping the army intact for military purposes."

One of the well-known Communists, Khodovsky, in the Moscow *Pravda*, advocated the militarization of trade unions so that they could be used as agencies for enforcing decrees on militarization of labor. To cite only one instance of the general attitude of the workers toward labor conscription, an article published in the Bolshevik *Red Gazette* may be referred to. A Communist reporter gives these comments on interviews with mobilized workers in Petrograd:

"Not all of them speak the truth. Some one spread the rumor that all unskilled laborers would be permitted to return to their villages for agricultural work, while the skilled were done for. . . . When asked why they did not report for the first draft, they seemed to hesitate. They in-

vented all sorts of excuses: one would not have finished building a house; another would plead some family cause. In one way or another it was obvious that had it not been for mobilization, the Petrograd factories would never have even got a glimpse of them.”*

The Russian workers tried to defend themselves as well as they could. In many factories when electing Workers' Shop Committees, they voted down all the Communist candidates. Sometimes they consciously elected anarchists because they knew that these were opposed to everything, no matter what it was. In one of the issues of the *Economicheskaya Jisn* an incident referring to the elections, at the railway shops near Moscow is described:

“The workers”—thus runs the account—
“were simply frightened at the introduction of compulsory labor and of the threats of labor discipline. The only anarchist in the work shop (whose head is a perfect jumble of ideas and catch-words) explained to his fellow-workers that this is nothing more than the reinstatement of serfdom. The result was that this anarchist ‘with his jumble of ideas’ was elected to the Soviet. He will make short work of them,’ they said.”†

But the bitter resentment of the poor Russian proletarians to Bolshevist inquisitionary methods did not modify them in the slightest degree. On the contrary, Trotzky, reiterating

* See *Krasnaya Gazeta* (The Red Gazette), No. 240, October, 1920.

† Quoted in *The Russian Economist*. Vol. I., p. 595.

Karl Marx's stipulation (*Communist Manifesto*) went so far as to urge militarization of all agricultural processes, which, if put into effect, would have placed 100,000,000 Russian peasants under the yoke of Red Army Commissars. On this subject Trotzky came out with a startling explanation:

“At present the militarization of labor is all the more needed because we have now come to the mobilization of the peasants as a means of solving the problems requiring mass action. *We are mobilizing the peasants and organizing them into labor detachments which very much resemble military detachments. . . .* We have in the important branches of our industry more than 1,000,000 workmen on the list; in reality, however, not more than 800,000 are actually engaged in work. Now, where are the remainder? They have gone to the villages or other divisions of industry or into *speculation*. Among the soldiers this is called desertion in one form or another. The methods used to compel soldiers to perform their duty must also be applied in the field of labor. *Under the unified system of economy, the masses of workmen should be moved about, ordered and sent from place to place in exactly the same manner as soldiers.* This is the foundation of the militarization of labor and without this we shall be unable to speak seriously of any organization of industry on a new basis under the conditions of starvation and disorganization existing to-day.”*

* Moscow *Izvestia*, March 21, 1920. Further details on labor conscription and mobilization of labor may be found in Chapter 8 of Trotzky's Book *The Defence of Terrorism*, London, 1921.

Such are—to use Lenin’s own expression—the “diabolical methods” which have been introduced by the Soviet rulers, ostensibly for the purpose of solving the industrial crisis; in reality, however, to enslave the whole nation, torturing it in the All-Russian Cheka, in filthy Soviet prisons, and in miserable Red Guard armories. Under the pretext of establishing a dictatorship *of* the proletariat, the Communists have imposed a horrid dictatorship *over* the proletariat. Indeed, hell they have attained. But the industrial crisis in all its magnitude continues to be the nightmare of Russian life.

It is hardly necessary to go into further details describing the extent and the various phases of the Russian industrial catastrophe. Incidentally it may be noted that all Soviet measures, culminating in the restoration of slavery and militarization of labor, have failed to relieve the tragic situation. Production continues to decrease in ever-growing proportions. Here are a few additional figures bringing the analysis up to date:

SOUTH RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS

December, 1921, coal output	7,500,000	poods
January, 1922, coal output	4,600,000	”
December, 1921, cast iron smelted	491,000	”
January, 1922, cast iron smelted	347,000	”
December, 1921, smelted in furnaces	896,000	”
January, 1922, smelted in furnaces	724,000	”*

* See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 82, April 12, 1922.

As compared with December, 1921, in January, 1922, the rolling mills reduced their operations by 52 per cent. In February, 1922, there was a further reduction of 18 per cent. The most significant decrease, however, was registered in smelting cast iron; of the two furnaces in the South Russian District, the famous Uzovsky furnace was extinguished, with the result that in February, 1922, only 8,000 poods of cast iron were smelted.*

Similar disintegration is observed in textile industries. Here, too, the production of manufactured goods infallibly grows less:

November, 19211,518,000	arshines†
December, 19212,179,000	”
January, 19221,402,000	”
February, 19221,000,000	”

Everywhere the picture of decay and despair is the same.

As a general remark it must be said that wholesale destruction of Russian industries is in no way a casual phenomenon. It is the logical outcome of the nonsensical and brutal policies which have been pursued by the Communists during the entire period of their incredible misrule.

* See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 82, April 12, 1922.

† One arshine is equal to 2.3 feet. See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 82, April 12, 1922.

Marxism, fallacious as it is in theory, when applied to practice produces dismal conditions. Chaos, Misery and Death are the three monsters—the three symbols of Bolshevism.

Shall civilized mankind bow down before these monsters?

CHAPTER IV

TRADE AND FINANCE

MODERN economic life is a complex mechanism, the integral parts of which, such as agriculture, industry, trade and finance, are so closely inter-related that the functioning of one branch is conditional upon the normal and uninterrupted operation of the others. With chaos reigning in Russia's agriculture, and disintegration prevailing in her industries, it was natural that both trade and finance could not remain on a sound footing.

In the preceding brief sketch of the nationalization program the fact was emphasized that trade, in the same way as industry, was placed under Soviet control. Foreign and internal commercial intercourse were monopolized by the Communist State, and no private trade transactions could be carried on no matter whether they were confined to Russia proper or extended to foreign countries.

By the end of 1920 the nationalization cycle was completed. Distribution of commodities, and trade exchange at large, were entrusted to bureaucratic institutions, while even petty trade was declared a crime against the Soviet Republic and labeled as "speculation." It was due to this policy and not to the "blockade"

that trade relations between Soviet Russia and foreign countries have almost ceased. Nothing was exported from Russia since there was nothing to export. The table below shows the rapid decline in shipments to foreign countries:

RUSSIAN EXPORTS

1913	23,017,500	tons
1918	29,490	"
1919	20,210	"
1920	10,900	"
1921	209,080	"*

In 1921 the Soviets began to modify their trade policies, and commercial relations in several lines were freed from Soviet tutelage. This explains the puzzling increase of exports in that year. But the improvement did not last long. In January, 1922, the total amount of exports did not exceed 16,600 tons and in February it was again reduced to only 13,300 tons.

The stoppage of exports produced a reciprocal condition regarding imports. According to a report of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, in 1921 the imports were only 916,666 tons, including charity shipments of the American Relief Administration and kindred organizations. The value of these goods was approximately 248,557,000 gold rubles at pre-

* *Economicheskaya Jisn*, issue of March 7, 1922.

war prices. In 1910 Russia's foreign trade balance showed the following:

Imports1,084,446,000	gold rubles
Exports1,449,085,900	gold rubles

Comparing these figures with the turnover in foreign trade for 1921, we see that it constituted about 10 per cent. of that in 1910, while with regard to weight it was only 2.8 per cent.*

The increase in imports from western countries, mainly from England, took place during the first part of 1920, reaching the peak (10,000,000 poods) in the month of September. But beginning with October, foreign consignments again began to fall off:

October, 1921,7,800,000	poods
November, 1921,6,500,000	"
December, 1921,5,200,000	"
January, 1922,4,439,000	"

In February, 1922, the volume of imports showed a somewhat livelier tendency owing to larger quantities of food shipped by the American Relief Administration.

* The total value of goods exported from Soviet Russia in 1921 did not exceed 20,000,000 gold rubles. Compare these figures with data furnished by the *Economicheskaya Jisn*, issues February 16th and 18th, and March 18th and 21st, and the Weekly Bulletin of the Supreme Monarchical Council, No. 39, May 1, 1922. Published in Berlin in Russian.

The significance of these statistics will be made quite clear if it is considered that even in former times Russian economic life had to rely upon commodities imported from abroad. The following table indicates the percentage of imports in proportion to domestic production in pre-war times:

Agricultural machinery:

(a) Not equipped with steam engines	42 %
(b) Complex machinery	72 %
(c) Scythes	78 %
Coal	25 %
Mathematical and astronomical instruments	70 %
Medical instruments	75 %
Electrical instruments	80 %
Zinc	65 %
Lead	98 %
Cotton-wool	47 %
*Silk	90 %

Nationalization measures, having brought to a standstill Russia's commercial intercourse, with foreign nations had an equally deleterious effect upon the distribution of commodities within the country itself. The Soviets had private stores closed and their merchandise seized by the State. Traditional Russian customs of bartering, such as fairs and bazaars, were prohibited and the exchange of goods was put under the supervision of State officials.

* See A. Raketoff, *Op. Cit.* p. 70.

Nominally every citizen of the Soviet Republic had the right to purchase from Soviet stores everything needed for the daily upkeep of his household. It was the prerogative of the State to regulate prices. On the other hand, it was also its duty to supply the different regions with various kinds of goods in sufficient quantities. Such was the theory. The practice was entirely different.

When the trade mechanism fell into the hands of the State, it was found that the bureaucratic organization set up by the Soviets was unequal to coping with the task of furnishing the people with the necessary commodities. Underproduction, combined with the elimination of imports from abroad, caused an acute shortage of merchandise of every description. The stocks of private merchants which had been confiscated were either sold out or appropriated by Soviet functionaries themselves. No wonder prices of food, fuel and other daily necessities became prohibitive. But even in a Soviet State, and under a Marxian régime, people have to live somehow or other. The mere fact that the Bolsheviki dispensed with private trade could not and did not bar commercial intercourse among private citizens. However, the effect of the Communist program has been twofold: First, hundreds of thousands of citizens, including the Commissars, have gone into speculation, making regular trips to rural districts

to procure food, linen, and other necessities, which were thereafter resold in the cities at extortionate prices. The Bolsheviki have thus created a new caste of society—the speculators—who, like social parasites, are looting and snatching whatever there is left in the possession of private individuals. Second, the colossal wealth which through centuries had accumulated in the cities has been gradually smuggled out to rural districts. The reason for this was that in the cities the greatest need was food. Food was available only in the villages. Soviet rubles meant nothing to the peasants. They flatly refused to exchange their products for rubbish currency. But they did sell them for such things as they either needed in their households, or wanted to keep as objects of luxury. In view of this situation, the urban residents were compelled to give up their all, from matches, hammers and nails, to paintings by Raphael, rare musical instruments, priceless libraries, and most precious gems.

Like conspirators, the poor Soviet citizens secretly crept to the “thief markets” where they met the speculators. It was there that the bulk of the “business” was carried on. It was there, and not in Soviet stores, that people procured their daily bread. Communist spies and agents of the Cheka, sneaking around these markets, took part in swindling, stealing and smuggling. Meanwhile the things belonging to

urban residents grew scarcer every day. Many have already sold everything they had and now there is nothing more to sell. Theft is the only solution, the only means of making a livelihood, and they become thieves in order to save themselves and their families from hunger and death.

One of the most pitiful features of the trading practice in Soviet Russia is the large number of children at present engaged in speculative activities. Boys and girls between the ages of eight and twelve are flocking around bazaars and railroad stations, waiting for a chance to steal a loaf of bread or a bundle of vegetables. Then they go to a starving "bourgeois" and he pays for the stolen morsels with his last ring or overcoat.

The *Moscow Izvestia*, issue No. 254, for 1920, stated that between the months of February and November of that year 7,000 children engaged in speculation and swindling were brought before the Moscow Commission in charge of minor criminals. These children, left to their own care, lead a vagabond life. All of them are morally degenerate. Easy money is all they are after. Venereal diseases are rampant among them. What drags these little ones to the depths of the social inferno? Sometimes it is the unselfish desire to help their destitute parents who are starving on the Soviet ration; in other instances it is their

greed, or the sordid instincts of their elder relatives who seek to make a fortune by employing children to do the actual stealing. The ranks of this infantile army of speculators comprise many who have managed to escape from Soviet asylums and hospitals.

The socialistic methods of distribution produced a peculiar type of speculators known in Russia as "*bag-carriers*" (*meshechniki*), meaning those who carry in their bags food and other things for sale. In Petrograd and in Moscow these traders are almost unionized, forming numerous detachments, with foremen, treasurers and collectors of their own. Bag-carriers journey to remote rural districts where they "collect their crops." They return to the cities in railroad cars, often occupying places on the platforms and roofs. As a general rule, they are in collusion with Soviet officials who get the lion's share. One of such speculators tells the following story of his experience in the smuggling business.

"I made trips to Ukrainia where I paid 400 rubles for one pood of potatoes. In Petrograd I charged 500 rubles for one pound* and in addition I insisted upon *douma rubles*.† I was aware that the buyer was giving up his last clothes in order to purchase my potatoes or my pound of flour. But what could I do?—I was employed

* 1 Russian pood is equal to 40 pounds.

† Rubles issued by the Provisional Government. They are valued higher than Soviet rubles.

in the Truck Transportation Department as assistant chauffeur. I was fed very poorly. I did not want to go to the Commissar and beg favors from him. Besides I had a grandmother to support. She had nothing to eat. In the meantime I began to bloat from hunger. So I made up my mind to desert the Truck Department. I got up a gang, and once a month we would go to Ukrainia. Really it made no difference in what way we died, whether by starving to death or being murdered. In Ukrainia we would buy or exchange for calico, matches and soap, various products and take them back to Petrograd. Now, if one carries these goods as a bag-carrier in a passenger car, there is always a chance that he may be caught and his goods confiscated. Therefore, we usually made an agreement with the Train Commissar. We would pay him 20,000 rubles and he would take us, along with our bags, into a freight car. Then this car would be sealed up and from Bakhmach to Petrograd we would be carried without being disturbed. There were several such freight cars in one train. The car records are kept by the Commissar and no one among the superiors ever checked us up. A single trip gave me a monthly return of thousands of rubles, and in addition I had food for myself and my grandmother. On railroad stations speculators of our type outnumbered the general public. Of course everyone of us had an official pass executed in Petrograd by the various Soviets. What did they care? For 100 or 200 rubles they will always affix a seal. Railroad officials are well aware of this procedure, but they keep quiet as all of them receive their 'ration.' They charge just as much as they like because our lives are in their

hands. Now and then, in order to 'raise the exchange' they execute someone among the less experienced. The result is: If a Soviet in charge of food supplies (Prodkom) intends to ship bread to Petrograd, no cars are found available, whereas with us it is different. Three of us are permitted to occupy an empty car which is allowed to run to the place of destination without being uncoupled."*

True seems the new proverb originated by the Russians: "*He who does not speculate shall not eat.*"

From a sanitary point of view, the bag-carrying trade turned out to be a misfortune. Owing to the scarcity of bags and the difficulty of laundering them—for practically no soap is to be had—food is being dragged all over Russia in filthy bags which are infested with vermin. This indisputably is one of the contributing causes of epidemics and the terrible spread of infectious diseases.

Of course, this kind of commercial intercourse could not solve the distribution problem. The ill-feeling harbored against trade restrictions grew so intense that finally revolts broke out all over the country, culminating in the Kronstadt uprising. Urban workers assiduously protested against the idiotic Soviet policy relating to internal trade. The mass of the population was steadfastly opposed to the Cheka

* See Professor Shcherbina's "*Laws of Evolution and Bolshevism*," pp. 78, 79. Belgrade, 1921. Translated from the Russian.

prosecution of petty traders. Even the speculators enjoyed the sympathy of the majority of the people because everybody knew that without speculation and bag-carrying, no food could be obtained in the cities. Therefore, among the essential points raised by the Kronstadt rebels was the demand for the abolition of all trade restrictions and the reinstatement of free trade. It was reported that Apfelbaum (Zinoviev), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale ("Komitern") and the Red Dictator of Petrograd, was one of the most ardent opponents of this movement. But ultimately the Bolsheviki were compelled to submit to the unanimous pressure of the people.

Beginning with 1921, step by step, concessions on the trade issue have been made by Soviet authorities. In the first place, petty trade was nominally freed. Small shops were reopened in many places, and retailers given the right to sell certain categories of goods. On the other hand, simultaneously with the adoption of Lenin's project known as the "Prodnalog,"* the peasants were permitted to trade in their "surplus" grain and this unfortunately was bitter irony. In addition, there is a tendency at present to facilitate the procedure required for the opening of commercial concerns.

* See Chapter II.

Nevertheless, general trade conditions in Soviet Russia remain intolerable. The All-Russian Cheka still clings to its aggressive policy towards private commerce, while the Local Soviets deliberately disregard the decrees ordering reinstatement of free trade.

In one of the issues of the *Economicheskaya Jisn* is published an interview with Jacob Halperstein, a Communist in charge of a Soviet department store at Moscow. He stated:

“We must strive to organize State retail trade, at the same time encouraging individual retail merchants. State stores alone cannot satisfy the requirements even of Moscow, not to speak about the provincial districts. . . . It is to be regretted, however, that the common view is different: Private trade both wholesale and retail is considered a grave sin.”*

Another Communist, by the name of Eismona, recently admitted that:

“Due to the guilt of the local organizations which have been destroying private petty trade in every possible way, and burdening it with unbearable taxes, it still remains to a large extent, a ‘shyster’ profession.”†

But Moscow Soviet authorities are hardly any better than their provincial colleagues. Professor Terne gives the following account of

* See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 92, issue of April 27, 1922.

† Ibid, see article, “The Struggle Against the Industrial Crisis.”

the procedure for obtaining a license to open a store:

“First of all, the Soviets require that a person desiring to open a trade concern shall produce a certificate from the so-called ‘Kvartkhoz’ (The Soviet in charge of economic activities in a given block), to the effect that premises therefor are available. This, of course, means that the particular Commissar has to be bribed. After having received such a certificate, the prospective merchant must procure another permit to actually occupy the space allotted to him, which, in turn, necessitates another and higher bribe. The next step consists of filling out an application giving exhaustive answers as to the nature of trade, the profession of the applicant prior to the revolution, his attitude toward the Soviet Government, etc. At the prevailing bribing rates, the approval of such an application costs anywhere from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 rubles. In addition, there is always a danger that the information thus furnished in the application might serve the Cheka, with the result that the daring merchant would finally land in a Soviet prison.”*

Such was the condition early in 1922.

The reinstatement of free trade has become all the more difficult as practically all suitable buildings are requisitioned by the Soviets and used for official purposes. At the same time, space for temporary wooden sheds in open markets is being auctioned off at prohibitive prices.

* See Prof. A. Terne's *In the Realm of Lenin*, pp. 256, 257. Berlin, 1922. Published in Russian.

For instance, in May, 1922, the renting of such space for one year was 46,000,000 rubles.*

Furthermore, the decree of July 26, 1921, established a special trade tax levied by the State. The new law divides trading into three classes. The price of a six months' license for the first class is 60,000 rubles; the second, 180,000 rubles; and the third, 600,000 rubles.

It is evident that only the privileged class—that is, the Communists, ex-convicts and Soviet officials—can afford to pay such prices and taxes.

In view of these conditions, it is not surprising that the prices of commodities have reached a fabulous level. In December, 1918, after twelve months of Communist practice, food was sold in Moscow at these rates:

Potatoes	10	rubles	per	lb.
Salt Fish	9 to 10	“	“	“
Bread (in open markets)	18 to 20	“	“	“
Pork	50	“	“	“
Beef	23	“	“	“
Sugar	80	“	“	“
Tea	100	“	“	“
Butter	80	“	“	“

A suit of clothes could be bought for 800 to 900 rubles, and a pair of shoes for 400 rubles.†

* See Russian paper *The Last News*, issue of May 5, 1922. Published in Reval.

† See *A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism in Russia*, presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty, April, 1919, p. 67.

These prices were justly considered exorbitant at that time. After four and one-half years of Soviet mismanagement, in April, 1922, the market prices were fixed by the Soviets as follows:

	April 1, 1922	April 14, 1922
	Rubles per	Rubles per
Barley	4,400,000 pood	6,000,000 pood
Millet	5,200,000 pood	6,000,000 pood
Fish (large cans)...	500,000 can	800,000 can
Fish (medium cans)	250,000 can	400,000 can
Fish (small cans)..	140,000 can	220,000 can
Raisins	10,000,000 pood	14,000,000 pood
Refined sugar	16,000,000 pood	17,000,000 pood
Raw sugar	9,000,000 pood	10,500,000 pood
Honey	10,000,000 pood	16,000,000 pood
Preserves	175,000 lb.	250,000 lb.
Caramel sugar	275,000 lb.	440,000 lb.
Salt	1,400,000 pood	1,600,000 pood
Vinegar	3,000,000 pood	3,300,000 pood
Soap (good quality)	8,000,000 pood	10,000,000 pood
Soap (poor quality)	5,000,000 pood	7,000,000 pood
Toilet soap	175,000 cake	225,000 cake
Matches	4,000 box	4,500 box
Swedish matches ..	4,500 box	5,500 box
Tea	1,200,000 lb.	1,500,000 lb.
Coffee	140,000 lb.	200,000 lb.*

The price folly reigns not only in Petrograd and Moscow but throughout all Russia. According to Soviet data, in the city of Rostov-on-

* See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 89, issue of April 23, 1922.

the-Don, the cost of a monthly ration, at 3,600 calories per day, on March 1, 1922, was 10,265,000 rubles, whereas on March 15, 1922, it had risen to 16,500,000 rubles, or in two weeks the prices had advanced 60 per cent.*

Commenting upon market conditions in Moscow, the *Economicheskaya Jisn* (No. 91, April 26, 1922) stated:

“Prices of all products without exception have advanced considerably. The proportion of increase with regard to several products was 40 per cent. (butter), 55 per cent. (buckwheat flour and cabbages), and even 91 per cent. (beef). Calculating the cost of the monthly food ratio at 3,600 calories, which by April 23rd reached the level of 30,269,000 rubles, we notice, as compared with April 15th, when it was only 21,107,000 rubles, an increase of 43 per cent., while for the whole month the advance is 94 per cent. Comparing the prices for the month of October, 1921, when the ratio was 529,000 rubles, we see an increment of more than 57 times.”

The present trade muddle in Soviet Russia comes as a consequence of the general economic collapse. The fact that the Communist authorities were forced to make minor concessions to the Russian people on the question of commercial intercourse did not bring the expected relief. Sovietism is so insane in its foundations, so corrupt in its workings, that secondary im-

* See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 82, issue of April 12, 1922.

provements and insignificant changes cannot restore the country to normal conditions.

There was a time when liberals, lamenting over Russia's economic plight, argued that it was caused by the Allied blockade and the egoistic attitude of capitalism towards the resumption of trade relations with the Soviets. Mass meetings were held, radical organizations formed, and newspaper campaigns engineered with the exclusive aim of inducing the western world to start trade with the Soviets. This agitation assumed a virulent form especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. In England where the Labor Party is thoroughly Sovietized, and where Lloyd George manifests a sort of natural proclivity toward the oppressors of the Russian people, a trade agreement with Soviet Russia was signed on March 16, 1921.

Bolshevik sympathizers on the Thames anticipated that the resumption of trade with the Bolsheviki was rather a measure of political self-defense than a constructive economic policy. The gentlemen of Downing Street, shortsighted as they may have been, placed but little faith in Krassin's assurance that Russia presented "wonderful opportunities" for the English merchant. The underlying motive for dealing with the Soviets was and still remains England's dread of Communist propaganda in British Asiatic Dominions. The Bolsheviki agreed all the more readily to the clause to

refrain from propaganda as they knew that they would never fulfill their promise.

In the fall of 1921 Lord Curzon openly admitted before Parliament that, from a political standpoint, the Anglo-Saxon Treaty has been shamelessly broken by the Bolsheviki, while in the way of economic advantage, English merchants and manufacturers have gained very little.

The same applies to other countries which were moved either by greed or political considerations to sign commercial treaties with the Moscow Communists. These "scraps of paper" have proved of no help to Russia or to western countries.

Some light was shed on the whole problem of trade with Soviet Russia when Mr. Finkelstein (Litvinoff) advised the members of the Credits Sub-commission of The Hague Conference that:

*"There should be no question of confidence by shippers in the Russian Government, because the shippers should not look to Moscow for the money, but to their own governments."**

This certainly must have come as a great disappointment to the political flappers of both continents. *All's well that ends well!* Now, at least, the world knows what the Bolsheviki

* See *The New York Times*, June 28, 1922. article entitled "Russians at Hague Held to Business."

mean when they refer to Soviet Russia as the land of "commercial opportunities."

Soviet sympathizers have also tried to make it appear that the resumption of trade with the Marxian State would overnight cure the unemployment situation. They knew that what they were telling was nonsense, for Russia had nothing to trade with and any orders placed by the Soviets with western manufacturers would inevitably be fake orders.*

"LABOR LEADS IN SENATE FOR SOVIET TRADE.

Spokesmen of 3,000,000 Toilers Demand Russia of Workers Have Same Privilege as Russia of Czars. Resumption of Commerce Necessary to Relieve Unemployment, Leaders say."

And still these idealistic creatures agitated, babbled, lobbied and otherwise labored to the utmost of their limited ability to force their respective governments into shameful deals with the usurpers in the Kremlin. It was hoped that this would bring about the first step toward the recognition of the Soviet régime.

Much in the same way the notorious Soviet campaign for "concessions" had but a remote connection with trade policies and financial openings. People with common sense did not fail to understand that Washington D. Vanderlip would never receive Kamchatka as a Christmas gift from "comrade" Trotzky. Nor

* Compare this with the headlines in the *New York Call*, the official organ of the American Socialist Party, in its issue of January 27, 1921:

was it difficult to grasp that promises made by Lenin to "Bill Haywood" and his I. W. W. pals to give up the Kouznetzsk mines were merely a political move designed to place the "American" beneficiaries under the control of the Third Internationale. Nevertheless, parlor agitation in favor of such and similar "concessions" is in full swing. At this point it may be well to recall the statements made by Communist leaders regarding the matter.

Milutin, who is among the "foremost" Bolshevik economists, addressing the Petrograd Soviet in December, 1920, declared:

"We have seized the means of production from our own bourgeoisie. At present we are determined to seize the means of productions from the foreign bourgeoisie. Because, however, we are unable to nationalize the plants of Vanderlip and Krupp, we must give them concessions and thus take possession of the technique of their means of production."*

Significant is also Lenin's statement made before the Moscow District Conference of the Communist Party on November 23, 1920:

"The differences between our enemies have recently increased, particularly in connection with the proposed concessions to be granted to a group of American capitalist sharks, headed by a multimillionaire, who reckons upon grouping around

* Quoted from Bulletin No. 1 of the Russian National Society, issue of February 3, 1921, p. 4, New York City.

himself a number of other multi-millionaires. Now, all the communications coming from the Far East bear testimony to the fact that there is dissatisfaction in Japan regarding this agreement, although the latter has not been signed yet, and is so far only a draft. Nevertheless, Japanese public opinion has been brought to the boiling-point and I have read to-day a communication to the effect that Japan accuses Soviet Russia of planning to embroil Japan with America. *We have rightly estimated this imperialist rivalry and we have made up our minds as to the necessity of systematically utilizing this rivalry in order to make their fight against us difficult.*"

Lenin further explained:

"There can be no better proof of the material and moral victory of our Soviet Republic over world capitalism than the fact that the powers which went to war against us on account of our terrorism and on account of our new order (?) were compelled, in spite of their own wish, to enter into relations with us, knowing full well that they are thus strengthening us."*

But then the reply of the parlor Bolshevik to this outspoken argument of Lenin's is classically simple: "*He really doesn't mean it.*"

FINANCE

It is next to impossible to speak seriously of the Soviet "financial system" for this is a case where there is no method in madness.

* Quoted from *The Workers' Challenge*. See issue of January 16, 1921, p. 6.

Imperial Russia bequeathed to Soviet Russia a gold fund amounting to 1,350,000,000 rubles. Communist activities as far as finances are concerned consisted mainly of two things: (a) the dissipation of the gold fund, and (b) unrestricted issuance of paper currency. In both tasks they have succeeded splendidly. After one year of Bolshevist management, the gold fund was reduced to 825,000,000 rubles. By 1919 it amounted to 410,000,000 rubles; by 1920, to 200,000,000 rubles, and by the end of 1921, to only 70,000,000 rubles. There is no way of determining the exact sum of gold left in Russia for no reliable statistics are available. According to the American press, soon after the Genoa Conference, the Bolsheviki admitted that their régime would collapse within six months unless large sums of cash were obtained.*

The latest advices from Russia seem to indicate that out of the original Imperial fund there is practically no gold left, with the exception of a certain minimum allotted for foreign propaganda.

The infamous pillage of the Russian Church was undertaken by the Bolsheviki with the object of increasing their gold reserve and by no means for the purpose of relieving the

* See cable from The Hague to *The New York Times*, issue of June 7, 1922, article entitled, "Bolsheviki Said to Admit Cash Alone Can Save Soviet."

starving population. This vandalism, according to *The Journal of Commerce*, yielded considerable booty, amounting to 314,000,000 gold rubles. The correspondent of the paper added:

“These are absolutely the last reserves of the Soviet; nothing else remains with which to make international payments.”*

This information was not quite correct, for a few days later news came from Petrograd that the Bolsheviki had desecrated the Imperial tombs in the St. Peter and Paul Cathedral. This abominable crime was committed for the purpose of appropriating the jewels which were placed in the sarcophaguses wherein the corpses of the late emperors repose.

Russia's gold has been lavishly spent by the Communists for propaganda abroad. Immense sums were also appropriated by them and smuggled over the border. The time has not yet come to tell a comprehensive story regarding the dissipation of Russian gold reserves. This much, however, can be asserted: Colossal graft has been freely practiced by the Marxian disciples, who, disguised in proletarian overalls, have managed to make huge fortunes at the expense of the Russian people.

Simultaneously with the scattering of the gold fund came the issuance of paper currency

* See *Journal of Commerce*, May 16, 1922.

in ever-growing quantities. Paper circulation in Russia increased as follows:

January	1, 1917.....	9,103,000,000
October	23, 1917.....	18,927,000,000
January	1, 1918.....	25,200,000,000
January	1, 1919.....	55,000,000,000
January	1, 1920.....	194,000,000,000
June	1, 1920.....	455,000,000,000
November	1, 1920.....	855,000,000,000
January	1, 1921.....	1,168,000,000,000*

The precise quantity of rubbish rubles cannot be calculated. At the time of The Hague Conference, however, some light at least was thrown upon the general chaos prevailing in Soviet treasury matters. The fact, for instance, was made known that for the first four months of 1922 the expenses of the Soviet Republic reached 130,000,000,000,000 paper rubles and 104,000,000,000,000 of new paper was issued. Two hundred and fifty thousand billion new paper rubles have been printed during the first six months of 1922. Analyzing these figures, Edwin L. James, *New York Times* Special Correspondent at The Hague, remarked:

“The best comment on the Russian budget is that while the covering letter makes a general claim that only 20 per cent. of the expenses have been met by paper money issue, the actual figures they themselves give, show that the expenditures

* Raketoff, Op. Cit., p. 67.

in June this year were 130,000,000,000,000 rubles paper with a money issue of 85,000,000,000,000. This represents 53 per cent. The Russian claim of 20 per cent. must be a lie or else the Treasury Department shows a default of some 40,000,000,000,000 rubles for one month.''*

As a matter of guesswork, it was estimated that on July 1, 1922, there were approximately 280,000,000,000,000 paper rubles in circulation.

In these circumstances, it is idle to speak about a "budget system," or a State balance, as far as *Soviet* Russia is concerned.

All figures appearing on Soviet balance sheets are quite fictitious since the actual expenditures are much larger and the revenues much smaller than originally estimated in the budgets. Attempts to analyze these annual and semi-annual statements are futile for the disbursements, according to the allocations to the various Commissariats, if added up, do not coincide with the grand total. Thus, for the year 1920, the specific allocations give a total of 504,500,000,000 rubles, which, however, is only 48 per cent. of the total disbursements. The question, of course, arises: What has become of the remaining 52 per cent?†

Referring to the revenues, it must be borne in mind that such consist almost exclusively

* See article "Soviet Budget Staggers Experts," *New York Times*, July 5, 1922.

† See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, September 21, 1920.

of new paper issues. The Soviet printing office is probably the only Soviet factory the output of which has increased tremendously.

Things have gone so far that a special Soviet Commission was appointed in 1920 to devise a plan for the acceleration of the output of paper money.

Owing to the perturbed conditions of Communist finances, Soviet rubles have lost all value on the international exchange. On April 22, 1922, the "Gosbank" (State Bank) fixed the following rates for foreign currency:

1 pound sterling.	4,100,000	rubles	(April 21,	3,300,000)
1 American dollar	900,000	"	"	708,000)
1 Canadian dollar	850,000	"	"	700,000)
1 French franc...	85,000	"	"	60,000)
1 Swedish krona.	245,000	"	"	190,000)
1 German mark..	4,000	"	"	*3,000)

Low as these quotations are, they do not nearly represent the actual devaluation of Soviet rubles. According to *The New York Times* of June 13, 1922, 3,300,000 Soviet rubles could then be bought for \$1.00.

The bankruptcy of the Communist régime has become so obvious that Soviet officials themselves have admitted it on many occasions. As the last resort to save the situation, they have adopted a new system of swindling the people by marking 100,000,000 rouble bills as "10,000

* See *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 89, April 23, 1922.

rubles." In this way they hope to fool the public, eventually forcing a deflation.

Here is what Mr. Walter Duranty relates about this affair:

"The authorities hope that when the latter (high denomination bills) are retired the new figures will be adopted as written, which will have the effect of reducing the internal debt 10,000-fold. This is deflation with a vengeance, as if the value of the dollar were suddenly fixed at one-tenth of a mill. Yet such deflation will quite probably be accomplished as the result of the extraordinary 'bread loan' which the Soviet Government is now floating. As the price of a pood of flour is now around 5,750,000 rubles, the proposition might seem to be most advantageous to the public. In reality the whole affair is a gigantic gamble in futures; for if the harvest is good, as is now hoped, the price of flour in December will probably be less than 3,000,000 rubles. In that case the result will be that the Government will kill two birds with one stone—retire the old high-denomination paper and reduce inflation directly to the benefit of its currency."*

What Mr. Duranty chooses to call "*a gigantic gamble*" should properly be described as *a gigantic swindle*.

Spectacles of wisdom are not needed to see how completely Marxian disciples have wrecked a great and wealthy country. At pres-

* See article "Unique Soviet Plan to Force Deflation," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1922.

ent it is only the incurable imbecile of the sentimental type who is still hoping for better days to come. In his phraseology, however, there always is a little "but" to be added—namely, his pious desire that the Soviets be given a further chance. This means perhaps that the entire world should yield its cash to "comrade" Lenin, thus making his task "more comfortable and easy."

Paraphrasing Heine's remark about the Germans, it may be said to these "Friends of Soviet Russia":

"People have the right to be stupid, but you, gentlemen, abuse this right."

CHAPTER V

RUSSIA UNDER THE SOVIET HEEL

IN no land have revolutions ever been found pleasant. Forcible destruction of civil order and political organizations inevitably leads to grave perturbances in the national organism. It is an error to imagine that peoples who have become infected with the revolutionary disease recover from it as easily as philosophers and politicians have written books which paved the way for social cataclysms in various countries. Smooth are the theories but rough the events that form the substance of revolutionary upheavals. Cromwell's epoch in England and 1793 in France have many bloody episodes on their records. The fact that we, in our day, are viewing them from misty historical distances and through the prism of all-pacifying Time, makes them no less abhorrent, for tears shed by mourning nations do leave ineradicable traces in their hearts. When human multitudes are dragged through furnaces of suffering and grief, how is tragedy to be eluded? We may not exactly understand it, but we always have the right to presume that behind the veil of Space and Time things have happened that would have made us quiver had we witnessed them.

And yet how insignificant and paltry the deeds of the Convention do appear compared with the boundless despair pervading Russia of the present. The *great* French Revolution seems like a mere rehearsal, a children's masquerade, in the face of the crushing catastrophe, under the debris of which the Northern Giant lies buried.

Only those who have actually lived through the agony of the disaster, through all its manifold phases, the shameful wretchedness and vulgar misery of Communism, who, themselves, have lost their homes, their Motherland, and all they held sacred in their lives, only they who, themselves, have undergone the tortures of the Cheka, the base humiliation of cruel serfdom—only they are capable of grasping the full meaning, the hopeless aspect of an existence which is neither life nor death, but a slow process of dying.

It is not the object of this volume to render exhaustive account of the intolerable conditions prevailing in every-day experience under the Soviet yoke. The most that can be attempted is a general sketch of the fundamental features characteristic of the present State. Nor is it possible to focus attention on any individual plight, no matter how deep our sympathy may be for this or that person subjected to torment and death. From time to time, civilized humanity is staggered by news

coming from the depths of that unfortunate country, and then, for a day or two, newspaper columns are filled with dreadful stories depicting the inhuman conduct of the Soviet tyrants. Thus it was when the shocking Ekaterinburg crime was revealed to the world, and the details learned about the detestable murder of the martyred Emperor Nicholas II and his whole family, including the young Czarevitch and the Grand Duchesses.

The grim background of Russia's agony is *Terror* which penetrates all the pores and fibres of the nation, keeping it in a state of constant fear and depression. It is true that the first stage of red outrages has passed, when slaughtering was openly practiced in squares and market places, and when the corpses of victims were found lying around on street corners. At present, terror is no longer a public demonstration of cynical criminals against the peaceful population. It has assumed an organized and "orderly" form. It is less obvious but just as ruthless as in those days of the past. While in 1918, during the bright spring days of Bolshevism, Red Guard soldiers and drunken Kronstadt sailors, whom, incidentally, Kerensky called "*the beauty and pride of the Russian revolution,*" on their own initiative, were plundering, raping and butchering the "liberated people"—now the terroristic procedure is regulated by hundreds of decrees and elaborate in-

structions of the All-Russian Cheka to its agents scattered throughout the country. At present Terror is a closely devised plan, a carefully laid out system of murder combined with espionage and provocation. As Mrs. Snowden, the liberal British laborite, remarked when she got out of Soviet Russia:

“The people are afraid of the police and spies, spies are afraid of one another. All dwell in an atmosphere of suspicion and the Red Terror is a dreadful reality.”*

What is the Cheka? Peters, one of the most sinister types of Bolshevik Jacobins gave the following definition of this slang word:

“The All-Russian Cheka with its local branches must be the organ of the proletarian dictatorship, of the merciless dictatorship of one party.”†

“The Cheka is the sentinel of the revolution,” says the Bolshevik paper *The Red Sword*. Paraphrasing Kerensky’s remark about the drunken sailors, Apfelbaum (Zinoviev) declared:

“*The beauty and glory of our party are the Red Army and the Cheka.*”‡

* Mrs. Philip Snowden, *Through Bolshevist Russia*, p. 161. Castle & Company, Ltd., London, 1920.

† See the weekly of the Extraordinary Committee, No. 27, 1918. Translation from the Russian.

‡ See an important volume entitled “*Cheka*,” published by the Central Bureau of the Social Revolutionary Party, p. 15, 1922.

In other words, the Cheka is *the* machine of oppression, a terrible weapon which the Communists wield to keep the Russians in obeisance. A Lettish Bolshevik, by the name of Latzis, who at one time was considered the guiding spirit of the Cheka, gave this instruction to his subordinates:

“We do not conduct war against individuals. *We exterminate the bourgeoisie as a class.* When investigating, do not take the trouble to gather material and evidence to the effect that the defendant by word or deed opposed the Soviets. The first questions which you must propound to him are: To what class does he belong? What is his birth? How was he brought up? What is his education, and to what profession does he belong? These questions shall determine the fate of the defendant. Therein lies the meaning and the substance of Red Terror.”*

But these Lettish Robespierres of the Communist State indeed are merely tame sheep in comparison with a Dzerjinsky who is the grandmaster of the Cheka. An ex-convict of Polish descent, he rose to power which is even greater than that of Trotzky, because he justly enjoys the reputation of a man with a stony heart. In the whole range of human feelings, mercy is the one which he completely lacks. For him, Red Terror not only is “cold business,”

* See the Bolshevik publication *Red Terror* October 1, 1918. Translation from the Russian.

but to a greater extent perhaps, it is poesy in which he finds depraved delight. Like a real connoisseur, he relishes every manifestation of other peoples' suffering, every new form of inquisition. In inventing the most refined methods of torturing the victim, Dzerjinsky's imagination has no limits. It is probably only his companion, the Jewess Braude of the Moscow Cheka, who can compete with him in these fields. For a psychologist, it must be an instructive sight to watch Dzerjinsky, with his pale face, with his thin nostrils always trembling, with his drowsy gaze expressing mortal fatigue, and his constantly weeping eyes, while interrogating the panic-stricken defendant who knows that there is no hope for him who enters the gate of the All-Russian Cheka. Dzerjinsky is a clever actor. He has scrupulously learned all those catty little gestures, those shades of mimicry, sometimes conveying the impression that he is animated by condolence or overcome by emotion of sincere sympathy for the victim. There are moments when a mysterious flame may be observed in his usually dull eyes, a symptom which leaves no further doubt as to the outcome of the deadly game.

The Cheka is located in one of the crowded quarters of old Moscow. The Bolshaya Loubianka Street, where in former times the biggest insurance companies had their offices, has be-

come a huge prison in which all sections of the Cheka are located. People go far out of their way to avoid passing these places full of horror. The immense building heretofore occupied by the insurance company "Russia" is now the headquarters of the All-Russian Cheka, and it is there that its "inner prison" has been established. At No. 13 on the Loubianka there is a club for Cheka employees who, by the order of Dzerjinsky, are being "educated in æsthetics." Once a week the best Moscow artists are summoned to deliver lectures at the club, and entertain the distinguished audience with dramatic performances.

In the evenings, when Moscow sinks into darkness owing to the lack of fuel, it is only on the Loubianka that electric lights twinkle, warning the citizens that the Cheka is at work and that nothing can be concealed from it even under the mantle of night.

Connected with the main building of the Cheka is an annex facing the backyard, where the "Death Ship"* is situated.

To the right of the entrance there is a big room with a balustrade extending along the four walls. In the center there is an open space with a spiral stairway leading down to the cellar in which those condemned to die are kept. In one of the stone walls of the "hold"

* The "Death Ship" is a part of the Cheka prison where those sentenced to die are confined.

small cells are cut out. These are the so-called "*Chambers of departing souls.*" Therein the victims are left to live their last hours. Profound silence reigns there for no noise from the outside can reach the underground. Here every link with life is severed. In the evenings, after sunset, the death numbers are called out from upstairs, and the cells, when vacated, are immediately re-occupied by those who are "next" on the Cheka execution list. A man, who by a miracle managed to escape from this sombre tomb, gives the following simple, yet heart-breaking story, which throws a ray of light in the dark realm of the Communist inferno:

"At the end of January, 1921, I was thrown into the 'Ship' where there were two others awaiting their turn to die. * * * Those who were tried by the '*Troyka*'* usually were executed on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Therefore, on Wednesday, January 26th, they clearly realized that this was their last day. Still they were apparently very quiet, and even at dinner they applied to the foreman with the request: 'Pour us some thick stuff! Mind, you are feeding us to-day for the last time.' * * * Around six o'clock, the man on duty appeared, giving instructions to evacuate all those who had been casually thrown into these cells. Then it became apparent that in a few minutes the remaining ones would be taken out for execution. Our two

* The Cheka Council of three who deal with the important offenses against Soviet rule.

single cells were open but there was no chance to converse with the men in the adjoining cells as the jailer closely watched every move of theirs. In spite of this, they succeeded in hastily destroying some pencil notes. However, an hour later the executioner, Pankratov, accompanied by the commandant, Rodionov, came down to the cellar. Persons sentenced to death were called out of their cells and ordered to undress. They took off their overcoats, suits, and even their shirts. They undressed very quickly as though they were in a great hurry. Their faces were very pale. Their emotion was so strong that some of them proved unable to stand firmly on their feet, and then they would fall. But once more they would get up. They smoked one cigarette after another and kept deadly still. After that, also without saying a word, promptly, almost running, the six began to mount the spiral stairway. * * * We were as though paralyzed on the spot. Benumbed, we watched them leave. I was struck by the thought that the same fate was awaiting me. Soon afterward the guards came in and took the belongings of the victims. The food was immediately divided among them, while some of their clothes were later observed on the executioner, Pankratov. Twenty minutes later a truck passed through the gates of the Moscow Cheka. * * * It was the truck which carried away the dead bodies of the executed, taking them to the Lefort morgue for postmortem examination and burial in a common grave. The judgment against the executed was rendered in default. For six weeks they had been waiting to be executed.'*

* Cheka, pp. 33 and 34. Translation from the Russian.

Practically every city of importance has a Cheka of its own. Some of the provincial branches exercise even more cruelty than the central body itself. The infamous activities of the Odessa, Kharkov and Don Chekas are known all over Russia, having assumed legendary proportions.

The Rev. R. Courtier-Forster, late British Chaplain at Odessa, who in 1919 witnessed a reign of terror, gives this vivid description:

“The house in the Catherine Square in which I was first in captivity afterwards became the Bolsheviks’ House of Torture in which hundreds of victims were done to death. The shrieks of the people being tortured to death or having splinters of wood driven under the quick of their nails were so agonizing and appalling that personal friends of my own living more than a hundred yards away in the Vorontsoffsky Pereulok were obliged to fasten their double windows to prevent the cries of anguish penetrating into the house. The horror and fear of the surviving citizens was so great that the Bolsheviks kept motor lorries thundering up and down the street to drown the awful screams of agony wrung from their dying victims.

“Week by week the newspapers published articles for and against the nationalization of women. In South Russia the proposal did not become a legal measure, but in Odessa bands of Bolsheviks seized women and girls and carried them off to the Port, the timber yards, and the Alexandrovsky Park for their own purposes. Women used in this way were found in the morn-

ings either dead or mad or in a dying condition. Those found still alive were shot. One of the most awful of my own personal experiences of the New Civilization was hearing at night from my bedroom windows the frantic shrieks of women being raped to death in the park opposite. Screams of shrill terror and despair repeated at intervals until they became nothing but hoarse cries of agony like the death calls of a dying animal. This happened not once, or twice, but many times. Never to the day of my death shall I forget the horror of those dreadful shrieks of tortured women, and one's own utter powerlessness to aid the victims or punish the Bolshevik devils in their bestial orgies."*

The personnel of the Cheka employees is composed of ex-convicts, sexual degenerates, political crooks and similar elements who go to make up the cream of the Communist Party. Their behavior is outrageous. Dressed in leather coats, with Brownings hanging from their belts, and wearing riding-boots, they can be seen everywhere—in the theatres, at labor meetings, at Communist Clubs, and in various "educational centers." The Cheka pass opens all doors to them. With this badge they have the right to raid private apartments at their discretion. Searches, as a general rule, are accompanied by theft, and things stolen by the Chekists can never be recovered, for there is

* Rev. R. Courtier-Forster, "Bolshevism, Reign of Torture at Odessa," reprinted from the *London Times*, December 3, 1919, pp. 2, 3, and 4.

no institution where complaints can be filed against these parasites of the Communist State. The various Soviets themselves are terrorized by the Cheka. Sometimes a mere anonymous letter, accusing a Soviet official of pro-bourgeois leanings, is sufficient to cause his arrest and have him "tried" on the Loubianka. Nobody feels safe under the Soviet régime because, as adjuncts to the official agents of the Cheka, there are innumerable "volunteer workers" in its employ. Soviet spies are everywhere. Everybody is watched, and Dzerjinsky went so far as to declare that he was quite willing to be shadowed by dozens of Chekists. "The Workers' and Peasants' State" has set up a model dynamo of espionage with a network of wires running to every section of the country.

All those who, as a result of Bolshevism, have become degraded and sunk to the social bottom, thieves and swindlers of former times, criminals guilty of sexual abuses, prostitutes, and degenerate young men who in days passed belonged to the idle strata of society—they all are now on the staffs of the All-Russian Cheka.

Russian counter-revolutionary organizations have collected albums containing pictures of these Communist spies. One glance at their faces, with loose-lipped, drooping mouths, flopping ears, weary eyes with not even a spark of will or courage in them, is sufficient to prove

that these records furnish priceless material for the future criminologist.

It is noteworthy that, while general science has been practically abandoned in Soviet Russia, a number of new "scientific disciplines," hitherto unknown to civilized mankind, have been invented by the Communist rulers. Special courses pertaining to the practice of espionage and its "theoretical foundations" are being given in the Cheka, with spies and executioners in attendance.

In the beginning of 1922, on the Loubianka, lectures were given on the following subjects:

- (a) The general aims of the Extraordinary Committees.
- (b) The organization of espionage.
- (c) Methods of investigating counter-revolutionary "crimes."
- (d) The organization of espionage on railroads.
- (e) The methods for struggling with counter-revolutionary activities in the army.
- (f) Methods for combating speculation.
- (g) The inter-relation between the different branches of the All-Russian Cheka.
- (h) The organization of searches and arrests.

The new Communist "learning" is rapidly replacing the old bourgeois science of the Newtons, Kants, Lobachevskys, and Darwins. These were found to be no good, at least compared with a Morozov, author of *The All-Russian Cheka and the October Revolution*, or a Latzis

enlightening the world with his booklet, *Two Years of Struggle on the Internal Front*. Trotzky himself, envying the scientific laurels of his Cheka companions, has devoted much of his precious time to writing a volume which bears the re-assuring title, *The Defence of Terrorism*. Therein he expatiates at length on the virtues of Terrorism in practice, and explains in what respect Marx would have sanctioned the Communist inquisition had he been alive to-day. Trotzky's book, as a whole, is a glorification of the extreme brutality which has marked the Socialist régime in Russia. His general deduction on the subject is:

“The State terror of a revolutionary class can be condemned ‘morally’ only by a man who, as a principle, rejects (in words) every form of violence whatsoever—consequently, every war and every rising. For this one has to be merely and simply a hypocritical Quaker.”*

Indeed, Trotzky's vindication of Terror does not leave much ground for a liberal heart to rejoice. Take this passage, for instance:

“The press is a weapon not of an abstract society, but of two irreconcilable, armed and contending sides. *We are destroying the press of the counter-revolution, just as we destroyed its fortified positions, its stores, its communications and its intelligence system.* Are we depriving

* Trotzky's *The Defence of Terrorism*, p. 55, London, 1921.

ourselves of Cadet and Menshevik criticisms of the corruption of the working class? In return we are victoriously destroying the very foundations of capitalist corruption.’*’

Or,

“Without the Red Terror the Russian Bourgeoisie, together with the world bourgeoisie, would throttle us long before the coming of the revolution in Europe. One must be blind not to see this, or a swindler to deny it.”†

In this respect Trotzky is merely reiterating such statements as have become commonplaces in the Bolshevist press. As far back as 1918 the official policy regarding Red Terror was formulated thus:

“Only those among the representatives of the bourgeois class who during the period of nine months succeeded in proving their loyalty to the Soviet rule should be spared. *All the others are our hostages and we should treat them accordingly. Enough of mildness. The interest of the revolution necessitates the physical annihilation of the bourgeoisie class. It is time for us to start.*”‡

The important point about this and similar utterances is that the Bolsheviki *do* mean what they say. According to Latzis’s own boast:

“In Petrograd alone as many as five hundred

* Ibid, p. 58.

† Ibid, pp. 60 and 61.

‡ *Red Gazette*, editorial article in the issue of August 31, 1918. Translation from the Russian.

persons were shot as an answer to the shots fired at Lenin and Uritsky.’’*

Nor is it possible to determine the precise number of Soviet victims—of all those who have been murdered either in the cellars of the Cheka or in the course of open banditism carried on by Red sailors and other “beauties” of the Communist Régime. The number of martyrs is unknown. Their names oftentimes have not even been recorded by Soviet chanceries.

In the spring of 1922, a member of British Parliament put the question to the Cabinet, whether it was true that from the beginning of Bolshevik rule up to July 1, 1921, the Soviets had executed the following number of people belonging to different classes:

Clergymen	1,215
Bishops	28
Professors and school teachers.....	6,775
Physicians and their assistants.....	8,800
Army and Navy officers.....	54,650
Soldiers	260,000
Policemen of higher ranks.....	10,500
Policemen of lower ranks.....	48,500
Land owners	12,950
Belonging to the intellectual class.....	355,250
Manual Workers	192,350
Peasants	815,100
Total	1,766,118

* N. Y. Latzis, *Popular Synopsis of Two Years' Activity on the Extraordinary Commissions*, quoted from Allan J. Carter's article, "The Bolshevik Substitute for a Judicial System," in the *Illinois Law Review*, January, 1922.

The answer was that His Majesty's Government had no authentic figures.

As a matter of fact, the subject is one that precludes astronomic accuracy. The bloody reality of Red Terror stands out as a frightful indictment of Communist rule. The slaughter of the Russian Nation has not ceased; it continues with uninterrupted ferocity. Lenin and Trotzký are butchering their serfs in haste, but systematically. The machine of oppression crushes its opponents without discrimination but also without mercy.

A few words should be mentioned about the Bolshevik judicial institutions, such as Revolutionary Tribunals and the "People's" Courts. Justice in the most elementary sense of the term does not exist in the Marxian State. One of the leading Soviet "jurists" frankly admitted:

"The task of Revolutionary Tribunals consists in passing judgment swiftly and ruthlessly on the enemies of the proletarian revolution. These courts are one of the arms for the suppression of the exploiters and in this sense they are just as much weapons of proletarian offence and defence as the Red Guard, the Red Army, the Extraordinary Commissions."*

Bolshevist judicial practice is as much of a mockery as it is an insult to the conscience

* See *Soviet Russia*, issue of September, 1921, p. 123. Published in New York City.

of the nation. Illiterate judges are turning over their decisions like so many pancakes, leaving the Soviet citizens in a state of perplexity. At times, court proceedings are converted in a real "Comedy of Errors," where the judge fails to grasp the difference between the plaintiff and the defendant, while the litigants are puzzled over the distinction between the judge and the witness.

The administration of justice in Soviet Russia does not differ from other modes of oppression, the sole purpose of which is to safeguard the proletarian oligarchy. Everything is adapted to this end. This is particularly true about the Red Army, which grew out of the original Red Guard bands and small Communist detachments. The scattered Red Guard units, however, were later brought under uniform management and centralized command. When Trotzky became War Commissar, he strove to build up a formidable Red force with two objects in mind: First, to use it as a weapon for fostering world revolution; and second, as a deadly tool against the Russian people themselves.

At an epoch when all civilized nations are concerned about the problem of limitation of armament, Soviet Russia is feverishly increasing her standing army, which justly causes grave anxiety to her neighboring States. While Russian industries are at a standstill, the Soviet

munition plants are working at full speed. Rifles and machine guns, which are the basic elements of modern military equipment, are being turned out at a rate which exceeds the pre-war output. Beginning with 1919, approximately 1,700,000 rifles were manufactured per year; at present their total supply on hand in arsenals is not less than 19,500,000.

Trotsky is continuously agitating in an endeavor to keep the militaristic spirit alive. His inflammatory speeches always refer to preparedness, and ever-increasing armaments are urged. By January, 1922, the standing army of Red Russia was approximately 700,000. In the army ranks, industrial workers represent scarcely more than 15 per cent., the rest being made up of peasants who are unreservedly opposed to the Soviet Régime. Still, espionage in the Red Army is so developed that any attempt to turn bayonets against the oppressors must necessarily encounter great obstacles. Every regiment has a Communist group which attentively watches the mood and behavior both of the officers' corps and the privates. The least manifestation of disobedience leads to immediate execution. Soldiers do not dare to form counter-revolutionary organizations because of the fear that Communist spies might get into them. Furthermore, mercenary detachments composed of Chinese coolies and Lettish Communists, together with Jewish Interna-

tional battalions, are there to quell every possible uprising against the Soviets. Special military training is being given to members of the Communist Party. In this connection the "younger set" of Bolsheviks received the following instructions from their superiors:

"Every Communist must learn military science; must learn to handle a rifle, a machine gun, and a trench gun and drive an armored motor truck—in general, learn military science. The Central Committee of the party ordered to create from all Communists in good health regiments *for special service*, with regular training in military matters, and to organize Communist women to study sanitation. * * * The young Communist must pay the most serious attention to his studies in these regiments. He must know that the calling of a Communist imposes on him a special obligation to be ready at any moment, on the call of his party, to come to the defence of the Soviet authority against the attacks of its enemies—whether it be an internal counter-revolutionary conspiracy or a danger on external fronts. We must say then: 'Young Communists, learn military science!' "*

Those very people who in 1917 persuaded the Russian soldiers to lay down their arms, preaching fraternization, and delivering ser-

* Compare *Red Gazette*, September 27, 1919, article entitled "The Duty of New Members of the Party," quoted from "Memorandum on the Bolshevik or Communist party in Russia and its Relations to the Third or Communist International," p. 29. Washington Government Printing Office, 1920.

mons on "eternal peace," are now seeking to convert Russia into an armed camp, and propagate the most despicable type of militarism which thoroughly ignores the idea of patriotism. To-day the sole aim of Trotzky's preparedness is the preservation at all cost of his unscrupulous régime of violence. Things have gone so far that universal military drilling has been decreed not only for men but women as well. Mrs. Kollontay has boasted that beginning with June, 1920, all girls between the ages of sixteen and eighteen have been made to drill equally with young men. Those under military age are forced to attend special courses for physical training and preliminary military drill. In Moscow alone, she said, six thousand women were drilling in January, 1922.*

Hungry and wretched as they are, the Russian people have no other choice than to submit, at least temporarily, to the will of a shameful clique. Harried by the Cheka, menaced by the Red Army, their most sacred beliefs insulted and debauched, they have to endure the yoke. But in their hearts the Holy Image of Christ still shines like a ray of hope.

The late Alexander Block, the Pierrot of Russian poetry, who in years gone by composed mellifluous sonnets to the "Azure Dame," devoted his last poem, "The Twelve," to a deeply pathetic portrayal of Russia's present agony.

* Compare *Soviet Russia*, issue of January, 1922, p. 27.

“The Twelve” is a symbol of the Red Army in all its naked ugliness and boundless hooliganism. In their march forward they tread over the strangled body of their Motherland, while the starving people lag behind:

“So they march in Sover’ign manner,
In their rear—a hungry hound,
Leading—with the bloody banner,

“From the Bullets’ touch protected,
By the Tempest undetected,

“In a snow-like gentle pace,
In a pearl-like whirl of grace,
With a few white roses crown’d—
Leading—Jesus Christ is found.”*

Red Terror, in its various ramifications, is the background of the Russian disaster. Notwithstanding its gigantic scale and atrocious nature, Bolshevism has failed to extinguish completely the flame of life. Human beings, labeled as Soviet citizens, still continue, if not to live, then at least to vegetate in a state of incessant apprehension, their psychology having been reduced to a few primitive longings. Among these the persistent craving to eat is the propelling force which drives them to pursue their every-day business, be it theft, or speculation, or forced labor in Soviet factories.

* *The Twelve* by Alexander Blok. Author’s translation from the Russian.

From a narrow biological viewpoint, such a pitiful existence might be termed life. Yet in a broader sense the life of man cannot be restricted to mere physiological functioning. At the dawn of history, it is true, wild tribes in their mode of living did not differ much from kindred zoological formations. In higher stages of civilization, however, the animal instinct gradually became subjugated to a long range of loftier aspirations, which since then have borne a strong influence upon the history of mankind.

In the case of Soviet Russia that part of life which lifts man above the ape is non-existent, or else it exists on paper only.

Had the workings of Soviet rule been confined exclusively to the dissipation of material wealth, the defence of Sovietism might not have been a task so hopeless; but utter degradation has permeated all the manifestations of national being. Constructive thought as a guiding principle, and a basis for intellectual achievement, is killed.

Charles R. Crane, former U. S. Minister to China, who recently visited Soviet Russia, thus summarizes his impressions regarding general conditions there:

“Russia,” he said, “* * * is * * * a vast prison and the people are living under prison conditions * * *. The Terror is present at all times and everywhere. The new bourgeoisie

and the new aristocracy have stolen an empire right out from under the eyes of the whole world, and not only have reversed all natural processes of evolution, but as regards liberty and progress have pushed Russia back to the darkness in which she lay before the time of Peter the Great.'*"

Every country has lights and shadows of its own. But Russia dwells in perpetual midnight. Filthy and diseased, she lies helplessly in her rags of poverty. The mass of wreckage of that which once was Holy Russia impedes the progress of reconstruction everywhere.

To fully comprehend this condition, it becomes necessary to examine some of its outstanding features.

SANITARY CONDITIONS

Probably one of the most horrible aspects of Russia's tragic plight is the total ruin of her cities. Hitherto flourishing urban communities, including both capitals, Petrograd and Moscow, now resemble dreary cemeteries. The streets which in days past gleamed with smiling crowds and happy life, now are found deserted. The stores are closed and their show-windows either smashed or boarded up. Here and there, one finds wooden houses partly demolished; sidewalks and pavements are in a

* Compare interview with Charles R. Crane published in the *Chicago Daily News*, issue of October 25, 1921.

state of decay; street traffic has been abandoned. It is on rare occasions only that a heavy truck laden with a score of Red Guards thunders down a deserted boulevard. The rattling noise produced by such a vehicle tends to intensify the deadly silence reigning all around.

When the Bolsheviki usurped the power, they promptly dissolved all municipal institutions. In their place various kinds of Soviets were set up with ignorant Communist politicians managing and mismanaging city affairs. A few months later urban life at large was hopelessly wrecked. The crisis was aggravated by the acute shortage of food and fuel.

Francis McCullagh who, in 1920, for several weeks, was detained in Moscow, gives a glimpse of his pleasant experiences there:

“At first I lived in the railway carriage in which I had come, and I found that other people were living there also. On these people I managed to ‘sponge,’ more or less successfully, but for some weeks I could not get anything to eat or drink till six o’clock in the evening. What this means I leave the reader to imagine. One can live without food for a long time if one lives quietly in a warm room and drinks plenty of water, but I walked a great deal about Moscow in cold weather and with the streets knee-deep in snow and slush. Later on, when the snow melted, great pools of water made some of the principal thoroughfares almost impassable. In some places there were stepping-stones, or one could creep along close by the sides

of the houses where there was a broken margin of dry land about an inch wide; and it was strange to see long queues of people waiting at such places till they could negotiate these dangerous crossings slowly and in single file. As my own pair of boots was worn out, I soon began to suffer from 'trench foot,' which I had never known when in the trenches. My hair grew long, I ceased to shave, I could not even wash every day; I was only able to clean my boots once during the course of a month; * * *.'*

This is typical of the conditions prevailing in that country, for everybody is dirty, starving on Marxian rations, and clothes are worn until they hang in tatters. Whatever food abounds, is filthy and rotten. There is a long "bag-carrying" experience behind every Soviet menu. On this point our English author has this to tell:

"At several places near the Kremlin, women sold a sort of rough porridge for one hundred roubles a cup—equivalent to £10 in the old currency—and I used to stand in the street amid a crowd of famished derelicts who looked almost as disreputable as myself, eating out of a wooden porringer, with the aid of a wooden spoon this grateful and comforting food. The porridge was kept in a large wooden bucket like what cattle are fed out of; and, being carefully covered, it was always warm, though there was very little nourishment in it."†

* Francis McCullagh, *A Prisoner of the Beds*, p. 206, New York City, 1922.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 206 and 207.

Deplorable as the external appearance of Soviet cities is, still worse are the housing conditions which the Russians have to endure.

There is a peculiar institution which supposedly administers all dwelling-houses; these are the notorious "Beggars' Committees," elected from among the inhabitants themselves. As a general rule, however, a Communist spy always plays the first fiddle in such institutions. Instead of taking proper care of the house, he exerts his energies to protect the "Workers' and Peasants' State." It is he, in fact, who reports to the local Soviet on any "suspicious individual" residing within the boundaries of his jurisdiction. It is he who leads in searches, which from time to time are decreed by the Cheka. It is finally he who decides upon the policies of the "Beggars' Committees" as a whole.

Owing to the incredible incompetency of the Communist officials, and to the general chaos reigning throughout the country, fuel, which is quite indispensable during the long and cold Russian winters, is almost unavailable. Wood-yards, where in previous times firewood was purchased, have been nationalized. In Petrograd some of the sawmills are engaged exclusively in the manufacture of coffins, the output of which is over 30,000 per month. Yet this quantity proves insufficient. Fuel is so scarce that wooden houses are razed to the ground and

block pavements torn up and used for heating the apartments.

Likewise barges in which timber was carried have been taken to pieces and added to the meagre fuel supply.

The municipal transportation system has completely broken down, since all horses were requisitioned for food and other purposes. It, therefore, became impossible to remove the dirt from the streets, and garbage from the houses which are being dumped in vacant lots and city squares.

In December 1919, an amusing convention of "Beggars' Committees" deputies was held in Petrograd. Questions pertaining to the deplorable condition of the city were discussed. It was pointed out that water pipes in nearly all houses had frozen and burst and apartments had been flooded with sewage.

Governmental buildings are in no better state. Professor Zeidler, an eminent Russian surgeon who is in charge of the Red Cross work in Viborg, Finland, some time ago made a lengthy report on sanitary conditions in the Russian capital. Here is what he says:

"At No. 11 Chernishoff Street one can visit an institution bearing the pretentious title 'Committee of Sanitary Welfare of the City of Petrograd.' In this building the central heating is out of commission, despite every endeavor to put it in order, and notwithstanding all the means and knowledge

at the disposal of the municipal administration. Only a few rooms are heated with small iron stoves, the pipes of which are stuck out through the windows. In the same institution one can notice that water fixtures and toilets are completely out of repair.”*

Similar is the condition in schools and other educational centers managed by the Bolsheviki.

“Generally speaking,” says Dr. N. N., one of Professor Zeidler’s informants, “the whole school life has been turned into a continuous caricature. If one attempts to visit a school at nine A. M., it might be observed that owing to the absence of lights, it is possible to walk through the rooms only by groping along. In the classes one can see small shadows grouped around one big shadow; those are the children wrapped up in their winter clothes and their teacher also bundled up from head to foot to protect herself from the cold, performing her pedagogical duties.”

Much worse, if possible, is the condition in hospitals and other medical institutions. In this connection Professor Zeidler gives heart-breaking details. Referring to one of the typhus epidemics in Petrograd, he says:

“Without exaggeration, it can be asserted that a majority of the sick with spotted or intermittent typhus were taken into the ward covered with lice. They infected the others and spread the

* See Prof. Zeidler’s report on Sanitary Conditions in Petrograd. Viborg, 1920.

disease amongst the medical personnel and their assistants. Hospital inventories are in a chaotic state. Patients steal night clothes, bed linen and blankets; the belongings of the patients are likewise stolen from lockers, while the nurses steal firewood and carry it to their homes. * * * Medical supplies are very scarce, and there is a complete absence of some of the most common and indispensable remedies. Bicarbonate of soda is not available, nor is there any castor oil, pyramidon, phenacetin, etc., etc. Quinine and camphor oil are given in minimum doses. * * * Operations are performed under the most difficult conditions, the temperature in the operating-rooms varying from 3 to 6 degrees R. The patients freeze and the hands of the surgeon freeze too. Almost all operations are followed by complications, such as pneumonia and ulcers. Water pipes have burst and toilets are out of order. * * * Laundries and fumigating plants yield very inefficient work, partly due to the destruction of the pipes, and partly to the lack of fuel. In the morgues * * * an enormous number of corpses are piled up, and there are no coffins to bury them in. * * * Physicians are overworked and exhausted in the extreme. Every doctor has from one hundred and fifty to two hundred patients to attend. * * * Scientific life has stopped entirely."

All this relates to Petrograd, but the same conditions are found everywhere. An American physician, Dr. Weston B. Estes, who in 1921 was kept an inmate in one of the Soviet prisons at Moscow, and later transferred to a hospital in the same city, says the following:

“The surgeon in charge of the barracks where I was an inmate, was a very hard-working, able man. The operations were confined largely to patients suffering from hernia, appendicitis and gun-shot wounds. * * * Scarcely ever was a clean operation carried out without infection, except in isolated cases where the liberal use of bribe money obtained better work from the attendants. In connection with the operating room there was only one of the five sterilizers in order when I was there. Consequently the field of work was distinctly limited, especially in view of the fact that the chief surgeon had no assistant. * * * Many men died in the ward. They never received any helpful attention. Never once did I see a laboratory diagnosis attempted. In fact, there was no laboratory. If there was strychnine in the hospital I never saw it, and I do not believe there was any. * * * The deaths in the ward were harrowing because of the lack of opiates and anodynes, so relief from pain was almost impossible. Men died like sheep, with no more self-consciousness than an animal would have. In fact, animals in America are better treated than men in Soviet Russian hospitals and in prisons.”*

Life in Petrograd apartment houses has become a real torture. Professor Zeidler’s report reveals the following details:

“All the filth from the pipes has risen to the surface, while the tenants in their apartments

* Address delivered by Dr. Weston B. Estes before the members of the Associated Physicians of Long Island, “Prison and Hospital Life in Soviet Russia,” p. 10, New York City, 1922.

heap up dirt to the last degree. Rubbish and waste water are thrown out anywhere: on stair-cases, in yards, and even through the windows into the streets. None of this is being removed. Dirt accumulates, converting the houses into rubbish piles. In many apartments the temperature is below zero. The inhabitants no longer undress; they keep on their fur coats. * * * They sleep with their clothes on covered up with numerous sweaters and scarfs. They do not wash for several months, nor do they change their underwear; naturally, they become infected with lice. The slightest illness leads to most serious complications. As a result of hunger and cold, in the skin on the hands and feet, especially among elderly men and children, there appear peculiar knots, smaller or larger in size, which have a tendency of being converted into ulcers; these practically cannot be healed.''

In some of the big apartment houses in both Petrograd and other cities, the tenants throw out their dirt onto the lower floors of the buildings. Gradually these floors become uninhabitable; then the tenants move to the next floor above, until finally the whole house becomes a horrible depository of human refuse. Such houses are thereafter abandoned. They stand out as monuments of the dirty Bolshevik rule itself.

No wonder that under these circumstances epidemics of all kinds ravage Soviet Russia. In 1920-1921 spotted typhus killed more people than the Chekas did. In 1922 Asiatic cholera broke

out not only in the famine stricken districts, but also in the Northwestern parts of Russia. The sick were doomed since there was no medical help, especially in rural districts.

There has been a staggering decline in the urban population. In pre-war times there were about two million inhabitants in Petrograd. In January, 1921, according to the Bolshevik press itself, its population was 706,800. This was a decrease of 71 per cent. The census of Moscow shows a decrease of 50 per cent. since 1917, notwithstanding the fact that all governmental institutions were removed from Petrograd to Moscow. Odessa which before the war had a population of over one million, at present has not more than 400,000. Equally tragic is the situation in Kiev, Kharkov, Kazan and other principal cities.

The average mortality in Petrograd in 1911 was 21.5 per one thousand, while in 1919 it was 74.9. In 1921 conditions had grown still worse. The birth-rate in Petrograd for 1911 was 29.4 per one thousand, dropping to 13 by 1920.

According to Professor Shcherbina, who refers to six districts: Penza, Tamboff, Orel, Kursk, Chernigoff and Kharkov, out of the total number of newborn in 1920 ninety per cent. died, whilst five per cent. were found to be affected with rachitis. Out of the 1,200 foundlings registered in the Samara nurseries

in 1920, seventy-two per cent. died of under-nourishment, and twenty-five per cent. of syphilis.*

Disregarding all these facts, Semashko, the Bolshevik Commissar of Public Health, hypocritically stated:

“The Workers’ and Peasants’ State attaches the greatest importance to the physical welfare of the children, realizing that the young Communists are the foundation of future Socialistic Russia; for it is only a generation in fine mental and physical condition that will prove capable of consolidating the achievements of the great Russian Social Revolution, leading the country to the fulfillment of its final aim, that is, the establishment of a Communist Régime.”†

How can such utterances be taken seriously? What value is there in various Communist posters bearing camouflage inscriptions:

“Soviet Russia takes care of her children,”

Or,

“The Socialist State protects the mother and nourishes the child,”

and so on. Propaganda of this nature does not help. Sanitary conditions remain appall-

* Professor Shcherbina, Op. Cit., p. 103.

† *Communist International* No. 9, March, 1920, p. 1330. Published in Petrograd and Moscow. Translation from the Russian.

ing. It is a state of wholesale putrefaction, it is the rapid decadence of a great nation.

EDUCATION

There has been a big boom in liberal quarters about the "educational achievements" of Soviet Russia. Until recently, it has been maintained that the conspicuous "revolt against illiteracy," led by no one else than the illiterate Commissars themselves, should be taken seriously. A comparison was always drawn between the "cruel" Czarist régime, when the Government was said to have exerted every effort to suppress education, and the benevolent Soviet rule which is purported to be engaged in enlightening the masses, making science popular and accessible to all. This was a clever way to present the case.

Yet the fact was concealed that in pre-war times, particularly during the decade preceding the World War, tremendous progress was made along educational lines. The labors of the Imperial Government, the Zemstvos, and the municipal institutions, combined with private initiative, succeeded in eliminating the disease of illiteracy in urban districts. A great portion of rural Russia had been also covered with a network of primary schools. Long before the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, universal education for the peasants' children had been put

into effect in the Little Russian districts. Another fact is usually forgotten or consciously ignored by Soviet sympathizers, namely, that Petrograd alone, in 1914, had twenty-five universities and colleges with a total number of students not less than 30,000 belonging to different strata of society.

Moscow was the second great educational center, with its world-famous University and the unique Institution of Eastern Languages.

The progress of elementary education met with almost insurmountable obstacles in the northern part of the Empire because of its widely scattered population. On the contrary, in the central, southern and western parts of European Russia, there were but few among the younger generation who did not know how to read and write. In another twenty-five years illiteracy in Russia probably would have become a condition of the past.

After the November revolution of 1917, the Soviets started their educational program with the destruction of all educational institutions on the ground that they were offshoots of the bourgeois state, and consequently serving capitalistic ends.

Education, like everything else, overnight was declared the monopoly of the Communist State. In lieu of the model colleges then in existence, nonsensical institutions in the shape of "Karl Marx Universities" have been estab-

lished, in which the educational program is limited to Communist propaganda, and inciting class hatred under the cloak of science.

The majority of the original pedagogical personnel fled before the monster of Red Terror. Professors who were unable to make their escape are now living through a period of apathy, deprived of all scientific means, such as foreign literature, laboratory instruments, every kind of chemical supplies, and sometimes even paper, pencils and ink. Lunacharsky, who is reputed to be the great educational genius, confessed in an interview with W. MacLane, that public education in the domain of Lenin has a few shortcomings of its own:

“We are terribly short of appliances for physical culture and for the ordinary educational work. We can only supply one pen point for every one hundred and fifty children, one pencil for the same number, one exercise book for every two pupils. *The situation is really desperate.*”*

Old text-books were, of course, abolished by the Bolsheviki, who decided to found the teaching system along entirely new, proletarian principles.

Much in the same way that destruction was easy to “achieve” in Russian economics, the annihilation of the firmly established educa-

* See *Soviet Russia*, issue of January 1, 1921, p. 14. Article entitled, “The Educational Work of Soviet Russia.”

tional methods was found a trifling task. For what wisdom was needed to pile up old manuals and "bourgeois" manuscripts, turning them into a splendid *auto-da-fe*? The constructive phase, however, proved a task immensely more difficult.

To begin with, the whole educational program had to be laid out on a strictly sectarian Marxian basis. The Soviet Commission which was entrusted with the general school reform, in its decree of December 8, 1920, stated:

"In a society divided into classes there can be no freedom or neutrality in science. The scientific, artistic and philosophic thought reflects the psychology of the struggling classes. Russia, having thrown off the bourgeoisie, is now living through a transition period, during which the struggle against the remnants of the past must continue. This struggle requires the utmost effort on the part of the people. Under these circumstances the Soviet Government would have committed suicide had it proclaimed freedom of scientific teaching and research. The Soviet power during its present phase of material and spiritual development is unable to grant everybody the right to teach anywhere subjects in whatever way one might choose. On the contrary, having proclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat in political and economic fields, the Soviet authority must in equal manner frankly declare that this dictatorship also applies to science."

The principles as set forth by the Commis-

sion were literally followed out by Lunacharsky. At present in Soviet Russia there are no private schools, for both teachers and pupils were *Sovietized*.

Whilst nominally on paper there may be more school buildings than in the Russia of the past, still the effect of Communist educational policies is disastrous.

School life is utterly vulgarized. Co-education, which is so ardently advocated by Lunacharsky and Mrs. Kollontay, has ruined discipline and undermined morality. Venereal diseases are spreading among school children to an alarming extent. Undoubtedly, this is largely due to the fact that Communist women of Kollontay's type are daily preaching to the young principles of freedom of relationship between the sexes. Special courses "for sexual enlightenment" have been established in Soviet schools. This delicate subject is handled by the Women's Sections of the Communist Party.

Mrs. Kollontay, addressing the Third Congress of Women's Sections of the Communist Party, made this comment:

"The Women's sections in the provinces also must enter into contact with the national educators, in order to push into the foreground the question of proper provision for sexual enlightenment in the schools. In addition, a number of conversations and lessons must be introduced, of social, scientific or scientific-hygienic character,

as to questions of marriage, the family, the history of the forms of the relationship between the sexes, the dependence of these forms, and of sexual morality itself, on purely economic, material causes.”*

In order to realize the grave danger of this obnoxious project, it must be borne in mind that the pedagogical staff under the Soviets has become morally crippled. Many teachers have secured their appointments owing exclusively to their membership in the Communist Party. This body, however, is composed of social rubbish which has risen to the surface of political life as a result of the general revolutionary upheaval. In the hands of these degraded educators the “sexual enlightenment” of Juvenile Russia has been placed.

Furthermore, the old-fashioned type of the experienced teacher has entirely vanished. This has been specifically admitted in the Soviet press. Thus the *Red Gazette* in its issue of December 1, 1920, printed a statement which ought to be learned by heart by all admirers of the Soviet experiment:

“There are no teachers. The ranks of the old teachers have surprisingly thinned, whilst there are few new teachers. There is a regular hunt for them. They are enticed from other schools. In one place, dinner without producing a food card is promised; in another, full board is the in-

* *Soviet Russia*, issue of September, 1921, p. 120. Alexandra Kollontay's article entitled “The Fight Against Prostitution.”

ducement. * * * But after awhile, waving all considerations aside, people take the first teacher whom they come across. Thus, an instructor in French, gives lessons in mathematics; or a teacher in literature—in natural history. The teachers' problem indeed is a grave one. We must confess that the schools have really become like almshouses. They are places for casual and played-out people."

Because of the alarming deficiency in the teachers' personnel, many of the high schools have been closed. Lunacharsky, in one of his reports to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, revealed the fact that only seven to eight per cent. of all the children who were to attend these schools were actually given the opportunity to receive educational instruction. What is the fate of the remaining ninety-two per cent.?

The slogan "Democratize the School" affected college life in a most harmful way. It will be recalled that in 1918 Lunacharsky came out with his insensate decree, according to which "every person, regardless of citizenship and sex, who has attained the age of sixteen, shall have the right to enroll as a student in any educational institution, without producing a diploma or certificate of graduation from a high school or any other school."

The immediate effect of this measure was that out of the five thousand who matriculated

in the Moscow University, "*the majority were found illiterate in the rudimentary sense of the term.*"*

It can be easily imagined what educational standard must have been maintained to match the intellectual level of such "students." Would not their proper place have been in a kindergarten?

In their attempt to pollute everything that has the appearance of decency, the Communists have not only ruined the schools, but in an equal manner they have ruined the Russian language, the precious heritage of Russia's whole history. Referring to its deep and harmonious nature, Turgenev, the great Russian novelist, spoke thus:

"In days of doubt, in days of dreary misgivings on my country's fate, thou alone art my stay and hope; O, mighty, true, free Russian speech! If it were not for thee, how should I not despair, seeing all that is at home? But who can think that such a tongue is not the gift of a great people?"

After five years of Soviet misrule, the Russian language has been partly converted into a filthy jargon of abbreviated words and cut-in-half sentences. People who were born and brought up in Russia, when they pick up a Bolshevik newspaper, have difficulty in deciphering the Communist argo which resem-

* See *Izvestia*, No. 15, of the Central Executive Committee for 1919.

bles thieves' Latin. The dignified rhythm of classical Russian is dead. Now the official language is a concoction of German, Yiddish and Latin words, with an admixture of the old Russian. It is a peculiar kind of Esperanto, through the medium of which a Bill Haywood makes himself understood when addressing a Bela Kuhn, née Cohen, of Hungary, or a Katayama from Japan. To make the destruction of the Russian tongue complete, the Communists introduced a jazz spelling which spelling reform enthusiasts call "Scientific Phonetic Spelling." The result is that the refined beauty of the Russian printed speech has been eliminated. Many words are quite senseless since their "simplified" spelling can have many meanings at one and the same time. To make this point comprehensible to an English-speaking reader, it may be of interest to reproduce verbatim a few lines from an article under the caption, "Aunt Julia Says":

"That woz a weiz gie. wozn' it?—huu sed 'Foarmativ eksersiez ov fakulti aloan iz the soars ov awl heuman enjoiment.' That iz whie children hait dishwoshing and skuul and dusting; thai kahn't see a bit ov eus in it; and that iz whie thai will work twies and three tizez az hahrd at sumtthing that eksersiezez their injeneuiti and muslz foar it deevlups them."

This is the way in which the Soviets are enlightening the Russian people.

ART

What has happened to Russia's art? On this topic, too, insidious propaganda has been on foot ever since Trotzky ascended the Communist throne. Of course, it was impossible for his Socialist adherents abroad not to concede that under the Imperial régime Russian thought created a world of art that is immortal. Consequently, it would have been absurd to start out with the premise "denying" the Russian theatre, or denouncing Tolstoy in literature and Tchaikowsky in music. Another fact which had to be admitted was the panic-flight of Russian artists out of Soviet Russia. Only those remained there who were unable to make their escape. For a while, the law of inertia enabled some of them to continue their artistic occupations. Gradually, however, the great aesthetic assets of Russian culture became exhausted, while the ugly features of the Marxian régime supplied no incentive for further creative efforts. The old masters who were forced to stay there, in the realm of Hunger and Death, slowly used up their impaired energies, and now they drag out a weary existence under a gang which does not discriminate between a pound of nails and a painting of Murillo. A hint of what the artists' life in Soviet Russia is like was furnished by H. G. Wells who, during his short sojourn in Petrograd,

met Glazounov, one of the foremost Russian composers:

“All musical people in England,” says Wells, “know the work of Glazounov; he has conducted concerts in London and is an honorary doctor both of Oxford and Cambridge. I was very deeply touched by my meeting with him. He used to be a very big florid man, but now he is pallid and very much fallen away, so that his clothes hang loosely on him. * * * He told me he still composed, but that his stock of music paper was almost exhausted. ‘Then there will be no more.’ I said there would be much more, and that soon. He doubted it. He spoke of London and Oxford; I could see that he was consumed by an almost intolerable longing for some great city full of life, a city with abundance, with pleasant crowds, a city that would give him still audiences in warm, brightly-lit places.”*

This is the death agony of a great artist.

And how many of these martyrs have passed away! Lord Byron’s tribute:

“There is a mourner over the humblest grave,”

cannot be paid to them. Forgotten, they have left this world of sorrow.

How many more among them have sunk to the lowest depths of abject pauperism, with the last spark of artistic flame extinguished! The great wreck that ruined Russia could not have left intact the intellectual life of the old order. Nationalized artists and Sovietized art do not

* H. G. Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*, p. 53, New York, 1921.

elevate the people to the snowy heights of harmony and perfection. Quite the reverse: art itself is dragged down to the level of self-conceited mediocrity.

Much has been rumored about Shakespearian plays being produced in Soviet theatres; still there is an irreconcilable contradiction in this antithesis: There—a *Prince Hamlet*, a *King Lear*, a *Julius Caesar*, all those royal figures of the past, with the majestic greatness of their passions,—and here, the pigmy Soviet rulers of the present, with their petty greed, their little envies of everything that is superb and great. Proletarian audiences made up of Red soldiers and unruly sailors may listen to a performance of Griboyedov's "Woe From Wit," but certainly they do not appreciate the delicate weaving of rhymes where the brilliant French vocabulary intermingles with the Classic Russian, where every sound has its precise meaning, every word its peculiar shade of thought. Formerly there was the most appreciative response to all this on the part of the Russian public; but now it is gone. As Captain Francis McCullagh remarked:

"Some provincial delegates with whom I sat during the progress of a delicate artistic operetta, reminded me of cows looking at a railway train."*

It is only the refined training of the old Russian actors that still enables them to act before

* Op. Cit., p. 218.

such audiences and *such* spectators. Threatened by Communist reprisals, they still act, but the very spirit of creation has faded away. No longer does there exist that charming intimacy of olden times, that atmosphere of sympathetic understanding between the achievements on the stage and the vibrating pulses across the foot-lights.

The new generation of Soviet artists is tainted with hooliganism. Vulgar is Communist reality, and vulgar is their work. They have no use for the sublime masterpieces of the past in which divine inspiration blended with religious zeal. Of what value to them is the whole school of Renaissance with Christ and the Madonna the guiding motives of creation? What ties them to traditions of the old Russian school with its magnificent Byzantine Iconography? What charm is there for a true-bred Communist versifier in the melodies of Pushkin and Fet whose hearts and souls were boundlessly devoted to old Russia, with her beauty and splendor, her palaces and cathedrals, her fountains and dreamy parks? Today the most prominent Bolshevist "poet," Serge Yessenin, writes a volume, *The Confession of a Hooligan*, (Moscow, 1921), in which he says:

"I am a robber and a serf,
Horse-stealer's blood there is in me."

In another place:

“On purpose I march with my hair uncombed,
With a head that resembles a kerosene lamp.”

There is a still better couplet in which the dignified desire is expressed—

“To-day I feel awfully eager
To spit at the moon through my window.”

Some of his sonnets are so obscene they are unfit for translation.

The destructive spirit of Communism is graphically expressed in the following five lines taken from one of Mayakovsky's “poems”:

“If you find a White Guardist
Pin him to the wall!
Has been Raphael forgotten?
The time is ripe for bullets
To stick in the museum's walls.”

Sometimes poetry is used as a means to incite class hatred. Then *chef d'œuvres* of this kind are produced:

“We will not spare the enemies of labor,
Make a list of every one of them;
We shall exterminate the most dangerous,
They have lived long enough in comfort.

“All the handmaids of capitalism,
 We shall take as hostages,
 We shall not forgive them,
 But we shall crush them like dogs,
 And throw them into the rubbish ditch.”*

In 1922 the Bolsheviks themselves inadvertently admitted the absurdity of proletarian “aesthetics” when they closed the Imperial Academy of Arts in Petrograd following an exhibition held there by a group of “Neo-Cubists,” “Imaginists,” and “Cubo-Impressionists.” One of the exhibits produced by these insane fanatics represented a board to which a round plate was tied. Below the plate there was a braid of woman’s hair hanging. That was all.†

Art is dead.

WOMEN IN SOVIET RUSSIA

In civilized society for centuries the family has been the firm foundation of civil order. This assertion may be commonplace: nevertheless it is one of paramount importance.

Karl Marx was the first to openly assail the family and advocate its abolition. In his *Communist Manifesto* he puts it in these terms:

“Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Com-

* *Red Gazette*, September 23, 1919, Petrograd. Translation from the Russian.

† See *The Last News*, Russian daily published in Reval, issue of June 2, 1922, No. 124.

munists. On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.”*

Accordingly, one of the first measures adopted by the Bolsheviki was the abolition of the bourgeois family. This they have attained by so facilitating the divorce procedure that in practice it has become a matter of mere formality, since on the strength of Section 1 of the Divorce Law:

“Marriage is annulled by petition of both parties or even one of them.”

The only technicality required by this decree is that the judge shall ascertain whether the petition comes from the party who wishes to be divorced. Section 6 reads:

“Having convinced himself that the petition for the annulment of the marriage really comes from both parties, or from one of them, the judge personally and singly renders the decision of the annulment of the marriage and issues a certificate thereto to the parties * * *.”

It is also the judge who “personally and singly” determines with which of the parents

* Karl Marx, *Communist Manifesto*, p. 36.

their minor children shall live, and who of the two shall bear the expense of the maintenance and education of the children.

No legal grounds for divorce are required by the decree of December 18, 1917, which established this classically simple procedure. Of course, if marriage is no longer considered a lasting and mutual obligation between husband and wife, and if divorce is granted as easily as water runs down hill, then family ties are so loosened that marriage ceases to be a basic institution, becoming a farce which can be ended any time at the discretion of either party or both.

Such is the legal situation. In addition, the Bolshevik press—and this is the only press that exists in Soviet Russia—has been carrying on virulent propaganda against what is termed the reactionary institution of the bourgeois family. The very conception of domestic life is being daily attacked, while in its place Communist modes of living are recommended. In relation thereto the following theses on the feminist movement, urged upon womanhood by the Second Congress of the Third Internationale, are to be borne in mind:

“Endeavors must be made to induce the housewife of the traditional family (the most backward, ugly, and undeveloped form of economic mediaevalism) to adopt collectivism, thus convert-

ing her from a serf into a free worker in a large Communal household.

“Endeavors must be made to establish model Communal institutions which shall take charge of the domestic problems which hitherto have been the task of the women belonging to the former bourgeois family, and which in every way shall facilitate their maternal duties.

“It is necessary to explain to the women that the individual household in its original form bears a backward character and causes superfluous waste of time, labor and money; that capitalism uses individual households as a means of maintaining for the husband a low level of wages, relying upon the free housework of his wife, and in order to keep his wife in a state of mental and political backwardness, excluding her from social life.”*

The insidious meaning of these *pia desideria* amounts to the following:

1. The family in its present privacy must be abolished.
2. The touch of loveliness and intimacy that is conveyed to family life through the care of the wife must be abolished, and mechanical forms of Communal life substituted therefor.
3. The mother must be relieved of the care of her children, and they be entrusted to the care of “model” institutions administrated by special appointees.

Mrs. Kollontay puts this in energetic terms when she screams from her pulpit:

* See *The Communist Internationale*, No. 15, pp. 3464-3467, Petrograd, December 20, 1920. Translation from the Russian.

“Down with the unproductive labor in domestic life, with the exploitation of children in the home!”*

The woman’s task must be made quite easy. It is a question of Communist chivalry. Now, therefore, Soviet legislators enact a law the first article of which reads:

“Artificial interruption of pregnancy is hereby permitted provided it is performed in Soviet hospitals where the minimum of injury is assured.”†

Everything is allowed and a real bacchanalia inaugurated in the range of sexual relations.

That the Communists are actually struggling against the very principle of the family is best demonstrated by Mrs. Kollontay’s own statement. Addressing the Third Congress of Women’s Sections of the Communist Party, she said:

“We are ready to renounce all the accustomed forms of life, ready to hail the revolution in every field, and yet we are afraid to touch the family! Only do not touch the marriage system! * * * It is necessary to declare the truth outright: The old form of the family is passing away. The Communist society has no use for it * * *.”‡

* Mrs. Kollontay’s address is published in full in *Soviet Russia*, issues of August and September, 1921.

† See *Izvestia* of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, No. 259, November 18, 1920.

‡ Mrs. Kollontay’s address published in *Soviet Russia*, issue of September, 1921, p. 121.

In the concluding paragraph of her speech she reiterated the same thought by saying:

“Comrades! Our task is to destroy the roots that nourish prostitution. Our task is to wage relentless warfare on the vestiges of individualism, which has hitherto been the moral basis of marriage. Our task is to revolutionize thought in the field of marriage relations and to clear the way for a new, healthy, conjugal morality that shall correspond with the interests of the workers’ commonwealth. * * * Comrades! In the place of the family which is passing away, the family of the past, there is already arising, solidifying, and spreading, the new family—the great workers’ family of the victorious world proletariat.”*

According to Soviet usage, a bombastic passage of this kind is followed by singing the anthem of the Third Internationale. One monstrous project after another is being handed out as liberally as Soviet rubles. In this sense Lenin’s proposition to electrify Russia is just as prodigious as Kollontay’s plan to nationalize family life at large.

However, putting aside Kollontay’s revolutionary phraseology, the following must be observed:

In Soviet Russia private property has been done away with; the last layers of bourgeois

* Mrs. Kollontay’s address published in *Soviet Russia*, issue of September, 1921, p. 121.

strata have been torn out; Communism, in its most extreme manifestations, is flourishing. But what about prostitution which, according to Marx—the Great Mogul of Socialism—is the reverse side of the bourgeois family medal? Has it been eliminated?—Were one to quote data furnished by opponents to the Soviet régime, volumes could be produced on this subject; it would be possible to prove that in Marxia prostitution is freely practiced, having become the prevailing form of relations between the sexes. But even the Communist writers are quite outspoken on the question. Mrs. Kollontay narrates as follows:

“We know that prostitution is an evil; we even understand that now, in this extremely difficult transition period, prostitution is assuming large and intolerably extensive proportions, but we simply wave it aside, we are silent on this phenomenon, partly through a remnant of hypocrisy that is still with us as the heritage of the bourgeois view of life, partly through inability (to) properly grasp and become conscious of the damage which a widely developed prostitution is inflicting upon the working society.”*

Perhaps it is only the wicked remnants of the bourgeoisie who are engaged in this profession?—Alas! Even that is denied by Mrs. Kollontay:

* Mrs. Kollontay's address, *Soviet Russia*, August, 1921, p. 42.

“Prostitution,” she says, “is practiced by the Soviet office employees, in order to obtain, by the sale of their caresses, boots that go up to the knee; prostitution is resorted to by mothers of families, working women, peasant women, who are out after flour for their children and sell their bodies to the manager of the rations division in order to obtain from him a full bag of the precious flour. Sometimes the girls in the offices associate with their male superiors not for manifestly material gain, for rations, shoes, etc., but in the hope of advancement in office. And there is an additional form of prostitution—‘careerist prostitution’—which is also based in the last analysis, however, on material calculations.”*

In truth, the author immediately admits:

“The freedom of relations between the sexes does not contradict the ideology of Communism. The interests of the commonwealth of the workers are not in any way disturbed by the fact that marriage is of a short or prolonged duration, whether its basis is love, passion, or even a transitory physical attraction.”*

Nevertheless, the fact that prostitution is assuming colossal proportion in Soviet Russia seems to worry Mrs. Kollontay. In her fear, however, moral considerations play no part whatsoever, for she makes the startling assertion:

“From the standpoint of the worker’s collective, a woman is to be condemned, not for selling

* Mrs. Kollontay’s address, *Soviet Russia*, September, 1921, p. 119.

her body, but for the fact that, just like a legally married idle woman, she does no useful work for the collective.”*

She argues further:

“How are we to consider the professional prostitute from the standpoint of the interests of national economy? Only as a *deserter from work*. In this sense we may mercilessly condemn prostitution.”†

Communist ideology is fully expressed in these quotations from Karl Marx, “*The Communist Internationale*” and Mrs. Kollontay, “*The Little Grandmother of Communism*.” The passages referred to are useful, for there are many women, worthy women too, who, without any idea of what Communism is or what it stands for, merely because they are emotional, wish to put themselves “on record” as being “*certainly* in sympathy with the Soviet form of government.”

BOLSHEVISM AND CHRISTIANITY

Quoting Karl Marx, the Bolsheviki inscribed on the wall of one of the Moscow churches:

“*Religion is the opium of the people.*”

* Ibid, p. 46.

† Ibid, p. 45.

From the early days of their reign, the Communists have manifested a distinctly hostile attitude towards the Christian Church in general, and the Russian Church in particular; in addition, they have treated the clergy, and especially Russian priests, with the utmost cruelty.

Soviet tactics as regards the Church are twofold: First, direct aggression; and second, the gradual undermining through propaganda of all religious devotion.

From the dawn of their history, the Orthodox Church has exercised a steady and benevolent influence on the life of the Russian people. Religion has always been a guiding principle. During the two and a half centuries under the Mongol yoke, the monasteries stood on watch over the educational work, and it was in them that all historical records were kept. In the seventeenth century, after the last Czar of the Rurik Dynasty had passed away, when the country was brought to a state of civil war, it was the Church that saved the unity of the nation. In the popular mind the Church has always been associated with the conception of the State itself, the two forming a harmonious ideal of divine authority and civil order. The names of such historical figures as Saints Serge Radonejsky, Theodosy Pechersky, Nil Sorsky and Patriarch Hermogen are deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. Not only have these

men attained moral perfection in private life, but also they have shown deep wisdom and constructive statesmanship at the most crucial moments of Russia's history. Through centuries the Russian *prikhod* (parish), with priests and villagers united by bonds of friendship and the spirit of mutual assistance, served as a solid foundation for State existence and every-day intercourse among the parishioners themselves.

When the Marxian roughnecks arrived on the field, they hurriedly began the destruction of this simple, and yet firmly founded organization. In December, 1917, they came out with their decree separating the State from the Church. All properties of existing Churches and religious societies were nationalized. These institutions were deprived of the right to act as juridical persons or to own any property whatsoever. Buildings, and sacred vessels could be given for the free use of the congregations only by special decision of the Local or Central Soviet. The teaching of religious doctrines in State and public schools was forbidden.

The provisions of this decree have been vigorously carried out by the Bolsheviki who never miss an opportunity to subject the members of the Christian clergy to humiliation. When, on the strength of the Soviet Labor Code, the bourgeoisie was drafted and assigned to forced labor, priests were always

made to perform the most degrading jobs. Disregarding a tradition sanctioned by centuries, the Soviets have compelled ecclesiastics to serve as privates in the Red Army.

Lawless Red Guards, acting under the instructions of the Commissars, raided the Churches during the time when divine service was held. Priests were dragged from the altars, and the altars desecrated, while those attending the service were locked up in jails and tortured by the Cheka.

When the dreadful famine came the Bolsheviki used it as a pretext for robbing the Church of its treasures. The whole world was shocked when the decree ordering their requisition was made known. In many cities the priests and parishioners showed organized opposition to the new barbarism inflicted upon the people. Tikhon, Patriarch of All-Russia, who for a long time was kept as a prisoner *de facto* in the Moscow Kremlin, faithful to his religious duties, not only refused to sanction the outrageous Communist order, but forcibly protested against it. In consequence of this, the Soviets charged him with high treason. His fate still remains doubtful, notwithstanding unanimous protests made by the Christian Church in both America and Europe.

Patriarch Tikhon, a venerable man of seventy, with his vital force weakened by age and privation, is the only person in Russia who dares

to openly oppose the diabolical rule of Trotzky. It was he who in 1918 excommunicated the Bolsheviki as a body, and it was upon his instructions that the canon of anathema was read in all Churches. While under arrest, the Patriarch issued a declaration which had a large circulation all over Russia. Vehemently accusing the Red rulers of heinous crimes, he stated therein:

“It is not enough that you have stained the hands of the Russian people with the blood of their brethren. You have instigated the people to open, shameless robbery. You have befogged their consciences and stifled their conviction of sin; but under whatever name you may disguise an evil deed, murder, violence and robbery will always remain crimes and deeds of evil that clamor to Heaven for vengeance. Yea, we are living through a dreadful time under your domination, and it will be long before it fades from the hearts of the nation, where it has dimmed the image of God and impressed that of the beast.”

Had the Russian Cardinal Mercier the right to accuse the Soviets of all these crimes? The answer is given by the Reverend R. Courtier-Forster who thus pictures the horrors of the persecution of Christians in Odessa:

“It was the martyrdom of the two Metropolitans and the assassination of so many Bishops and the killing of hundreds of various Christian ministers of religion, regardless of denomination or

school of thought, that proved the undoing of the Scourge. Russian Orthodox clergy, Protestant Lutheran pastors, Roman Catholic priests, were tortured and done to death with the same light-hearted indiscriminatioin in the name of toleration and Freedom. Then it was that the Scourge, seeing the last remnants of Liberty ground under the heel of a tyranny more brutal in its methods than a mediæval torture chamber, published another full-page cartoon representing Moses descending from the Burning Mount, bringing in his arms the Tables of Ten Commandments to Humanity, and being stoned to death by a mob of workmen's and soldiers' delegates.

“The following Sunday afternoon I was passing through the Town Gardens when I saw a group of Bolshevist soldiers insulting an Ikon of the Thorn-crowned Face of Christ. The owner of the Ikon was spitting in the pictured Face, while the others were standing around watching with loud guffaws of laughter. Presently they tore the sacred picture into fragments, danced on it, and trampled and stamped the pieces into the mud.”*

Shall we forget Archbishop Andronik who was buried alive? Or Vassili, Archbishop of Chernigov, who had come to Moscow to inquire about the fate of the former, and who was cut down and killed with his two companions? Or Bishop Feofan, who, after unspeakable tortures, was dipped several times into the river through a hole in the ice, and finally drowned

* See Rev. R. Courtier-Forster, reprint from the *London Times*, December 3, 1919, p. 4.

in the Kama? Shall we forget the latest atrocities committed by the Bolsheviki in Petrograd when Metropolitan Benjamin and over ten other High Dignitaries of the Russian Church were sentenced to death for interfering with the seizure of Church treasures?* Shall we forget the long list of other martyrs who have been murdered in cold blood for no other crime than worshipping Christ?

Was Patriarch Tikhon justified in accusing the Bolsheviki of all these abominations? Can it not be said in their defence that all this is being perpetrated by them because "They know not what they do"? Perhaps this may be so in the case of a rebellious sailor in whose perverted mind the conception of sanctity has been artificially destroyed. But what justification is there when Communist poets engage themselves in the defamation of Christ? Or when these paid "minstrels" and writers compose, under the orders of the People's Commissars themselves sacrilegious prayers designed to undermine those precious feelings that uplift the human soul to spiritual heights, where this realm of tears and grief ends and the kingdom of peace and infinite love begins.

Read:

1. "In the name of Father—Socialism, and the Son — Communism, and the Holy Ghost —

* See *Associated Press* dispatch of July 6, 1922.

Marxism,—proletarians of all countries unite.”

2. “Mother of God, Holy Virgin—the Commune,
—blessed be thou, mother of equality and
fraternity, Lord—Labor, be with thee.
Blessed be thou as the wife of the proletariat
of the whole world, and blessed be the fruit
of thy motherhood—the Internationale.”
3. “The Holy Trinity—Socialism, Communism
and Marxism—kill the tyrants. Lord—
Labor, purge us from the sins of capitalism.
God—proletariat, forgive the crimes of the
tyrants, exploiters and parasites, and chain
them to the lathes in the factories and to the
plows on the soil.”*

Next comes Soviet poetry on the same subject. The two excerpts given below are taken from the Bolshevist monthly magazine *Yav*, issue of October, 1920, p. 7) :

“Stability, Stability! We drag thee in the whirl,
We thrash holiness with the whip,
We torture the weak body of Christ,
We torture it in the Cheka.”

* * * * *

“Now then, do pardon us sinners!
Save us as thou didst the robber on Golgotha.
We wildly spill thy holy blood,
As we spill water from the washbowl.”

‘And this:

“Go to the devil! Splendid is our obscene dance

* This blasphemous prayer was reproduced in the Russian daily paper *The New Russian Life*, issue of April 8, 1921, No. 79. Translated from the Russian.

On the porch of the Church.

Christ is again on the Cross, while we have taken
Barabbás for a walk down the Tverskoi Boulevard.”*

Mr. Hillquit, however, asserts that the Soviets represent “The best spirit of the Socialist movement at this time.” Is this to be taken as a compliment or an insult to Socialism?

* The Tverskoi Boulevard is one of the main streets in Moscow.

CHAPTER VI

THE ALL-RUSSIAN FAMINE

Know'st thou the land where all with plenty
breathes? * * * COUNT ALEXIS TOLSTOI

So now prosperity begins to mellow
And drops into the rotten mouth of death.
Richard III., SHAKESPEARE

Victor Hugo in one of his Parliamentary speeches in the French Chamber made this remark:

“When men forget God, God, by earthquakes, reminds them of His existence.”

The Russian famine is a world-debated topic. Everybody is alive to the fact that Russia is starving. It is also known that the scale of the disaster is colossal, embracing all parts of the former Empire. Therefore, an exposition here of this situation can be confined to a brief summary of its main features and the general outlook for 1923.

A few lines, however, may be devoted to the cause of the famine. The Soviet press, through all its foreign agencies, has been conducting a strenuous campaign, the object of which was to convince Western public opinion that the acute shortage of food came as a consequence

of the drought. In the spring and summer of 1921, it is true, both the absolute and relative humidity was unusually low in the Volga basin, which to a certain degree tends to explain the scarcity of crops in that sector. But in other parts of the country meteorological conditions were more or less normal, compared with the average for the preceding ten years. Still the harvest everywhere, especially in the most fertile regions, like Little Russia, was extremely poor. For this reason, agricultural districts, outside of the region directly damaged by the drought, were unable to come to the relief of the hunger-bitten population in the Volga Provinces.

Mr. Nansen, the League of Nations Commissioner for relief in South Russia, an extreme radical himself, referring to the causes of the All-Russian famine, said:

“The Soviet principle used to be that of requisitioning from the peasant all the surplus he had and only paying him in paper which could not buy anything for him. It could not buy agricultural machinery, because it did not exist, and it could not buy clothing. Consequently, the peasant said: ‘I will not cultivate more than necessary for myself and my family; otherwise it will be taken away from me.’”*

Being a Soviet sympathizer, he, of course,

* See Fridtjof Nansen's report to the League of Nations published in the *Provisional Record*, No. 17, November 12, 1921.

maintains that since then the agricultural policies of the Soviets have changed considerably, and that now the peasants are taking a more reasonable attitude toward the problem of cultivating their lands. The Scandinavian scientist argues that the change was caused by the introduction of Lenin's notorious "Prodnalog," which, as will be recalled, means the levying of taxes in kind, leaving the "surplus crop" for the free use of the peasant. That such a contention is wrong is evidenced by a comparison of the acreage sown in 1920, prior to the adoption of the "Prodnalog," with that sown in the Autumn of 1921, after the new form of tax had been in operation for about six months:

Name of Province	Acres sown in 1920	Acres sown in 1921	Percentage of area sown compared with 1920
Samara	1,429,920	1,152,443	80.5
Simbirsk	1,202,040	636,743	52.9
Saratov	2,072,520	2,430,000	117.2
Mari Area	367,200	200,277	54.5
Chuvash Area..	373,680	393,840	105.3
Ufa	1,407,240	591,391	42.0
Viatka	1,857,610	1,472,850	79.2
Votjak Area ..	619,380	395,150	63.7
Bashkir Republic	408,780	66,744	16.3
Tartar Republic	2,284,470	969,734	42.4*

* Figures taken from a statement issued by the Soviet Trade Delegation in London. Published in *Soviet Russia*, January, 1922, p. 7.

Thus, in spite of the "Prodnalog," the acreage under cultivation has been steadily decreasing, with the result that in the spring of 1922 the entire country, excepting several insignificant districts, was in the grip of King Hunger.

The underlying causes of the Russian famine are to be sought in the general economic upheaval brought about by the insane Communist experiment.

In 1916 the crops were good; in 1917 they were not below normal; but ever since 1918 Russia has been living through an agony of starvation which first affected the cities, and then gradually spread to the rural districts. It was due to the industrial crisis that the agricultural technique from year to year has been growing less efficient. The peasants could not be blamed for this, because farming implements were unobtainable, and horses were either requisitioned by the Soviets or killed for food. Without horses, the land could not be cultivated, at least in Russia, where, after the revolution, mechanical methods for tilling were almost abandoned. In addition, oxen and cows, having also been eaten, the farmers in many localities were obliged to draw the plows themselves; this, in turn, meant that deep plowing could not be done and the soil was merely scratched. Therefore, the slightest unfavorable atmospheric influence inevitably affected the matur-

ing of the seed. In this connection some of the figures submitted in Mr. Nansen's report to the League of Nations are of particular interest. He refers to the harvest of 1921 and compares it with the average crops for the nine years between 1905 and 1913 in the wealthiest agricultural region, South Russia, including the provinces of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav.

	Winter Wheat	Poods Rye	Poods Barley	Poods Oats	Summer Wheat	Poods Corn
Average per 1 dessiatine for 9 yrs. 1905-13	42.1 to 42.6	41.6 to 42.0	42.7 to 50.4	51.2 to 54.9	26.3 to 32.5	70.5

Returns for 1921,
Province of Kherson:

Odessa District.	4.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.5	5.0
Tiraspol Dist..	5.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	10.0
Yelisave t g r a d District	10.6	13.0	5.2	9.3	8.3	12.9
Nickolev Dist..	4.5	3.1	2.1	1.6	3.4	3.0
Dneprovsk Dist.	2.6	2.2	0.2	..	0.5	2.3
Province of Ekaterinoslav .	3.9	3.6	2.9	4.0	2.9	..*

Practically the same returns were yielded in the Alexandrovsk District, which at present bears the name "Zaporoge."

Among the contributing causes of the calam-

* Compare this table with figures given in a pamphlet entitled "*La Famine en Ukraine*," League of Nations Bulletin, No. 22, Geneva, April 30, 1922, p. 5.

ity, the wreck of transportation cannot be overlooked. When in 1891 the Volga region suffered so heavily from drought, the famine situation was solved in less than sixty days. At that time the railroads were in perfect order, and it took but several days to turn the whole traffic eastward, the first carloads of wheat arriving in Samara and Simbirsk ten days after the famine had been officially registered. At present, notwithstanding the combined efforts of the American Relief Administration, the Nansen organization, and the British volunteer work, the situation is becoming more and more menacing, largely owing to the lack of transportation facilities.

The various causes which led to the outburst of the famine may be summed up as follows:

1. Nationalization of land.
2. Nationalization of trade, and more particularly the monopolization of grain and other food supplies.
3. Systematic decrease in the acreage under cultivation.
4. The general industrial crisis with a sharp decline in the manufacture of agricultural implements.
5. General deterioration of the agricultural technique in peasants' households and the destruction of model estates.
6. The incompetent manner in which the "Prod-nalog" was put into operation.
7. The bitter and unanimous resentment of the people to the Communist Régime.

8. The complete collapse of the transportation system.
9. The drought.

Gigantic events are never the outcome of *one* specific cause or factor. It is always *the amalgamation of many diverse phenomena* and their combined functioning that produces the ultimate result. Childish, therefore, is the attempt to explain the All-Russian famine by a casual atmospheric condition which, moreover, affected only one section of the country. Still, this is precisely what Bolshevik "scientists" have tried to prove.

As to the extent of the famine, Tchitcherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in August, 1921, made an estimate that 18,000,000 persons were affected by the disaster. This number, however, applied to the Volga region alone.*

The vast Ural territory, the Northern Caucasus, the Don Region, and Little Russia, were not included in the original Soviet calculation. Adding to this number Nansen's figures for South Russia, 5,500,000, which are by no means complete, we have a total of 23,500,000, which leaves out both North Caucasus and the Ural District.

The official figures hardly represent the *actual number of starving Russians for they relate only* to those localities which are classed by the

* See Tchitcherin's "Circular Note to all Governments," dated, Moscow, August 3, 1921.

Central Statistical Bureau as "famine stricken." Hungry cities, such as Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev, are excluded therefrom. Besides, the latest available information dates back to May, 1922; whereas, the famine is assuming ever-growing proportions, drawing in its deadly clasp larger and larger masses of the people.

The spread of the calamity is demonstrated by the two following tables taken from Mr. Nansen's report:

Alexandrovsk District	Number of starving	Percentage of population
November 1, 1921.....	175,000	14
December 1, 1921.....	225,000	18
January 1, 1922.....	400,000	31
February 1, 1922.....	900,000	70
March 1, 1922.....	1,000,000	78
April 1, 1922.....	1,075,000	82
May 1, 1922.....	1,100,000	88

Donetz District	Number of starving
October 1, 1921.....	2,299
November 1, 1921.....	48,297
December 1, 1921..	204,884
January 1, 1922.....	274,060
February 1, 1922.....	493,404
March 1, 1922.....	654,749*

* Ibid, p. 13.

Mr. Nansen laconically remarks:

“If formidable relief is not given, it is almost certain that the statistical curve relating to mortality will follow the same path. In fact, thousands of deaths are registered daily. Soon these will reach tens of thousands.”*

Putting the number of Russians who are virtually starving to death at the modest figure of 23,500,000, it is essential to bear in mind that by July, 1922, all foreign relief organizations combined were feeding only 9,000,000 adults and children. As to the Bolsheviki, their schedule of relief was finally endorsed by the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The plan provided for a gradual expansion of work; it was intended to start by feeding 500,000 sufferers in October, 1921, bringing the number up to 3,250,000 in March and April, 1922. This scheme, which incidentally was never carried out, stipulated as follows:

NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO BE FED

Month	Children	Adults	Total
October, 1921	375,000	125,000	500,000
November, “	750,000	250,000	1,000,000
December, “	1,125,000	375,000	1,500,000
January, 1922	1,500,000	1,000,000	2,500,000
February, “	1,500,000	1,500,000	3,000,000
March, “	1,500,000	1,750,000	3,250,000
April, “	1,500,000	1,750,000	3,250,000
May, “	1,500,000	1,500,000	3,000,000
June, “	1,500,000	750,000	2,250,000

* Ibid, p. 13.

The following quantities of foodstuffs were set aside (on paper only) for this purpose:

Name of Foodstuffs	To be used for children	To be used for adults	Total
Grain	70,313 tons	28,125 tons	98,438
Groats	28,126 "	7,501 "	35,627
Meat	35,160 "	28,123 "	63,283
Potatoes	46,876 "	112,501 "	159,377
Other roots.	52,736 "	56,251 "	108,987
Salt	3,128 "	3,753 "	6,881
Sugar	2,350 "	2,350*
	238,689 tons	236,254 tons	474,943

In carrying out their proposition the Soviets met with utter failure. Up to December 1, 1921, they had succeeded in requisitioning only 44,000 tons of grain and other food supplies, which was but a little over 9 per cent. of the total. Simultaneously the levying of the "Prod-nalog" evinced an ever-decreasing tendency and, according to the *Pravda* (No. 256, 1921), gave the following returns:

Collected from	Poods
October 1st to October 10th.	10,932,000
October 11th to October 20th.	8,404,000
October 21st to October 30th.	7,644,000
Nov. 1st to Nov. 10th.	1,754,000

Taking the most optimistic view, it can be asserted that the Soviets succeeded in collect-

* See Kalinin's report to the Ninth Congress of Soviets. Quoted from *Soviet Russia*, March 1, 1922.

ing only 26 per cent. of food set aside by the Ninth Congress for famine relief. Thus, not more than 800,000 are being actually fed by the Soviets. In other words, foreign charity, together with Soviet work, gives relief to not more than 10,000,000 sufferers, while *not less than 13,000,000 are doomed to die.*

Leaving aside the Volga region, which, since the tragic exodus in the fall of 1921, resembles a vast cemetery, brief data should be presented regarding such sectors as are considered comparatively in better condition. The *Economicheskaya Jisn* in an article entitled, "Hunger in the Urals," says:

"People eat carrion, different kinds of refuse, and food substitutes. Relief for the starving is organized very poorly. The satiated districts are quite indifferent to their hungry brethren and openly refuse to help them. * * * Clamors for help grow stronger every day. There is no time to waste. We have to face the sowing season. But will there be any seeds? In the Province of Ekaterinburg one hundred famine counties have been registered, with a total number of 350,000 starving, of which children form 60 per cent. Hunger is becoming extremely intense. Everything has been eaten up. According to the Commission for Famine Relief ("Kompomgol"), if all forces and means are mobilized, it will become possible to feed 50 per cent. of those starving; the rest are doomed to death. Peasants' households are destroyed. Cattle breeding has practically stopped. * * * Mortality is

enormous, and the number of abandoned children and children's crimes is rapidly increasing."*

Because the population throughout Russia is using food substitutes, the rate of mortality is rising everywhere, while the birthrate is sharply declining. In Little Russia, straw is pulled off from the roofs and cut up into very small pieces, which, mixed with water and refuse, is used for food. Sometimes, apricot seeds are pounded up and added to the meagre supply of flour. Approximately 50 per cent. of those who eat such "bread" die almost instantly. In other localities acorns constitute the main food supply, together with mice and rats, which have not yet perished from the famine. Various diseases, like swellings, gangrene and ulcers, are rampant among the population as a result of eating such "food."

Cannibalism has become a common phenomenon. In No. 20 of the Bolshevik *Pravda* for 1922 this report was published:

"A peasant woman, Providochina, from the village of Stary Nachrantov, in the Province of Kazan, has almost completely eaten up her dead son who was 19 years old. The remnants of his corpse were buried. A peasant, by the name of Murzakov, has eaten the liver and lungs of his deceased wife. In the steppe district of the Samara Province, regular nightmares can be witnessed. There is an amazing spread of cannibal-

* *Economicheskaya Jisn*, No. 92, April 27, 1922.

ism. In the village of Lubimovka a peasant dug out of the grave the corpse of a fourteen-year-old youth, intending to cook it, but he was arrested. The Executive Committee of the same village states as follows: 'Wild cannibalism assumes mass proportions. During dark nights corpses are being cooked in peasants' huts.' In the village of Andreevka the head of a sixty-year-old woman is being preserved, her body having been eaten by a peasant in the same village, Andrew Pirogov."

Dr. Francis Rollins, formerly connected with the American Relief Administration, in an interview with the correspondent of *Rigasche Rundschau*, said this:

"I am leaving Russia for good, since I cannot stand the horrors which I have been witnessing for the last months. It is beyond human endurance from day to day, to look at the corpses of those who have died from starvation, half-eaten up dead bodies, sometimes only heaps of bones, indicating that once a corpse lay there which was devoured by other sufferers who desired to drag out their existence for a few days. Aside from hunger victims, thousands are affected with different kinds of epidemics; typhus, measles, dysentery and tuberculosis; recently cholera has been added, with a 60 per cent. mortality."*

In some of the starving areas cannibalism is menacing those who have managed to keep up

* See *The Last News*, issue of May 5, 1922, p. 2, article entitled, "Representative of the 'ARA' on the situation in Soviet Russia." Published in Reval. Translation from the Russian.

their physical constitution. For instance, in the Kazan Province, hungry Tartars lie in ambush along the roads, waiting to lasso the people as they pass by. The dreadful feature about this habit is that those who have become accustomed to eat human flesh do not seem to care for any other kind of food. Commissars in Moscow are daily receiving inquiries from the local Soviets as to what reprisals should be taken against the troglodytes of the twentieth century. On many occasions physicians and nurses refuse to visit remote villages since there is always danger that the starving peasants might attack and devour them.

A ghastly episode of anthropohagy is described in a letter sent from Moscow on May 18, 1922. It reads verbatim:

“A small tradesman with great difficulty succeeded in collecting a little supply of flour, groats, sugar and tea, and went to see his brother who was living in a village in the Samara Province. When he arrived at the last railroad station, he met several peasants with whom he was acquainted. He asked them: ‘How is my brother?’ They answered: ‘Well, he’s all right, but you better not go to see him.’ Defying this advice, the tradesman proceeded to his native village. There he met his brother who accepted the food with indifference. Soon he began to feel his flesh and remarked:

“ ‘You certainly are fat!’

“ ‘But where are the children?’

“ ‘They are in the cellar.’

“ ‘And your wife?’

“ ‘She’s there too.’

“After a while the wife came up and the first thing she did was to take hold of the visitor, pressing him all over; then she also dropped the remark: ‘How stout you are!’ In the meantime a group of over ten peasants had gathered outside, gazing through the windows. They all came to take a look at the newcomer.

“ ‘If you wish to see the children, step down cellar.’

“ ‘I would rather have you bring them up here.’

“ ‘They are living there, so you better descend first and I will follow you.’

“The tradesman instinctively felt that something dreadful would happen. Finally he persuaded the host to open the trap door and show him the way down. The moment, however, the host did this, the tradesman slammed the door shut and fled from the house. Outside the people immediately attacked him, and it was obvious that they had been watching him. Fortunately these men were as weak as flies; it was sufficient to touch one, and he would fall over. In this way the tradesman was able to make his escape and he hurried back to the railroad station.”*

Additional information on the same subject was given by Mr. William Shafroth, son of former Governor Shafroth of Colorado, who in June, 1922, arrived in London after a year’s work with the American Relief Administration. In an interview with the Associated Press he gave the following shocking story:

* This letter was published in the weekly organ of the Supreme Russian Monarchical Council, No. 44, June 5, 1922, p. 3.

“The desperate people,” he said, “are eating human beings, diseased horses, dogs and cats. Cemeteries are being dug up and long-buried bodies snatched as food. In their hunger-madness, the people are stealing bodies from morgues and hospitals to eat. * * * A Russian member of the A. R. A., who died of typhus, was disinterred at night and eaten by the crazed inhabitants. I know one instance,” said Mr. Shafroth, “where a distracted mother of five children killed the youngest in order to appease the pangs of the rest of the flock; but the oldest boy cried bitterly when he saw his mother sever his little brother’s head and place the body into a pot. He refused to eat the flesh. The famine in Russia is unequalled even by the dreadful famines of India, China or any other in history. In some districts the people, made insane by hunger, have gone secretly at night to the warehouses where hundreds of dead bodies were stored because graves could not be found for them and have carried off these cadavers and used them for food. Ten butcher shops in Samara were closed by the authorities because it was learned that they were selling human flesh. The melting snow has disclosed thousands of bodies strewn over the fields and along roadways. It was impossible to bury all these, so they were placed in warehouses like logs of kindling wood.”*

In brief, such was the situation in July, 1922.

What is the outlook for 1923? It is gloomy

* See *Associated Press* cable dispatch as published in the New York press, June 9, 1922.

in the extreme. First of all, the "Bread Loan," which was so much heralded in the Soviet press, failed completely. The scheme was to sell State Certificates at a nominal price of 380 rubles, which would entitle the bearer to receive one pood of rye flour between December, 1, 1922, and January 31, 1923. The "Prod-nalog," according to the terms of the loan, can be paid by surrendering bread certificates equivalent in sum to the amount of tax levied. The Moscow quota was fixed at 10,000,000 poods of rye. The subscription in that city gave a return of only several hundreds of poods. Throughout the entire country the response of the population to the Bread Loan campaign was quite insignificant. Secondly, in the spring of 1922, many parts of South Russia and the Volga basin were infested with swarms of locusts, and the new crops destroyed. Furthermore, the area under cultivation is still falling off, and in some of the wealthiest Caucasian districts it is only 25 per cent. as compared with that of 1921. Finally, the crops in the Volga region for 1922 were hardly any better than in 1921. Seeds delivered to the starving peasants by the American Relief Administration were eaten up long before the time for sowing came. Such was the condition in the Samara Province. Throughout Little Russia weather conditions were very unfavorable during the spring and summer of 1922, and it is believed

that only on the right shore of the Dniپر will there be something to collect, while on the left shore corn has not come up at all. In the Don Valley the land under cultivation for 1922 did not exceed 30 per cent. of the pre-war acreage. Some places near Odessa were left unsown by the peasants. The spring was unusually cold and dry in northeastern parts of Russia, for example in the Ufa Province. Owing to this, the seed froze in the ground. Approximately 40 per cent. of all land in the Petrograd District was damaged by frosts. The Commissariat for Food and Supply estimated that land tilled in 1922, for all of Russia, did not exceed 27 per cent. of the pre-war acreage. Accordingly, the famine is far from having been brought under control. Quite the reverse; there is every reason to believe that by February, 1923, the scale of the disaster will overshadow the horrors of 1921 and 1922.

At the time of The Hague Conference, the Bolshevik Delegation more than once made the assertion that there will be a good harvest in 1922. Finkelstein went further when he resorted to an obvious bluff, explaining that in 1923 Russia will become again a self-supporting country. There was a purpose in this lie: The Communists needed cash and there was nothing they would not use as an argument to obtain it. At present, however, it is not easy to dupe

Western Europe with Communist propaganda. Some of the British statesmen themselves begin to awake to the fact that the Soviets are swindling capitalist countries, using the famine as a pretext. The Soviets are fast becoming impudent. Encouraged by silly little courtesies extended to them—be it by Lloyd George or the King of Italy—they are openly ridiculing European politicians. They do not longer take the trouble to mask their activities. In this connection Mr. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons, made in February, 1922, revealed a very piquant situation. Reporting his speech, the *Gazette de Lauzanne*, spoke thus:

“The Soviets have just bought in London, on Moorgate Street, some real estate for use as their headquarters, at a cost of 250,000 pounds (12,500,000 francs). The exceedingly luxurious equipment for this house involved a disbursement of 100,000 pounds (5,000,000 francs). This ‘Soviet Palace’ is occupied by Mr. Krassin who is surrounded by a whole army of stenographers and dactylographs to whom he pays salaries of 350 to 400 francs per week. The sum of 17,500,000 francs which Russia expended for her palace in London is precisely the sum which Russia demands from England to give relief to the starving people.”*

* See *Gazette de Lauzanne*, No. 70, March 12, 1922. The figures in parenthesis are furnished by the Swiss paper from which the quotation is taken.

Communist graft has become a living legend. The Soviet rulers encompass themselves with all the comforts of life at the very moment when Russians everywhere are undergoing indescribable hardships. There is indeed a striking contrast between Soviet luxury on the Thames and humiliating misery on the Volga.

The people on this side of the water are unable to grasp the full meaning of the Russian tragedy, the extent of despair driving creatures that once *were* men to cannibalism and other atrocities. One must personally live through the abomination of Sovietism to understand that years will pass before the bestial instincts aroused by Marxian practice can be overcome.

As long as Trotzky remains planted on the Communist throne in Russia, there is no hope for that country.

Mr. Hoover's splendid work is incapable of solving the Herculean task of regenerating a great nation reduced, through Socialism, to a state of savageness and cave-like existence.

CHAPTER VII

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

BOLSHEVISM is not a local Russian matter, nor is it a Russian affair at all. Only in so far as Marxism has been particularly used for the destruction of Russia can it be associated with that country. At this point, however, connection between the two ends.

Bolshevism is decidedly *anti-Russian*. Not only is the personnel of the Soviet bureaucracy made up of the international *canaille*, with a slight admixture of native Russians, but Communist policies are diametrically opposed to everything the Russian people have stood for during one thousand years of their history. In this sense Bolshevism is a direct negation of Russian nationalism. From a scientific viewpoint, to speak of *Russian* Bolshevism is just as erroneous as to refer to *American* Confucianism or *Chinese* Calvinism.

The official exposé of Bolshevism and its aims was made by Bukharin in a pamphlet, "*Program of the Communists*," issued in 1918. The opening paragraph of one of its chapters reads:

"The program of the Communist Party is a program not only of liberating the proletariat of

one country; it is the program for the liberation of the world proletariat since such is the program of the international revolution."

The author further goes on to explain:

"The better we are organized, the stronger the armed detachments of workmen and peasants, the more powerful the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, the more quickly will the international revolution come. * * * Sooner or later we will have the International Republic of Soviets."

Apfelbaum, the President of the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale, closing his first May appeal in 1920, thus formulated the same idea:

"Amidst storms, blood and tears, hunger and endless suffering, a new world is being born, a bright world of Communism; of the universal brotherhood of the toilers.

"In 1918 the great Communist Internationale was born. In 1920 the great International Soviet Republic will be born."

Again, Lenin speaking before the Second Congress of the Third International (July 19th to August 7th, 1920) expressed this basic principle by stating:

"Now, we have everywhere advance detachments, and everywhere we have proletarian armies, although poorly organized and requiring reorganization. We are able to organize these into a single detachment, into a single force. If you

will help us to accomplish this, then no mental exercises or guesses with respect to what cannot be known and what no one can know, will prevent us *from accomplishing our task, and this task will be that of leading on, to the victory of the world revolution and to the establishment of an international proletarian Soviet Republic.*”*

One year later Apfelbaum, when greeting the Third Congress of the Communist Internationale, emphasized the aims of Bolshevism in the following terms:

“Comrades, in the whole history of the labor movement there has been no congress which had such a large representation of the peoples of the Near and Far East, as our present meeting. You will recall our Baku Convention which followed the Second Congress. Since then the influence of the Communist Internationale has been growing day by day in countries of the Near and Far East. The fact itself of the presence here of numerous delegations from those countries, gives us evidence that our organization is not only a workers’ brotherhood of Europe, but indeed a toilers’ organization of the world at large. Therein we see the pledge that the victory of the revolution in which we all, assembled here, are firmly convinced, will be not merely a European revolution, but a real world revolution in the precise meaning of the term. * * * Long live world revolution! Long live the Communist Internationale!”†

* The 2nd Congress of the Communist Internationale, p. 30, Washington Government Printing Office, 1920.

† *The Communist Internationale*, No. 18, pp. 4487 and 4488. Petrograd, October, 1921. Translated from the Russian.

Russia, having been the first to fall under the blows of Marxism, was naturally chosen as the stronghold and headquarters of the world revolutionary movement. For this reason, Soviet foreign policy is prominently devoted to the acceleration of a process which Marx described as "the decomposition of bourgeois society."

There is a certain parallelism between the domestic tactics of Bolshevism and its attitude toward foreign countries. In the same way that in Russia the original banditism of Red Guardsists gradually assumed the form of organized oppression, likewise militant tactics formerly used against the Western World, have recently been substituted by a policy of subtle undermining of all traditional modes of civil order. Both courses of action, however, pursued one and the same aim—that is world revolution.

Nowadays, true enough, the Soviets refrain from composing impudent notes in the style of Tchicherin's first communication to President Wilson. Nor do they admit that the red tape of their negotiations with the Lloyd Georges, Rathenaus, or Schanzers, is designed to worm the poison of Communist disease into the hearts and brains of European nations. At Genoa and The Hague they wash, shave, and wear silk hats. There they try to appear genteel, and smile pleasantly into the cameras of the newspaper reporters,—but can the leopard change his spots?

Still, even in Western Europe, the Finkelsteins and other Soviet envoys, forgetting their diplomatic rôle, from time to time, resort to rude jargon, swearing against capitalism and similar dreadful things that appear to burden their minds. Otherwise, as a general rule, when in the political foreground, they strive to use a language which can be understood not only by their brethren, but by Mr. Lloyd George himself. The more short-sighted among the European politicians earnestly maintain that a fundamental change has taken place in Communist psychology. With this contention in mind, they advocate peace at all costs with the Moscow trouble-makers. They overlook that on the eve of 1922 Apfelbaum, in an appeal to the workers of the world, made the positive assertion that, despite the ostensible changes in Communist tactics, merciless war with the outside world remains the guiding policy of the Soviets.

Everywhere abroad Bolshevik delegations have become the centers of revolutionary propaganda, and hardly is there a single disloyal movement now on foot which is not directly or indirectly backed by the Soviets. This is particularly true as regards Eastern countries. Tchicherin himself, submitting his report to the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, stated:

“In the East the Soviet Government is reaping

the fruits of the frank and far-seeing policy which it had adopted from the first days of its formation.

* * * To whatever eastern country we turn our eyes, whether Persia, China, Korea, Turkey or Egypt, we observe a deep fermentation which is assuming more and more the concrete form of a movement against European and American capitalism. *This movement has for its ultimate object the attainment of our ideals.***

Modern Communism is not merely a theory; to a greater extent it is a mode of action, a manner of bad behavior. Its schemes are pronouncedly militant. World revolution is the immediate task of its efforts, while the conquest of world power is the ultimate goal. For the realization of this end, the Bolsheviki have devised an elaborate plan which in substance covers the following:

1. In Russia, Communist dictatorship enables the Red rulers to so organize her manpower and natural resources as to transform the whole country into a tremendous armed camp, ready to deliver heavy blows in any given direction.

2. For the exercising of proper control over the revolutionary movement in foreign countries, a special body was set up in 1919 which is known under the name of the Third or

* See pamphlet published in London, entitled "The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia." A report submitted by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, pp. 30 to 32.

“Communist Internationale,”—in Soviet slang, called the “Komintern.” It is composed of professional agitators and revolutionary internationalists. Communist Parties in all lands are acting under the direct guidance and supervision of the Komintern. Drastic discipline has been introduced among all these groups and instructions regulating their activities were issued by the Komintern in a document known as “The Twenty-one Terms of Admittance to the Third Internationale.”*

3. The administrative power of the Third Internationale is vested in its Executive Committee. Apfelbaum is president, while Lenin, Trotzky, Sobelsohn and Bukharin are among its members.

4. The Soviet of People’s Commissars is subordinate to the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale.

5. The Executive Committee of the Third Internationale takes charge of all organization matters pertaining to the Bolshevist movement in every part of the world.

6. Every national group reports to the Executive Committee of the Komintern, and receives orders from it.

7. Every country has a National Communist Center whose policies are co-ordinated with those of the Executive Committee.

* See *The Communist Internationale*, No. 13, pp. 2387-2392. Petrograd and Moscow, September, 1920.

8. All differences between the various Communist groups abroad are finally decided upon by the Executive Committee of the Komintern.

Following out this program, the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale, beginning with 1919, has been feverishly at work in all countries, including the United States.

By the end of 1921, an estimate was made by the Komintern as to the membership of what is termed "The Army of the Communist Internationale." The official research gave these returns:

Country	Number of members	Number of Communist dailies	Number of weeklies and other Communist periodicals
U. S. of America....	13,000	8	13
Austria	18,000	1	3
England	10,000	..	2
Argentina	5,000	1	1
Australia	2,900	..	2
Armenia	5,000	..	1
Azerbaijan	16,000
Bulgaria	37,000	1	21
Belgium	1,100	..	1
Bokhara	6,000	..	2
Hungary*	1
Greece	2,200	1	3
Germany	360,000	33	12
Holland	4,000	1	3
Georgia	11,000	4	5
Gorsky Republic ...	10,000

* The number of Communist members in Hungary is not given because the party works underground.

Country	Number of members	Number of Com- munist dailies	Number of weeklies and other Communist periodicals
Denmark	1,200	1	1
Daghestan	7,000
Far Eastern Republic	7,095	6	..
Egypt	1,500
Italy	70,000	3	15
Spain	10,000	..	6
Iceland	3,000	1	..
Canada	1,000	..	1
China*
Korea†
Luxemburg	500	..	1
Latvia†
Mexico	1,200	..	2
Norway	97,600	14	27
Poland†	4
Persia	2,000	..	1
Palestine‡	500
Portugal	400	..	1
Roumania	40,000	3	6
Russian Soviet Re- public	550,000	500	96
Turkey†	1
Ukrainian Soviet Re- public	61,400	45	2
Uruguay	1,500	1	1
France	131,000	8	43
Finland	40,000	3	8
Khiva	1,000	..	1

* No information is available.

† No data are given because the Communist Party works underground.

‡ This number does not include Poale-Zionists.

Country	Number of members	Number of Com- munist dailies	Number of weeklies and other Communist periodicals
Chile	2,000	..	1
Sweden	14,000	2	15
Switzerland	7,000	4	2
Czecho-Slovakia	360,000	10	46
Esthonia	3,000	1	..
Jugo-Slavia	85,000	4	16
South Africa	750	..	3
Java	4,000	..	1
Japan*	900	..	2
Y. M. C. I. (Young Men's Communist Internationale) ..	800,000	..	50†
	2,805,745	656	425

Because figures are missing for several countries, such as China, Poland, Turkey, Hungary and Korea, which were purposely left out by the Soviets, it can be estimated, with a degree of certainty, that the total Communist membership throughout the world is not less than 3,500,000.

In Western countries the attention of the Komintern is focused on Germany. This is explained by the peculiar condition through which that country is living at present. The

* The Party works underground.

† This table is taken from the official publication of the Komintern, entitled, "The Army of the Communist Internationale," pp. 109, 110 and 111. Petrograd, 1921.

defeat of the Central Powers in the Great War, and the subsequent Versailles Treaty, have made Germany the arena of most complex intrigues in which the Allies themselves take an important part. Between France and England, the former Teuton Empire has indeed become the apple of dissension. On the other hand, the heavy financial burden imposed by the Entente upon Germany leads her to play a clever game, alternately using the Red menace and the prospect of the restoration of a monarchy as means of inducing France to modify her reparation policy. Realizing this situation, the Soviets, with the assistance of the late Rathenau, have concluded the much-talked-of Rap-palo Treaty, establishing close bonds of camaraderie between Red Russia and Pink Germany. The German toreadors are waving this document as a red flag before France. Furthermore, the Bolsheviki are cognizant of the fact that if any European country at all is in a position to help them to restore Russia's industries, it is Germany, the technical assets of which have been left intact. For all these reasons the Komintern took special care to build up a model revolutionary apparatus on the Spree. Koppelevitch, alias Kopp, the "Soviet Ambassador" in Berlin, is the directing manager of the revolutionary movement throughout Germany. In his delicate task he is assisted by his Secretary, Eberstein, while all

financial transactions are being conducted through a Jewish banking firm, Otto Marquavitch, of which Kopp himself is a partner.

The Communist organization center is located in Berlin; its more important local branches are established in Hamburg, Leipzig, Halle and Dresden. Kopp works in intimate touch with the Spartacan Group. He takes a lively interest in the secret mobilization of the German Red Army detachments, scattered over industrial districts, as well as throughout villages, especially in the Ruhr and Silesia Provinces. The following agencies are placed under the supervision of Kopp:

- (a) The Political Section.
- (b) The Commercial Department.
- (c) The Propaganda Bureau.
- (d) The Soviet of Workers and German Red Army Deputies.
- (e) The Cheka.
- (f) The Espionage Division.

Oscar Kohn serves as a liaison officer between the Kopp outfit and the German Spartacan Group.

In every country the structure of the Communist Center is adapted to local political and social conditions. For instance, in Esthonia, where the government is fighting the native Bolsheviks, the Communist Party has a double organization: First, the illegal or underground

group; and, second, its parliamentary delegation.

I. The underground group forms the Central Committee of the Esthonian Section of the Third Internationale. It is composed of:

- (a) The Central Executive Committee.
- (b) The Political Section.
- (c) The Information, or Espionage Bureau.
- (d) The Propaganda Department.

Victor Kingissepp, who was tried on a charge of high treason and executed in the spring of 1922, was the administrative head of the underground organization. Every one of its branches is entrusted to one "responsible member" of the Communist Party. Reval is its headquarters. Aside from the various sections which go to make up the illegal group, many factories have their own local committees which, in turn, are the nuclei of Communist work among the Esthonian laborers. The total membership of these Factory Committees, in June, 1922, did not exceed 135; but being closely united and belonging to different Esthonian trade unions, they do reach large workers' audiences. Connected with the same group is the Esthonian division of the Y. M. C. I. (Young Men's Communist Internationale), which Association, in April, 1921, was dissolved by order of the Esthonian Government.

II. As to the parliamentary delegation, it

works in the open. It uses the Esthonian Independent Socialist Party as a cover organization. In addition, the Communist members of the Esthonian Assembly maintain lively relations with the Central Council of the trade unions. This body is being rapidly sovietized. Although the official membership of the Esthonian Section of the Komintern does not exceed three thousand, nevertheless the number of Soviet sympathizers can be roughly put at twenty thousand. All sums spent for Communist propaganda are supplied by Moscow through the Soviet representative in Esthonia, Panchilevitch.

Similar are the contours of the Soviet Agency in Sweden, where direct contact is maintained between the Communist Center and the Communist members of the Diet, headed by Stroem and Begarsohn. The more confidential documents of the Soviet delegation are kept in the library of the Left Wing Parliamentary Group. It is in Sweden that the Soviet Telegraphic Agency, the "Rosta," is located.*

The nature of the instructions issued by the Komintern to kindred organizations abroad is exemplified by a circular letter of Bukharin's to the Communists residing in the United States. This document, which reached these shores early in 1921, reads in part as follows:

* Compare these data with Rézanof's cited work, pp. 90, 91 and 92.

“Esteemed Comrades: I wish to express to you a series of considerations regarding the current work in America. We believe that since the expulsion of all nationalistic elements from the American Communist Party, the time is now ripe for the formation of a Communist Party in America which will officially link itself up with the Communist Internationale. We also believe that such a party could consist of: (a) the former Socialist Propaganda League and those Left Elements which were expelled from the American Socialist Party; (b) Left Elements of the Socialist Labor Party, in which it is necessary to bring about a split, for, as we are aware, one of its sections does not behave decently; (c) the I. W. W.’s, the passive attitude of whom towards political matters has vanished, since they have acknowledged the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet power. Should a Communist Party be formed, it would be reasonable to expect that it would have a representative of its own at Moscow.

“We believe that one of the foremost problems at present is the formation of Communist nuclei among the soldiers and sailors (military party organizations), the duty of which must be to conduct energetic propaganda for the formation of Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Soviets, and the reckless persecution of the officers.

“Attempts to form Workers’ Councils (Soviets of workers) by no means should assume the form of philanthropic or cultural institutions. We are very much afraid that a danger of this kind does exist in America. Therefore, it is necessary to invariably emphasize that such Soviets, before they shall prove able to seize the power, must become fighting organizations, aiming at the seizure

of the power of the State and workers' dictatorship. * * * Your chief slogans shall be:

- (a) Down with the Senate and Congress!
- (b) Long live the Workers' Government!
- (c) Long live the Government of Workers' Soviets!
- (d) Down with capitalists and throw them out of their factories!
- (e) Long live the workers' control over the factories and mills!
- (f) Down with the profiteers!

* * * * *

"It is necessary to pay special attention to the American Federation of Labor. It is necessary to break it, working harmoniously in this direction with the I. W. W.'s for the establishment of a revolutionary trade unions' movement. *It is necessary to propagate to the utmost the idea of arming the workmen. Demobilized revolutionary soldiers must not give up their rifles. Our general slogan is:*

"A WORLD SOVIET REPUBLIC!"

* * * * *

It is important to bear in mind that in obedience to these instructions the United Communist Party of America, at its secret convention held in February, 1921, among other resolutions, adopted the following:

"The convention was dominated by an appreciation of the dawning industrial crisis, the mass lockouts, and the consequent imperative need of unifying all the forces of Communism *as directed by the Third Internationale*, at any cost within reasonable security to the revolutionary movement.

• • • The United Communist Party will systematically and persistently familiarize the working class with the fact of the inevitability of the armed conflict in the proletarian revolution. *The United Communist Party must prepare the working class for armed insurrection as the final form of mass action, by which the workers shall conquer the State.*"

A special paragraph is devoted to the "*Penetration of Military Units.*" It reads:

"The party must conduct a systematic propaganda in all military units, making clear to them the real function of military organizations, in order to awaken class consciousness amongst them and swing them over to the side of the proletarian revolution. The Communist Party will issue appeals to the soldiers and sailors, which will be distributed among them and will create Communist groups in the army and navy, which shall be closely connected, in order to establish a unified revolutionary body within the armed forces of the State."*

No matter what Soviet representatives at European conferences *say*, the Komintern, which is the superstructure of Marxism, *acts* in a way that leaves no doubt as to the nature of its work and final goal. It is not in Genoa and The Hague that the Soviet policy is being framed. Tchicherin and Finkelstein themselves have to obey the orders of their superiors who

* See issue No. 13 of the underground publication of the United Communist Party of America, *The Communist*, for 1921.

sit in permanent council at Red Moscow. The momentous tactical retreat of Communism before capitalistic countries of the world is nothing but a clever manoeuvre calculated to draw them more securely into the revolutionary whirlpool.

Three basic features have been observed by the managers of the Komintern: First, the utter fiasco of their economic policies in Russia, which tends to increase the difficulties of the Soviets in the way of fostering the scheme of world revolution. On account of Russia's domestic bankruptcy, it has become next to impossible to make large appropriations to the international revolutionary fund.* The authori-

* The first appropriation by the Soviets for international propaganda purposes was made on December 13, 1917, when the following decree was issued:

“Taking into consideration that Soviet authority stands on the ground of the principles of international solidarity of the proletariat and the brotherhood of the toilers of all countries, that the struggle against war and imperialism, only if conducted on an international scale, can lead to complete victory, the Soviet of People's Commissars deems it necessary to come forth with all aid, including financial aid, to the assistance of the Left International Wing of the labor movement in all countries, quite regardless of whether these countries are at war with Russia, or in alliance with her, or whether they retain neutrality. In view of these considerations, the Soviet of People's Commissars ordains: *the appropriation of two million rubles* for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement to be placed at the disposition of foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. President of the Soviet of People's Commissars—Oulianoff (Lenin), People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs—L. Trotzky * * *.

See *Gazette of the Temporary Workers' and Peasants' Government*, issue No. 31, 1917.

ties at Moscow are daily being urged by their foreign representatives not to delay shipments of gold lest the entire preparatory work abroad be wrecked. But gold is no longer available in the Soviet treasury. Cash from the outside is the one thing which can solve the problem. For this reason, the Komintern so readily speaks of concessions and overtures to international capitalism.

Second, much to the regret of the Komintern, revolutionary fermentation assumed a much slower tempo than was originally anticipated. In many countries the Communist program not merely failed to solidify the forces of social reaction, the radicals of all denominations, Social-democrats, and anarchists, but also it gave birth to dissension within these groups themselves. In Germany, France and Italy, several socialistic factions refused to submit to Lenin's "terms of admittance." The split caused thereby in the Marxian camp created much bitter comment on both sides. Trotzky accused Kautsky of pro-bourgeois leanings; Kautsky swore in the name of Marx that he was the sole and duly authorized commentator of the "Communist Manifesto" and the "Capital"; the yellow, or Amsterdam Internationale, was excommunicated by the Red Internationale; French labor leaders of Frossar's type protested against "the United Communist Front," as prescribed by the Moscow "comrades," as-

serting that such a drastic measure would ruin the French Communist Party. In other words, the arrogant behavior of the Komintern produced a regular storm in the Socialist teapot. Owing to this fact, many organization plans adopted by the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale were postponed or even given up. Accordingly, the general scheme for the world revolutionary offensive had also to be delayed.

Last but not least, the Red leaders are laying great emphasis upon the economic disorganization prevailing in Europe. They plan to use it as an asset for their infernal aims. They believe that Europe, having been thoroughly Balkanized as a result of the Versailles Treaty, will never be able to regain its internal equilibrium. Endless friction between Western Nations will eventually—so they hope—bring about a state of chaos, in the midst of which existing governments will totter, and in lieu of these, Soviet Republics will be easily set up.

Lozovsky, one of the originators of the Red Trade Unions Internationale (“The Profin-tern”), analyzing this prospect, expressed the following view:

“We are witnessing a conflict between Japan and America, which is still brewing. The Washington Conference in no way has settled it; for while Japan is allowed to build only sixty per

cent. of the warships which will actually be built by America, still Japan will build just as many ships as she possibly can, since the question of Siberia and China is involved. On the other hand, these countries are designed to serve as elements for the restoration of capitalistic peace. Furthermore, between France and England, we see a sharp struggle which is daily becoming more acute; this because France exercises control over Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia, and thus is maintaining at present hegemony on the Continent. She expands her influence also to Turkey, which brings her interests into conflict with those of England. It is therefore profitable for England to partly uplift Germany so as to enable her to oppose France and neutralize her onslaught upon England, which, after Germany, is the strongest 'hereditary enemy' of the French Fatherland. * * * The political and economic controversy regarding Upper Silesia now begins to develop, confusing the whole situation, which, of course, does not help to restore the equilibrium. Likewise, friction between Jugo-Slavia and Italy, between Turkey and Greece, are far from being conducive to the restoration of peace in the Balkans. The same is true about the decomposition of the world power of the British Empire. Within its own boundaries we are watching a strong revolutionary and nationalistic movement (India, Egypt, etc.), which is tearing this world empire apart. The biggest British Colonies, such as Canada, India, Australia, etc., are beginning to raise custom barriers against their Metropole.'''*

The Komintern keeps a vigilant eye upon this phase of world politics. Soviet papers are persistently publishing articles in which the international situation is pictured in the darkest colors. One quotation will be sufficient to give a general idea of the tenor predominating in the Bolshevik press.

“There is no hope. Different kinds of opportunists tricks lead to nothing. Our class enemies dig their own graves, while Poincare, the most blunt and blind among the counter-revolutionists, feels happy that he was able to destroy the last straw to which drowning capitalism was clinging. Again he looks to impoverished and humiliated Germany in order to take out of her empty pocket those billions which he lacks. The international situation at no time in the past was so hopeless and dark.”†

These three factors: The economic collapse of Russia, the unexpected delays in the process of world revolution, and the complex international conjuncture, have forced the Komintern to revise its original foreign policy. A temporary truce with capitalistic countries has been announced. The Soviets have accepted

* See Lozovsky's "The World Offensive of Capital and the United Proletarian Front," pp. 34 and 35, Moscow, 1922. Published by "The Profintern." Translated from the Russian.

† See *Izvestia* of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, June 3, 1922, article by Rappoport. Translation from the Russian.

Nietzsche's motto: "*Promote peace as a means for waging new wars.*" Yet their principles remain the same, their cardinal policies unchanged, their aims unaltered, their malicious hopes unshattered. Behind the screen of propaganda, disguised under the cloak of lies disseminated everywhere, protected by the dull indifference of their opponents, posing as friends of the toiling masses, the Soviets continue their diabolical work unmolested.

Astonishing ignorance and corruption drive European politicians from one blunder to another in their dealings with the Soviet régime. On this point the Bolsheviks are right: Western Nations, in their strife for economic recovery, are playing with powder; they lose one stronghold after another. There is a symbolic significance in the fact that a Lloyd George finds it pleasant to sit at the same table in company with habitual criminals.* It is a sinister thing when a King of Italy is not ashamed to shake the bloody hand of a Tchicherin. This signi-

* Most of the present rulers of Russia have served prison terms, and *not* for so-called political crimes. Some of them were sentenced by Russian Courts for grand larceny, raping and murder in the first degree. According to information given by A. Rézanof in his valuable book, "*La Troisième Internationale Communiste*," prepared for the members of the Genoa Conference, Finkelstein, alias "*Meer-Henoch-Movchev Vallach*" (Litvinoff), is known to have participated in the robbery of the Post Office at Tiflis on June 13, 1906. He escaped to Paris, where, during a search, the stolen goods were found. He is head of Bolshevik propaganda abroad. Formerly he was registered as a German spy by the Allied Intelligence Service, p. 48, Paris, 1922."

fies the universal lowering of moral standards and ideals. In this atmosphere of *décadence*, people begin to cling to the egotistic formula: "*Après moi le déluge.*" Nothing is stable, nothing is sacred. Traditions are broken, everything ridiculed, everything polluted.

Sobelsohn (Radek) put the historical controversy between Bolshevism and anti-Bolshevism in these forcible terms:

"The Russian peasants and workmen," he said, "are fully aware that they will either be beaten or else international capitalism will be destroyed; they know that *it is impossible for Soviet Russia to exist side by side with capitalist countries.* Russian peasants and workmen are also awakened to the fact that if they do not crush English capitalists, if they will not thrash French capitalists, the latter will crush them. The Russian workmen may seek to make temporary peace, or rather a truce, with them, during which the revolution will grow stronger in other countries; but no peace can exist between the Workers' State and the countries of exploitation."*

It is remarkable, however, that the leading European politicians refuse to recognize this elementary truth. Like ostriches, they try to hide from the enemy by merely sticking their heads in the sand. They consciously ignore volumes of Soviet propaganda in which the plot

* See Sobelsohn's speech at the Conference of Eastern Peoples at Baku. Stenographic report of the proceedings, quoted from Rézanof's work, p. 127.

against civilization is frankly revealed. France, which has every reason to dread Red Germany, and which still to a large extent exercises control over domestic matters across the Rhine, allows Kopp to openly conspire against the welfare of the French people. England, whose interests in Asia are vital, and which has ample ground to doubt the safety of her Eastern Dominions, helplessly throws down her hands when it comes to coping with the Bolshevist plague and its germ-carriers on the Ganges. In full knowledge of all circumstances accompanying the destructive work of the Soviets in Asia, England tries to buy off an enemy that has neither honor nor mercy. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1921 did not, of course, arrest the scheme of the Red East. Under the eyes of Western Nations, in the bright daylight, a second gigantic theft is taking place: First, Russia was stolen from the world; at present the Communists intend to snatch the entire Asiatic Continent. Their language is plain. In their "Appeal to the Peoples of the East," they state:

"The peoples of the East have long dwelled in the darkness of ignorance, under the yoke of despotism of their tyrannic rulers, under the oppression of alien capitalistic conquerors. But the rumble of the world butchery, the thunder of the Russian workers' revolution which tore down from the Eastern Russian people the historical chains of capitalistic serfdom, awoke them, and now,

having awakened from their century-long dream, they commence to rise. They are awakening and they begin to hear the appeal to the sacred war, to the 'Gazavata.' This is our appeal: The appeal of the first convention of the representatives of the Eastern peoples who, under the banner of the Communist internationale, have allied themselves with the revolutionary proletariat of the west. It is we, the representatives of the toiling masses of all eastern peoples—India, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashgar, China, Indo-China, Japan, Korea, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Northern Caucasus, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Khiva, Bokhara, Turkestan, Fergan, Tartaria, Bashkiria, Kirghisia, and others—united in an unbreakable alliance with the revolutionary workers of the west, it is we, who urge our peoples to start the sacred war. We say: 'Peoples of the East; many times have you heard appeals from your governments for the sacred war, and indeed, you did wage such wars under the green banner of the Prophet; but all these sacred wars were nothing but deceit and lies for they served the interests of your greedy rulers, while you, peasants and workers, after the struggle was over, remained in the same state of misery and serfdom. You secured all the blessings of the world for others, but you never profited yourselves. Now, we issue to you the first call for a real sacred war under the Red banner of the Communist Internationale.'

* * * Long live the union of all workers and peasants of the east and west, a union of all toilers, of all oppressed and exploited! Long live the military staff of this union, the Communist Internationale. Let the flame of the sacred war of

all eastern peoples and the toiling masses of the world against imperialistic England never be extinguished!"*

The Bolsheviki invariably emphasize that Communism *cannot* be introduced in Eastern countries. They are familiar with economics in Asia, and they know that no capitalism is there, at least not in the sense in which this term was used by Marx.

Safaroff, the leading Soviet expert on Eastern matters, is quite outspoken on this point. He says:

"The East is a living history. There, in some localities, the relics of patrimonial Communism and of the patriarchal household are still alive; there, feudal and patriarchal relations are as yet in force. The religion of the East is a social and political religion. It sanctions the existing civil order and family life. It is religion that forms the basis of social inequality. * * * Many Eastern tribes have not yet finally settled as agriculturists (the Kirghiz, Turkoman, Arabs, tribes of Northern India, Kurds, etc.); nevertheless, in their midst the odds and ends of patrimonial Communism long ago became the source of exploitation of the destitute majority by the wealthy patrimonial chieftains."†

* See *The Communist Internationale*, No. 15, pp. 3148-3150, Petrograd, December, 1920.

† See Safaroff's article, "The East and the Revolution," published in No. 15 of *The Communist Internationale*, pp. 3137 and 3138.

Another author, referring more specifically to Persia, makes this remark:

“Persia is neither a state nor a nation. She is a peculiar conglomeration of feudal anarchy and a centralized fiscal system; a wavering assimilation of nomadic tribes and agriculturists, weakly linked to their lands, a monarchical federation; or, to be more precise, a Shah herd of various tribes.”*

The Red rulers of Moscow, who are so particular about matters concerning the Marxian program, and who have been fighting for the “purity” of the Communist dogma, suddenly become quite apathetic when their doctrine is propagated amongst the Eastern peoples. They know that conceptions of Socialism are entirely alien to the mind of a Buddhist or a Brahmanist. In fact, when Barantulla, a Hindoo professor, arrived in Moscow at the head of the Afghan Mission, he hastened to explain:

“I am neither a Communist nor a Socialist, but my political program involves the expulsion of the British from Asia. I am an implacable foe of the European capitalization of Asia, the principal representatives of which are the British. In this I approximate to the Communists, and in this respect we are natural comrades. The ideas of the Bolsheviks, whom we call the ‘*Intraktion*’ have already been absorbed by the masses of India, and

* Compare with V. Berar's “Persia and the Persian Upheaval of 1912,” p. 10. Translation from the Russian.

a small spark of active propaganda is enough to set all Central Asia ablaze with revolution.”*

The economic situation in Asia is everywhere the same: The cultural backwardness of Asiatic tribes and nations, the absence of industrial development, the theocratic foundation of Eastern States, stand in diametrical contradiction to the *theory* of Communism; and yet everywhere Communist *propaganda* is rapidly gaining way among the Asiatic masses. It is true that tremendous sums were spent by the Soviets for revolutionary agitation in the East. According to a confidential report of the Cheka, dated July 25, 1921, out of 16,200 poods of gold requisitioned by the Bolsheviki during the first six months of that year, the major part was expended for revolutionary purposes in India.

When Urin, alias Dzevaltvosky, proceeded to China in the rôle of Soviet Ambassador, he carried in his luggage a bag containing 3 poods and 22 pounds of gems and precious stones, which were later exchanged for Chinese dollars and spent for propaganda.

The Bolshevist scheme of the Red East is an adroit plan in which even minor details of the work have been discussed at length and scrupulously weighed. Its general outline, however, is based upon the plain fact of the discontent among the masses inhabiting the Asiatic Con-

* Compare *Izvestia*, May 6, 1922.

continent. This is the great premise from which the deduction is drawn that subconscious fermentation among the Eastern peoples must be used *ad majorem Marxi gloriam*. To this end, all means are acceptable, all methods should be tried, all destructive forces set in motion.

When laying out their strategic plans, the Bolsheviki took into consideration that Asia is a land where all varieties of climate are found, where every tribe has peculiar customs of its own, religious traditions unknown to other ethnographic groups. Accordingly, propaganda and organization methods employed in Eastern countries had to be adapted to the individual character of the people with whom Soviet agitators came into contact.

A special institution was established in Moscow for the study of the different dialects spoken by Asiatic tribes, and their exotic habits. The whole map of Asia was divided into sections and zones and assigned to Soviet agents who are considered experts on the Eastern problem. They are given authority to form on their own initiative such agencies as are required for the success of the Communist offensive. As a typical example of Soviet "achievements" in that line, the Far Eastern Communist organization may be mentioned. Chita, the capital of the Transbaikal region,* was made

* The Soviets have carved out of this region a camouflage buffer state known as the "Far Eastern Republic."

the general headquarters for the Eastern Asiatic zone, comprising China, Japan, Korea and Eastern Siberia. China is subdivided into four belts, with Peking, Tien-Tsin, Canton and Shanghai, serving as communicating centers. Each of them has business ramifications of its own, subordinate to the local Soviet chiefs. Thus, the Shanghai organization, which probably is the strongest among the Chinese groups, works through the following subsidiaries:

- (a) The Chinese Labor Party, Gun-Dan-Koui, which disposes of considerable funds. Its members are conducting propaganda mainly among the army units. It also is engaged in buying munitions and supplies for rebel soldiers. This party publishes in Shanghai two newspapers and one underground organ, *Jan-Bao*.
- (b) The Chinese Students' Federation.
- (c) The Chinese Labor Union.
- (d) The Korean National Organization.
- (e) The Zionist Group.
- (f) The Esperanto Club.
- (g) A Special Committee which prints *The Shanghai Life*.

Propaganda, purchase of munitions, and espionage, are the three main lines of work in which the Shanghai Communist Center is engaged.

Many obstacles had to be overcome by the Soviets before they were able to solve, at least in part, their revolutionary task. First of all,

traveling through the steppes, deserts and mountain passes in Asia is a hazardous undertaking which cannot be attempted without experienced guides from among the natives. There also comes the question of dialects. Oftentimes two tribes which have lived side by side for many years do not understand each other due to the differences in their speech. Therefore, a special staff of interpreters or dragomans was necessary to enable the Moscow agitators to carry on their work. The principal difficulty, however, with which the Bolsheviks still have to contend is what they call the "religious prejudices" of the Orientals. In Asiatic countries straightforward attacks against religious faith are liable to produce results entirely opposite to those intended. Respect for the clergy there has always been an inherent duty, an integral part of the habitual mode of life. The Koran for the Mohammedans, like the Talmud for the Hebrews, is not merely a Book of Prayer; it is a code of laws and regulations which govern their daily conduct. In the light of these considerations, the Bolsheviks themselves were compelled to modify their standard methods of propaganda. The Soviet "instructions" to the Red East agents contain this interesting paragraph:

"Religious prejudices are far stronger among the Mohammedan peoples than among Russian and other European peasantry and proletariat.

* * * Because of this fact, great care must be exercised in combating religious prejudices. These should not be fought by open repudiation but by means of gradually undermining the same by propaganda . . . especially by emphasizing the class character of the institutions controlled by the Mohammedan clergy and their greedy attitude toward the needy classes of the population.’’*

Following this recipe, the Bolsheviki, when acting on Asiatic soil, refrain from insulting the native clergy. They tame their arrogance with cunning, they appeal to the lowest instincts of human nature. Wherever they find a solid trunk of faith, they plant the seed of doubt; they work like worms, and little by little, step by step, they shake loose the rock stability of eternal tradition.

But Oriental psychology is impregnated not only with religious principles, but also with deeply rooted conceptions of *nationalism*, which have for their source the economic seclusion of Eastern tribes. The Soviets quickly grasped that Eastern nationalism could not be defeated by Marxian internationalism. On the other hand, however, they found that nationalistic agitation, inasmuch as its nature was rebellious, could be effectively used for furthering the Communist program. Consequently, Soviet agents were instructed to render their support

* For further details relating to these “instructions” see Brasol’s “The World at the Crossroads,” p. 316.

to such movements as Gandhism in India, Poale-Zionism in Palestine, and Kemalism in Anatolia. Similarly, the Korean movement, which is purely nationalistic in its aims, is being backed by the Komintern.

It goes without saying that manoeuvring of this kind digresses a long way from the Communist dogma as outlined by Marx and professed by modern augurs of Socialism. But with the Communists, it is always so: the end justifies the means. Anything is good so long as it leads to a "Soviet Republic."

The economic policy to be pursued in the Red East was thus defined by Safaroff:

"An alliance of the peasants' Soviet Republics of the East with the Socialist Soviet Republics of the West, such is the path of Communism for the seizure of world economics. * * * It is by this method only that it will become possible to put an end to the colonial dependence of the Eastern peoples upon European and American banks, trusts and syndicates."*

There is no chance for Communism to triumph in Asia. Yet under the pressure of Soviet teaching, the East is being rapidly revolutionized. Race is being thrown against race, creed against creed. No Communists are there among the Eastern nomadic tribes, but duped millions are looking forward to the bleeding

* See Safaroff's article previously quoted.

heart of Russia. The exact number of such unconscious supporters is unknown. At the time of the Washington Conference, however, experts on the Oriental situation made the following rough estimate:

<i>China</i> : Soviet sympathizers, most of whom are armed	1,000,000
<i>Afghanistan</i> : Native Red troops....	80,000
<i>Persia</i> : Native Red troops.....	35,000
<i>India</i> : Natives in sympathy with the Intrakion movement and followers of Gandhi	800,000
<i>Mongolia</i> : Native Soviet supporters, all of whom are armed.....	43,000
	<hr/>
Total	1,958,000

For the Komintern, the great task is to set Asia on fire, to unite all rebel elements into one force, to combine the Red danger with the Yellow, strengthening the tension until finally the colossal discharge of revolutionary energy takes on the form of a new invasion of Europe. Then the epoch of Attila will be revived.

Innumerable leaflets and pamphlets have been distributed among Asiatic peoples, picturing Red Moscow as the Mecca of the East, and Lenin as the Mohammed of the Twentieth Century. On the highways to Tibet and India, from the Red Sea to the Pacific, from Punjab to the Arctic Ocean, Soviet agitators and spies are sneaking and whispering into the ears of

the natives deceitful stories about the heroic deeds of Red Russia and her altruistic struggle for the good of the exploited and oppressed. At times, to make their tales more enticing, Oriental legends are woven in.

A folklore lives among the Eastern peoples: It tells that in days gone by, when the invading clans of Chingishan were sweeping westward over the plains of Asia, they encountered the Sopot, a small and peaceful Mongol tribe which lived on the mountain slopes in Northern China. Their religion forbade the shedding of human blood and they refused to join the hordes of the stern ruler. Chingishan without delay dispatched a special detachment to capture the Sopot Khans. But the Great Khutúkhta, the Sopot King, together with his tribesmen, fled across the mountains. Suddenly, however, a wide and deep river barred Khutúkhta in his flight. Imminent was the danger for the pursuing soldiers of Chingishan were near. Khutúkhta then fell upon his knees, praying Heaven to save him and his good people. These prayers were heard by Lama, and on the river bank a cavern was discovered through which the whole tribe, headed by their sovereign, escaped to the Subterranean Kingdom, the realm of eternal peace and justice, where—it is said—the Great Khutúkhta still rules over his happy subjects. Such is the legend.

In our time, the Lamaites believe that as a

reward for pious life, when death comes, they will be led to the domain of restful shadows, where Great Khutúkhta reigns.

Combining this folklore with propaganda, the Bolsheviki are spreading rumors that Lenin has found the way to the Subterranean Kingdom, and that he saw the Great Khutúkhta, who told him to convey a message to the Lama-ites, advising them that their hopes will be fulfilled as soon as they embrace the Communistic doctrine. Thus, in the humble mind of the Mongolian herdsman, Lenin's name becomes connected with thoughts and hopes that are held sacred to his heart.

From mouth to mouth, from tribe to tribe, insidious propaganda is spreading like fire on a prairie.

It is the Red dawn of the East.

Is anything being done to arrest the growing danger?—

Now and then warnings are being served upon those who in their hands hold the fate of Christian civilization.

But these distracted voices seem to be lost in the wilderness of invincible apathy.

Here and there people temporarily pull together in an endeavor to stem the tide of hatred and destruction, surging from Red Moscow. Yet how weak are these sporadic efforts.

The principal fact remains unnoticed, that

peace on earth will never be achieved so long as a great nation is left in the mad clutches of its present rulers. In vain are the attempts to untie the Gordian knot of Bolshevism by conferences with those whose hands are besmirched with the blood of the Russian people. Idle is the hope to tame the beast by feeding him with human flesh. Bolshevism cannot be conquered by flirting with Trotzky in the backyard of European politics.

Moral courage is the one great thing which is imperative at this solemn hour of history. Had every European premier emulated the wise example of Mr. Hughes, Sovietism long ago would have collapsed and Russia been liberated for her own sake and for the benefit of mankind. The impotency of Western Europe to adequately deal with the Communist plague is unmistakably demonstrated by the fact itself that so far the nations on the other side have utterly failed to work out a uniform policy on a subject which is of greater importance than the Irish question, the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty, or the formation of a League of Nations. For after all, what has been the European attitude towards Sovietism? It was neither peace nor war.

Even France, which in the whole concert of Continental States has taken a more aggressive course regarding Communism, proved thoroughly incapable of setting the *moral principle*

in the foreground. France, too, laid emphasis on minor egotistic considerations, on the restoration of private property seized by the Soviets from foreign citizens, and other technicalities—as though these and similar matters could bear a decisive influence upon the far-reaching issues of the eternal conflict between Judas and Christ.

The historic “To be or not to be,” of course, is not confined to the speculative guess whether Russia will or will not pay her foreign debt. No doubt is there that Russia will pay the moment she is restored to normal life. But it is also clear that a régime that shows on its balance sheet fraudulent bankruptcy cannot and will not justly settle the claims of foreign countries. The center of gravity, therefore, does not rest in this phase of the dispute, for it is ethics rather than economics that must be called into council.

Now it is time to realize that in the great traffic of life there are nobler aspirations than the petty strife for larger interest and higher wages. Dostojevsky once proposed this question: “If the happiness of a nation had to depend upon the murder of *only one* innocent child, would we accept his life in payment for our welfare?” This is the crucial point, in fact, the climax of the world drama.

If Western peoples feel prepared to sacrifice Russia on the counter of mercantile hopes and

calculations, if Russia is the price which must be paid to satisfy shortsighted avarice and the pernicious ambitions of foreign countries, then let those nations start at once their petty trade with Lenin, their Shylock bargaining with Trotzky. But if the price at stake is found too high, the thirty shekels offered for Russia's existence must be rejected, and new modes evolved that are designed to build not merely with stones and plaster, but with the refined fabrics of high ideals and noble wisdom.

Sovietism has become a deadly menace to universal order. Its challenge must be met with valiant resolve. Where the coward has failed, the brave will win.

The storm of war is near; its roarings can be heard. No time is there to waste. All the reserve forces of civilization must be summoned and placed on the firing-line to check the advance of the invading hordes. The great battle must not be evaded, for vital issues cannot be avoided.

The triumph of Bolshevism would mean death to Christianity. The triumph of Christianity will be the death of Bolshevism.

The Cross shall conquer.

